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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
WORKERS5 COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter referred to as "WCF") is a 
statutorily created quasi-public corporation which functions as a mutual insurance 
company and sells workers' compensation insurance to Utah employers. WCF operates 
as and is regulated like a private insurance company. 
The theory advanced by Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Ellingsworth" or 
"Appellant"), that WCF is a state agency subject to the Fourth Amendment, is of critical 
concern to WCF as such a conclusion is contrary to WCF's enabling legislation and 
would have consequences beyond the issues herein. 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
WCF agrees with and adopts Appellee's Statement of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The only issue briefed by WCF is: 
1. Whether the district court properly found there was no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment by WCF when it reviewed Apellant's medical records and provided 
the records to law enforcement authorities. The standard of review is as follows: 
The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, but the 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given 
to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. 
State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Statutes 
Title 31 A, Chapter 33, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, with a cross 
reference to 1994 provisions which are substantially the same, is provided in Appendix 
A 
Selected provisions of Title 34, Chapter 1, Labor Commission, and Chapter 2, 
Workers Compensation Act, with a cross reference to 1994 provisions which are 
substantially the same, are provided in Appendix B. 
Rules 
Labor Commission, Workers Compensation Rules - R612-2-22. Medical Records 
(October, 1997) (Appendix C. provides a copy of this rule and the rule in effect in 1994 -
R568-2-21. Medical Records, which is substantially the same as rule R612-2-22.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
WCF adopts the Statement of the Case in Appellee's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
WCF adopts the Statement of the Facts in Appellee's Brief. 
2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted Appellant's medical records as evidence because 
WCF actions are not government actions subject to the Fourth Amendment. WCF is a 
privately owned insurance company which operates as and is regulated like any other 
insurance company. Like other insurance companies, WCF's investigates claims for 
possible fraud to protect its own interest and the interests its policyholders. Treating 
WCF differently than other insurance companies violates its constitutional due process 
and equal protection rights by limiting its ability to provide admissible evidence to law 
enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution of those who commit workers' 
compensation insurance fraud against WCF and its policyholders. 
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because Appellant did not 
meet her burden of proof that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to 
medical records voluntarily provided to WCF to evaluate her eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits. WCF was entitled to receive her medical records to evaluate her 
claim, including evaluation for potential fraud. WCF's actions did not exceed the the 
scope of the medical release form signed by Appellant.1 
1
 All of these arguments bear on the Fourth Amendment issue raised and decided below 
in the trial court, specifically whether WCF violated the Fourth Amendment. Although 
not all of the analysis was part of the district court's ruling, "[it] is well accepted . . . that 
without filing a cross-appeal... an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the 
record in support of the judgment below." Schwiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 585 (1982). 
Our brief here supports appellee State of Utah and presents purely legal arguments based 
on the existing record for supporting the judgment below by affirming the district court's 
ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. While we understand that many of our arguments 
will track the thrust of arguments made here by the state, that is in no way required for 
amicus briefs, particulary where (as here) the particular interest of the state and WCF 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO WCF BECAUSE ACTIONS TAKEN BY WCF ARE NOT 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. 
The district court properly refused to suppress Appellant's medical records 
because the Fourth Amendment does not govern activities of WCF. The Fourth 
Amendment applies only to government actions, not the independent acts of private 
citizens. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988). "The protection of the Fourth 
Amendment is a restraint only upon the activities of sovereign authority and is not 
applicable to the searches and seizures by any persons other than government officers and 
agents." State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972). Employees of WCF who 
examine medical records to verify the validity of a submitted workers' compensation 
claim are not "government officers and agents" conducting "searches and seizures" 
subject to the Fourth Amendment. The burden of establishing that the search was a 
government search rests on the appellant. See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 . 
Although the question of who qualifies as a "government officer or agent," 
Newbold, 581 P.2d at 992, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment has not been 
extensively litigated, the available cases require that any alleged search "must be fairly 
attributable to the state" and must "emanat[e] from the authority of the State." 
Commonwealth v. Price, 672 A.3d 280, 283, 284 (Pa. 1996). Following this general 
may differ somewhat. Indeed, the whole purpose of an amicus brief is to present new 
(and hopefully helpful) analysis of an issue raised by the parties. See Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989). 
4 
approach, the cases have found governmental action in searches by police officers acting 
under apparent governmental authority. On the other hand, the cases find no state action 
in searches by private actors, even when they perform functions that might appear to 
i 
involve law enforcement functions.3 For Fourth Amendment purposes, public utilities, 
although highly regulated by state government are considered to be private actors. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Cote, 444 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. App. 1983), appeal denied, 448 
2
 See, e.g., id. at 284 (finding state action where FBI agent in unmarked government 
vehicle used lights and sirens to stop suspect); State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 
1996) (if off-duty police officer employed as private security guard conducts a search 
"pursuant to his or her authority as a police officer, then officer would be acting on behalf 
of the state and would, therefore, be required to comply with the constitution"); In re 
Albert S., 664 A.2d 476, 484-85 (Md. App. 1995) (off-duty officer employed as security 
guard must comply with Fourth Amendment when stopping and searching an automobile; 
whether state action exists for purposes of constitution in a given case is not measured by 
the primary occupation of actor, but by capacity in which he or she acts at the time in 
question); State v. Wilkerson, 367 So.2d 319 (La. 1979) (deputy sheriff working as 
security guard subject to the Fourth Amendment because, he "remains at all times a 
member of the law enforcement agency, charged with greater knowledge and 
responsibility in criminal affairs"); see also State v. State, 937 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (Salt Lake City police officer a "state actor" in investigation of child abuse 
report); cf Goodwin v. State, 474 S.E.2d 84, 86 (Ga. App. 1996) (off-duty officer 
working as a security guard at a hotel was not acting as police officer when, pursuant to 
employer's instructions, he stopped each car driving on to the premises to ask whether the 
occupants were hotel guests; herefore officer was not required to comply with 
constitutional limitations). 
3
 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 673 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) cert, denied 675 
A.2d 886 (Conn. 1996), cert, denied, Smith v. Connecticut, 117 S.Ct. 191, 136 L.Ed.2d 
128 (1996) (court properly admitted evidence obtained by insurance company arson 
investigator to prosecute arsonist); Davis v. States, 344 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. App. 1986) 
(evidence obtained by private fire insurance company investigators properly admitted in 
arson prosecution); Commonwealth v. Corley, 491 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1985) (security guard 
not a state actor); State v. Hutson, 649 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Term. Crim. App. 1982) (industrial 
security guard not a state actor "unless the security guard has powers akin to that of a 
regular police officer"); United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(security officer at bank not state actor); United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 
5 
N.E.2d 766 (Fourth Amendment does not apply to search by employees of public utility 
employed by municipality; "The mere fact of State regulation of a public utility does not 
imply State action whenever the utility acts, in the absence of some relationship between 
the State and the challenged action."); United States v. Cleveland, 38 F.3d 1092, 1093-94 
(9th Cir. 1994) (Portland General Electric Company search of power meter on private 
property, accomplished in conjunction with law enforcement officer, not subject to the 
Fourth Amendment); Von Lusch v. State, 387 A.2d 306, 310 (Md. App. 1978) (illegal 
installation of pen register by Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company not subject 
to Fourth Amendment); State v. Hruska, 547 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Kan. 1976) 
(Southwestern Bell Telephone Company could properly monitor telephone numbers 
called and make them available to the police). 
Moreover, a victim of a crime (like WCF in this matter) may undertake to 
investigate that crime without becoming subject to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., 
State v. Smith, 673 A.2d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) cert, denied 675 A.2d 886 (Conn. 
1996), cert, denied, Smith v. Connecticut, 117 S.Ct. 191, 136 L.Ed.2d 128 (1996) (court 
properly admitted evidence obtained by insurance company arson investigator to 
prosecute arsonist); Ex parte Hilley, 484 So.2d 485, 490 (Ala. 1985) (court properly 
admitted evidence obtained by sister of a murder victim where police had not instigate 
the search); State v. Rice, 516 P.2d 1222 (Ariz. 1973) (evidence taken from defendant's 
house by father of child abuse victims properly admitted). 
(8th Cir. 1990) (police informant directed to participate in narcotic purchases discovered 
marijuana while trespassing on private property; held to be a private search). 
6 
Even where a private actor is performing a public function, the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply so long as the private actor has its own interests for 
undertaking a search or seizure. For example, in People v. Houle, 13 Cal.App.3d 892 
(1970), the court found that a bail bondsman had not engaged in state action in 
apprehending a defendant who failed to appear in court. The bondsman was "acting to 
protect his own private financial interest and not to vindicate the interest of the state." Id. 
at 895. Similarly, in State v. Bryant, 325 So.2d 255 (La. 1975), police called a towing 
company to impound a defendant's car. The towing company's inventory of the car was 
a private search, the court concluded, because the station owner "testified that he 
conducted the search for his own protection again liability which would arise if it were 
claimed that articles in the car were missing while it was stored under his care." Id. at 
259. 
With the foregoing legal landscape in mind, WCF is clearly not a government 
actor for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In making this determination, the court 
might find useful doctrines in other areas of the law. For example, in determining 
whether an entity is the "state" for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
federal suits, courts look at such factors as (1) how state law characterizes the entity; (2) 
whether the entity is autonomous and free from the control of the state; and (3) whether 
the judgment against the entity would ultimately be paid by the state. Simon v. State 
Compensation Ins. Auth., 946 P.2d 1298, 1305 (Colo. 1997).4 While doctrines for 
The Eleventh Amendment "arm of the state" analysis is also used to determine whether 
a state entity is a person under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 
7 
determining a "state actor" in other areas of the law may be broader than Fourth 
Amendment standards,5 even under this more sweeping standard WCF simply cannot be 
considered part of the state. A review of WCF's corporate and legal status will show that 
WCF is not a "government actor" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Utah Statutes and Case Law Demonstrate That WCF Is Not a Government 
Actor. 
To understand how state law characterizes WCF, several factors should be 
considered: 1) WCF's enabling legislation, 2) Utah case law describing the status and 
nature of WCF, and 3) the application of Utah law in general to WCF. Examination of 
these factors will demonstrate that WCF is essentially a private insurance company 
subject to the same Utah laws as other private insurance companies. 
i. WCF's Enabling Legislation 
WCF's statutory status as a quasi-public corporation does not make it a 
government actor subject to the Fourth Amendment. A brief review of WCF's legislative 
history demonstrates a legislative intent to distance WCF from state government and limit 
state control over WCF.6 From 1917 until 1988, WCF's legal status was that of an 
1983). See Simon, 946 P.2d at 1302 (finding that the Colorado State Compensation 
Insurance Fund was not an arm of the state and could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
5
 There are situations, for example, where an entity might be a "state actor" but 
nonetheless not covered by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. McKendrick, 
468 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("unlike the 'state actor' requirement of the 
fourteenth amendment, the fourth amendment cannot be triggered simply because a 
person is acting on behalf of the government. Instead, the fourth amendment will only 
apply to governmental conduct that can reasonably be characterized as a "search" or a 
seizure.") 
6
 Debate on Senate Bill 19, Senate, General Session of 47th Legislature, Day 11, 1/21/88. 
Record #17 beginning at side #1 at 22, ending at side #2 at 6. 
8 
independent agency under various executive branch departments in state government. 
However, in 1988, the Utah legislature passed S.B. 19 which changed WCF's legal status 
to that of a "nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation an independent state 
agency and a body politic and corporate."8 Act of Feb. 4,1988, ch.56, 1988 Utah Laws 
373, 374 § 4 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 35-3-3 (1988)). These legislative changes 
were made after a 1987 study of WCF was completed in a follow-up to a governor's 
study on the reorganization of the executive branch of government. One of two 
alternative recommendations of the 1987 study was that WCF "be granted autonomy 
from state controls and given the status of a quasi-public corporation, with a policyholder 
board of directors holding fiduciary responsibility for [WCF] and its operations." Greg 
Johnson, Research Analyst, Organizational Report Workers Compensation Fund p. 26 
(Sept. 1987). (Appendix D). WCF's newly created board of directors was made trustee 
of and given fiduciary duties over WCF's assets (the Injury Fund) however, the Injury 
Fund was still referred to as an enterprise fund. 1988 Utah Laws at 374-376, §§ 4, 5, & 9 
7
 WCF was created in 1917, at the same time Utah enacted its first workers' 
compensation laws. 
o 
The term "body politic and corporate" been applied to municipal corporations, school 
districts, state, or nation associations. Black's Law Dictionary 107 (6th ed. 1990). 
9 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-3-1, 35-3-2 & 35-3-6 (1988)).9 The State Treasurer 
was no longer custodian of the Injury Fund. 1988 Utah Laws 373.10 
In 1990, additional changes were made to WCF's enabling legislation to further 
clarify its status. The language referring to WCF as a "independent agency" and "a body 
politic and corporate" was deleted, as was all reference to WCF's assets (the Injury Fund) 
as an "enterprise fund." Act of Jan. 24, 1990, ch. 24, 1990 Utah Laws 132 (codified as 
amended at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-101 et. al. (Supp. 1997)).11 WCF's statutory 
status as a quasi-public corporation has remained unchanged since then. 
A quasi-public corporation is not defined in Utah law. Quasi-public corporations 
have been described as "private corporations which have accepted from the state the 
grant of a franchise or contract involving the performance of public duties." 1 William 
Meade Fletcher Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 63 (Charles 
R.P Keating & Gail O'Gradney, 1990 Revised Volume). WCF is a private corporation 
because it is not owned by the state but is owned by its policyholders.12 Its "public duty" 
9
 Prior to 1988, WCF was not under the control of a board of directors but was part of the 
Department of Administrative Services, and the State Treasurer was custodian of the 
Injury Fund. Utah Code §§ 35-3-1, 35-3-13. (1987). After 1988 WCF's assets continued 
to be referred to as the Injury Fund in its enabling legislation although the Injury Fund 
had no separate legal existence and consisted of the premiums paid to WCF, interest and 
any other income. 
10
 Utah Code § 35-3-13 (1987) which stated "[t]he state treasurer shall be the custodian of 
all money and other invested assets or the fund and shall provide investment services for 
the fund, subject to the provisions of the State Money Management Act of 1974, Chapter 
7, Title 51" was repealed. 
11
 WCF and the state severed many ties during this 1988-90 period, including removing 
WCF employees from the state personnel system and ending the participation of WCF in 
State Risk Management. 
12
 See Argument I.C. 
10 
is to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for all Utah employers who 
apply for coverage and also to be a competitive source of workers' compensation 
insurance in Utah's workers' compensation system. Thus, it satisfies the two 
requirements for a quasi-public corporation. 
ii. Utah Case Law Describing WCF 
The Utah Supreme Court has had several occasions to comment on WCF's status 
and nature and has repeatedly characterized WCF as a mutual insurance company owned 
by its policyholders. For example, in Chez v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 62 P.2d 
549 (Utah 1936), the court was asked to address the proper means to dispose of an 
indebtedness to the State Insurance Fund.14 In characterizing the State Insurance Fund, 
the court stated: 
[The State Insurance Fund] is no different than if the state and a number of private 
employers agreed to establish their own fund. It was made easier by setting up a 
skeleton Fund to begin with, giving the Industrial Commission the administration 
of it and providing by law for rules and regulations to govern it. That reached 
more quickly and more easily the same result as a mutual company would have 
reached.... It was a venture by the state as an employer and certain private 
employers who choose to come in, in which they pooled their premiums to create 
a fund for the purpose of paying, not a State obligation or making expenditures on 
behalf of the state, but of paying their own contingent compensation liability. Any 
Employers in Utah must provide workers' compensation coverage by either 1) 
purchasing insurance from a private carrier, 2) purchasing insurance from WCF, or 3) 
self-insuring. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201(l) (1997). Because workers' compensation 
coverage is mandatory, the state must provide a mechanism to ensure all employers can 
get coverage. There are several mechanisms available. For example, some states have 
assigned risk pools which cover employers who are unable to purchase insurance from 
insurance carriers. All insurance carriers writing insurance in the state would share in the 
premiums and losses of the assigned risk pool based on their market share in the state. In 
Utah, WCF has been designated by statute as the carrier which will cover any employer 
who applies for a policy. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1001 (1997). 
14
 Prior to 1986, WCF's name was the State Insurance Fund. 
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indebtedness or obligation to such a fund, whether for premium payments, or 
principle or interest on securities invested in, is not an indebtedness or obligation 
or liability to the state as meant by section 27 art. 6 of our Constitution.... If the 
Legislature decided to discontinue the State [Insurance] Fund, upon liquidation 
anything not needed to pay contingencies would be returned to the contributing 
employers. 
Id. at 550-51. 
Similarly, in State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 
(Utah 1978 the Utah Supreme Court held that the state's imposition of a special premium 
tax on the State Insurance Fund was arbitrary and violated equal protection. The court 
stated: 
The assets of the Fund exist only to cover the identical obligations covered by 
private insurers. The Fund has the same administrative costs as private insurers: 
establishment of premium and hazard rates, procedures for analyzing claims and 
making disbursements, reinsurance considerations. Fund investment decisions, 
collection procedures, legal fees and policy issuance. These administrative costs 
and other expenses are deducted from the Fund by legislative appropriations of 
Fund money. The Fund has the same rights to sue and be sued and make contracts 
that a private insurer has. The Fund enjoys no immunities not provided to private 
insurers. 
Id. at 1298-99. 
Finally, in Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court 
held an unconstitutional certain legislative enactments appropriating monies from the 
State Insurance Fund to pay for safety programs operated by the Industrial Commission. 
The court stated: 
The Insurance Fund is not an arm of the State to enforce requirements calling for 
safe places of employment, safety devices, safeguards, work methods and 
processes 
The money in the Fund is not public money subject to appropriation to meet 
expenses of the government. It is a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of 
12 
employers when an employee is entitled to compensation. If the appropriation 
were to be made it would amount to a seizure of trust funds for State purposes 
without due process of law. 
Id. at 691-92. See also, Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah 
1982) (concluding that the State Insurance Fund operates essentially as a private 
insurance company and its funds are trust funds for an insurance program designed to 
protect private persons.) 
In summary, these cases characterize WCF as essentially a private mutual 
insurance company that was publicly administered. It is important to note that these 
cases were decided before 1988, when WCF's statutory status was that of an independent 
state agency. Since the 1988-90 legislative changes, WCF is no longer a state agency, 
but a quasi-public corporation, operated by a board of directors with its assets owned by 
policyholders. 
WCF's status as a quasi-public corporation does not, ipso facto, make the Fourth 
Amendment applicable to its actions. The Appellant relies on Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto 
Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997), which concluded that the Fourth Amendment 
applied to the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC). However, that case did not 
adjudicate the governmental actor issue, but simply applied binding circuit precedent 
which had held that the PRTC was "an instrumentality of the Government of Puerto 
Rico," a holding that in turn relied on a binding description of the Puerto Rican Supreme 
Court. See Kauffmanv. PRTC, 841 F.2d 1169, 1170 (1st Cir. 1998) (relying on Torres-
Ponce v. Jimenez, 113 P.R.Dec. 58 (1982) (official English translation: No. R-81-161, 
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slip. op. (P.R. June 2, 1982)). Given the case law in Utah that takes a decidedly different 
view of the status of WCF, Vega-Rodriguez has no application here. 
While case law alone is enough to distinguish the case, it is also important to 
emphasize that PRTC is not a "quasi-public corporation" by statute. PRTC is wholly 
owned by the Puerto Rico Telephone Authority (PRTA) which is a "body corporate and 
politic constituting a public corporation and government instrumentality of the 
commonwealth of Puerto Rico " P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 § 404 (1991). (See n. 9 for a 
definition of a "public corporation.'9) PRTA is the sole shareholder of PRTC and as such 
the PRTA board of directors is the board of directors for PRTC and PRTA's Executive 
Director is the President of PRTC. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 § 405. PRTC is subject to 
fiscal supervision of the Controller of Puerto Rico. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 § 409. PRTC 
is exempt from property taxes. P.R. Laws Ann. 27 § 411. Although the court in Vega-
Rodriguez chose to describe PRTC as a quasi-public corporation, PRTC is not the same 
type of entity as WCF, and thus, Vega-Rodriguez is not relevant. 
iii. General Application Of Utah Law To WCF. 
State statutes applying to governmental entities do not govern WCF's operations. 
WCF's enabling legislation specifically exempts WCF from certain statutes. Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-33-104 (Supp. 1997) (exempting WCF from Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act, and Title 63 A, Utah Administrative 
Services Code). However, WCF's operations are not governed by other statutes that 
apply to state entities even though WCF's enabling legislation does not specifically 
exempt it from these statutes. For example, WCF is not governed by Title 51, Public 
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Funds and Accounts; Title 52, Public Officers; Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental 
Immunity Act (discussed below); and Title 63 A, Chapter 4, Risk Management. 
As a quasi-public corporation, WCF is not covered by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. The Governmental Immunity Act covers the state and its political 
subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) (1997.) WCF is not a political subdivision 
as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7).15 WCF is not the "state" as defined in Utah 
Code Ann § 63-30-2(9) as it is a corporation which has a separate legal identity, and can 
sue and be sued in its own name.16 Since 1990, when the Utah legislature removed 
language from WCF's enabling legislation which referred to WCF as "an independent 
agency" and "a body politic and corporate" and referred to WCF's assets (the Injury 
Fund) as an enterprise fund, WCF has notbeen covered by the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
Contrary to the Appellant's assertion, Utah Code Ann § 35-3-8 (1994) 
(renumbered § 31A-33-109) does not extend governmental immunity to good faith 
"Public corporations" are included in the definition of political subdivisions in the 
Government Immunity Act. However, a quasi-public corporation is not a "public 
corporation." A "public corporation" has been described as follows: "Public support or 
revenues and properties and public control are marks of a public corporation. The whole 
interest must belong to the government or at least be subject to governmental control. If 
the whole interest does not belong to the public or if the corporation is not created for the 
administration of political or municipal powers, it is a private corporation." 1 William 
Meade Fletcher Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 58, p.878 
(Charles R.P Keating & Gail O'Gradney, 1990 Revised Volume). 
16
 Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-103(l)(b) (1997) states that WCF is a "legal entity, that 
may sue and be sued in its own name." 
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actions of WCF's officers and employees. If that was the legislature's intent, the 
legislature could have plainly stated that WCF was covered by the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Rather, the legislature was providing liability protection for WCF 
officers, employees and directors which, to some extent, was also available to private 
corporations under Utah corporate law.18 
WCF is subject to the general laws of the state like any other private corporations. 
WCF has Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws which have been filed with the 
appropriate regulatory agencies. Like other workers' compensation insurance companies, 
WCF is regulated by the Labor Commission and the Insurance Commission and is 
subject to workers' compensation and insurance laws and regulations.19 WCF pays 
premium taxes and other workers' compensation and insurance assessments, and pays 
state property and sales taxes. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that the due process and equal 
protection guarantees of the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution apply to 
WCF. In Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 690 (Utah 1977) the court held that the 
legislature's appropriation of WCF's assets was "a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bingham v. Bd. of Education, 223 P.2d 432 
(Utah 1950) is not relevant in this case. The court's discussion on whether school boards 
had government immunity for nuisances focused on the distinction between municipal 
corporations and quasi-municipal corporations. The court's quote of from the McQuillin 
on Municipal Corporations regarding quasi-public corporations seems misplaced. 
18
 See generally, Utah Code Ann. § 16a-10a-840(4) and § 16a-10a-841 (1995). 
19
 See Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers Compensation Act and Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-
105 (1994). 
20
 See Utah Code Ann. § 59-9-10 et.al. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution."21 
Similarly, in State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 
(Utah 1978) the court held that imposing a tax on WCF and not other insurers violated 
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 2 of the 
Utah Constitution.22 The court also concluded that imposing the tax violated Article VI, 
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution, stating "[b]ecause all companies furnishing 
workmen's compensation insurance are of a single class, . . . a law operating exclusively 
upon one member of that class is constitutionally invalid as a special law." Id. at 1299.23 
B. WCF Operates Autonomously From The State. 
The State of Utah has no administrative, financial or operational control over 
WCF. Management, fiscal, and operational control, and fiduciary responsibilities for 
WCF's assets, are vested in its board of directors. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-107 (1997). 
Although WCF's board of directors is appointed by the governor, this appointment 
authority is not sufficient to conclude that the state "controls" WCF. WCF's board of 
directors does not serve at the pleasure of the governor and can the directors only be 
removed for cause. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106 (1997). The board's duties are 
specified by statute; the only "duty" the board has to the state is to "develop and publish 
21
 Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law." 
22
 Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution states "All political power is inherent in 
the people; and all free governments are found on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the 
public welfare may require." 
3
 Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution states "No private or special law shall 
be enacted where a general law can be applicable." 
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an annual report to policyholders, the governor, the legislature, and interested parties that 
describes [WCFs] financial condition " Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-107. The board 
has fiduciary responsibilities for WCF's assets (the Injury Fund). Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-33-107(1 )(e). As WCF's assets are owned by its policyholders, the board's 
fiduciary responsibilities and duties are to WCF policyholders, not the State of Utah. 
The fact that an entity's board of directors is appointed by a government official, 
does not necessarily mean that the entity is a government entity. In Metropolitan Tickets, 
Inc.v. City of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), the court reversed a trial 
court's decision that two corporations were municipal entities because the Mayor of St. 
Louis appointed most of the board of directors of the corporations. In concluding that the 
corporations were not municipal entities, the court stated: 
Neither corporation is supported by tax money, neither has the power to govern, to 
legislate, or to regulate and administer the local and internal affairs of the 
community. Of critical importance in determining that they are not governmental 
entities subject to the restrictions of the Missouri Constitution is the fact that 
neither corporation has the power to levy, collect, or to receive taxes. 
Id. at 55 (citation omitted). Like the entities in Metropolitan Tickets, WCF is not 
supported by tax money, has no power to govern, to legislate, or to regulate or administer 
any laws, and it does not have the power to levy, collect or to receive taxes. 
In addition to the governor's appointment of the board of directors, the Utah 
Legislature does have some control over WCF through its legislative powers. However, 
as discussed previously, the Utah Supreme Court has held that legislative powers over 
WCF are limited by the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 7, of the 
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Utah Constitution; and the prohibition of special laws provided in Article VI, Section 26 
of the Utah Constitution. Thus, WCF has a high degree of autonomy from the state.24 
C. The State of Utah Does Not Own WCF's Assets And Is Not Responsible 
For WCFs Liabilities. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, like any mutual insurance 
company, WCF's assets are owned by its policyholders and not the State of Utah. See, 
Chez v. Ind. Comm'n., 62 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 1936), (the fund belongs, not to the state 
but to contributing employers for their mutual benefit and upon liquidation anything not 
needed to pay contingencies would be returned to the contributing employers); Gronning 
v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1977) (the money in the fund is not public money 
subject to appropriation to meet expenses of government); Hansen v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah 1982 (the moneys paid into the fund do not 
belong to the state but to contributing employers). This is consistent with WCF's 
enabling legislation which states that the state may not use WCF's assets for any 
purposes. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-105(2) (Supp. 1997). 
The state is also not responsible for WCF's liabilities. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-
105(2) (1997) provides that the "[t]he state is not liable for the expenses, liabilities or 
debts of [WCF]. . . ." To cover certain liabilities, WCF purchases insurance coverage 
(for example, property insurance, general liability insurance, and directors and officers 
As discussed in Part A. iii. of this Argument, WCF is a regulated by both the Labor 
Commission and the Insurance Department. This regulatory authority is no different than 
the states authority to regulate other workers' compensation insurance companies and 
thus not relevant to determine WCF's autonomy from the state. 
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insurance) from private insurance companies. Any judgment against WCF would not 
be paid by the state nor would the judgment be paid with public money. Judgments 
against WCF would be paid out of WCF9s assets, which is not public money. 
The 1988-90 changes made to WCF's enabling legislation, discussed previously, 
were meant to distance WCF from the state for the purpose of shielding the state from 
liability. In addition, in 1993, the Utah Insurance Code was amended to clearly indicate 
that WCF, like other insurance carriers, was subject to the jurisdiction of the Insurance 
Commission. Act of Mar. 2, 1993, ch. 305, 1993 Utah Laws 1606 § 1 (codified as 
amended in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-105 (1994)). Thus, WCF applied for and received 
a certificate of authority to conduct insurance business in Utah. As a licensed insurance 
company, WCF is mandated by statute to participate in Utah's Property Casualty 
Guarantee Association. See, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-101 (1997). If WCF (or any 
other insurance company) is unable to meet its insurance obligations, these obligations 
would be paid by the Property Casualty Guarantee Association through an assessment of 
licensed insurance companies. 
WCF is not covered by Title 63 a, Chapter 4, State Risk Management. 
26
 Debate of Senate Bill 3, Senate, General Session of 48th Legislature, Day 8, 1/15/90. 
Tape #9, beginning at 1332, ending at 3779; Debate of Senate Bill 19, House of 
Representatives, General Session of 47th Legislature, Day 25, 2/4/88. Record #1, starting 
at 26, ending at record #2 at 6. 
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 WCF's Certificate of Authority number is 84394 which was effective April 6, 1994. 
WCF is authorized to transact workers' compensation insurance. 
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WCF receives no tax subsidy or other state subsidy of any kind and, in fact, has 
never received any subsidy from the state.28 As previously noted, WCF pays state sales 
taxes, property taxes, and premium taxes, and all insurance and workers' compensation 
assessments required of other insurance companies. 
To summarize, the Fourth Amendment is not applicable to WCF's actions because 
there is not a sufficient connection between WCF and the state to implicate WCF actions 
as governmental actions. WCF is essentially a private insurance company. It is not 
subject to or covered by state law which generally apply to state entities but rather is 
subject state law like any other private insurance company. WCF is not owned or 
controlled by the state and the state is not liable for WCF's debts. WCF's actions are 
taken in furtherance of its own interest as an insurance company, not any governmental 
interest. It has no government power or authority. Therefore, WCF is not a government 
actor subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO ACTIVITIES OF WCF BECAUSE NO DETERRENT 
PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY EXCLUDING INFORMATION 
COLLECTED BY WCF FROM CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. 
The preceding section established that WCF cannot be viewed as a governmental 
actor for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and, accordingly, that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to its activities. An alternative analysis leading to precisely 
the same conclusion is that it would make no sense to apply the Fourth Amendment 
When WCF was created in 1917 the state appropriated $40,000 from the state treasury 
for initial capital, however, this amount was to returned to the state when it was 
financially able to do so. See Compiled Laws of Utah § 49-3163 (1921). This money was 
paid back in the early 1920's. Other than the initial $40,000, WCF has not received any 
loan, subsidy, tax revenue or other form of financial assistance from the State of Utah. 
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exclusionary rule to activities of the WCF. "The question whether the exclusionary rule's 
remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as an issue separate 
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke 
the rule were violated by police conduct." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983); 
see, e.g., State in interest of A.R., 937 P.2d 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (declining to 
apply exclusionary rule to child protection proceedings), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 
(Utah 1997). 
Courts have long recognized that no purpose is served by applying the 
exclusionary rule to searches by private persons. Private persons will not be deterred 
from conducting searches where their aim is not obtaining evidence for a criminal 
prosecution, but rather their own private ends. See Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017, 
1021 (Ind. 1984) ("the exclusionary rule would serve no useful purpose as to private 
persons"). As the California Supreme Court has thoughtfully explained: 
except in unusual cases, we cannot assume that private citizens will be 
aware of an exclusionary rule, that they will be under any disciplinary 
compulsion to obey such a rule, nor that they will not be motivated in their 
conduct by reasons apart from, or in addition to, a desire to assist in 
securing a criminal conviction. The result of applying an exclusionary rule 
to cases such as the one at Bench would be to free a guilty man without any 
assurance that there would result any counterbalancing restraint of similar 
conduct in the future. 
Dyas v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 522 P.2d 674, 676 (Cal. 1974) (quoting 
People v. Botts, 250 Cal.App.2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967)). Courts have frequently 
noted that private persons are typically focused on their own interests, not the 
government's interest in obtaining criminal convictions. See, ej*., United States v. 
Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1994) (bank security personnel "were pursuing 
legitimate private ends unrelated to the pursuit of a criminal conviction," as indicated by 
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fact their investigation resulted in discharge of embezzling employee); Akins v. United 
States, 679 A.2d 1017 (D.C. App. 1996) (bail bondsman not "bound by the constraints of 
the Fourth Amendment," as the exclusionary rule "will not deter a bondsman from 
achieving his goal or, for that matter, from taking things that are not related to it"). 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has been quite reluctant to extend the exclusionary rule even 
to admitted government agents when that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
will not be served. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 n. 3 (1985) (while 
extending Fourth Amendment to searches to by school authorities, specifically cautioning 
that its holding did "not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the 
fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 
1, 15 (1995) (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to court clerks because "[t]he 
threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals). 
Here WCF had its own purposes for collecting Ellingsworth's medical records 
entirely apart from any criminal protection. Ellingsworth seems to misunderstand this 
point in asserting that WCF employees "like IRS employees, usually are involved in 
determining civil obligations but may also get involved in criminal investigations." 
Appt's Br. at 25. This simply is not true. WCF employees do not determine any civil 
obligations. Like employees of other workers' compensation insurance companies, WCF 
personnel determine whether employees filing for workers' compensation benefits under 
their employers' workers' compensation insurance policy are entitled to benefits under 
29
. In fact, the Appellant must provide her medical records to meet her burden of proof 
that she is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. See Argument III. 
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the policy. It is the Labor Commission, a state agency, which determines the "civil 
obligation" i.e. the obligation of the employer (or if the employer is insured, the 
employer's insurance carrier) to pay workers' compensation benefits as required by 
workers' compensation laws. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 (1997). 
Furthermore, WCF personnel do not conduct "criminal" investigations. Like 
employees of other workers' compensation insurance companies, they investigate claims 
to determine if the claims are valid and also if there is potential fraud. If the fraud is 
potentially criminal, they provide this information to the Utah Insurance Department's 
Special Investigations Unit for further investigation. 
WCF personnel are not acting on behalf of the state when they investigate 
workers' compensation claims. WCF's actions at issue are 1) requesting Ellingsworth's 
medical records for purposes of evaluating her workers' compensation claim, 2) 
evaluating her claim to determine whether Ellingsworth was eligible for workers' 
compensation benefits, and then determining that the claim may be fraudulent and 3) 
turning the information over to the Special Investigations Unit of the Utah Insurance 
Department. WCF does not take these actions on behalf of the state or under the 
direction of the state; these actions are part of WCF's claims handling procedures. They 
are the same procedures followed by any insurance company in adjusting a workers' 
compensation claim. WCF follows these procedures to protect employers from 
fraudulent claims by employees and in general, to protect all policyholders from the 
increased costs of workers' compensation resulting from fraud. 
24 
WCF actions at issue are, in part, based on its contractual rights and obligations 
provided for in its workers' compensation insurance policy. WCF's insurance contract 
with employers provides that WCF "has the right to investigate and settle [workers' 
compensation] claims, proceedings or suits." This contract is based on a model contract 
created by National Council of Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI) and utilized by the 
workers' compensation industry on a national basis. The contract ennunciates an 
obligation to its policyholders to investigate employee claims and deny payment of these 
claims when an employee is not entitled to payment under workers' compensation laws.30 
When WCF's investigation of a claim suggests possible criminal activity, it acts as a 
good corporate citizen and turns that information over to the state for criminal 
investigation and possible prosecution. 
Because WCF had its own independent motivation for collecting the medical 
records at issue, any application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to their 
activities would be misguided and inappropriate. "The threat of exclusion of evidence" 
in a subsequent criminal trial could not be expected to change WCF's behavior, much 
less serve the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 4 (1995) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule to actions of court clerks for this 
reason). WCF will continue to get medical records to evaluate employees' eligibility for 
i n 
An employer's premium for a workers' compensation policy is partially depended on 
its claims experience, so payment of invalid claims generally would cause the employer's 
premium to increase. 
1
 Even if WCF's motive simply to have the Appellant arrested, that would not change 
the relevant analysis. See State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 447 (Utah App. 1991) (even 
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workers' compensation benefits provided under the insurance policies it sells to 
employers. WCF will continue to investigate fraudulent claims submitted to it, regardless 
of how those claims are treated in subsequent criminal prosecution.32 
Courts have recognized that information gathered by insurance company 
investigators9 are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Smith, 673 A.2d 
1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) cert, denied 675 A.2d 886 (Conn. 1996), cert, denied, Smith 
v. Connecticut, 117 S.Ct. 191, 136 L.Ed.2d 128 (1996) the court held that evidence 
gathered by an insurance company arson investigator which was provided to police and 
subsequently suppressed by the trial court should have been admitted. The court 
concluded that insurance investigators investigating fraudulent claims were not agents of 
the state because insurance investigators have a legitimate independent motive to 
investigate. Id. at 1157. See also, Davis v. States, 344 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. App. 1986) 
(admitting evidence obtained by private fire insurance company investigators in arson 
prosecution because "[t]he investigation and collection of evidence by the appellant's 
insurer's agent was a private contractual right under the insurance policy issued by State 
Farm . . . . " ) . Similarly, WCF's investigations are done for its own private purposes and 
should not be subject to the Fourth Amendment. 
Indeed, it is hard to understand how WCF could change its behavior. A natural 
consequence of the argument advanced by Appellant is that WCF should be forced to 
motive to have defendant arrested is insufficient to convert a private citizen to a 
government actor for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
2
 WCF's fraud investigations result in reductions in liability/losses reserves for claims 
determined to be fraudulent and also civil fraud action to recover unjustified payments. 
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obtained search warrants before investigating workers' compensation claims. If WCF 
is truly subject to the "strictures of the fourth amendment" (Appt.'s Br. at 15), one of 
those strictures is the warrant requirement. However, as WCF has no governmental 
power or authority, it can not obtain a search warrant. Appellant's argument thus leads to 
the absurd consequence that WCF must comply with "strictures" of the Fourth 
Amendment and yet not have any way of satisfying those strictures. 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot be applied to WCF's 
actions which are the actions of an insurance company protecting its assets. As WCF has 
its own independent purpose for investigating fraudulent claims, no deterrent purpose is 
served by excluding information collected by WCF form criminal proceedings 
III. ONCE APPELLANT FILED A COMPENSATION CLAIM, SHE HAD NO 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN UNDERLYING MEDICAL 
RECORDS. 
Appellant has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the medical 
records underlying her workers' compensation claim. This provides an additional, 
independent basis for this Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of the motion to 
suppress. 
To trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, Appellant bears the burden of establishing 
(1) an actual (i.e., subjective) expectation of privacy that (2) society is prepared to 
recognize as objectively reasonable. See State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 n.3 (Utah 
App. 1997), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Ellingsworth cannot 
33
 Limiting WCF ability to get medical records for workers5 compensation claims would 
unnecessarily delay providing workers' compensation benefits to injured workers. 
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meet these requirements for two reasons. First, once she filed her claim, she was required 
to provide medical records to those with a legitimate interest in its validity. Indeed, the 
medical records were not "her" own records, but rather were the records of health care 
providers involved in her treatment. Accordingly, society is not prepared to recognize as 
reasonable any expectation of privacy in such records. Second, Ellingsworth signed a 
medical release form explicitly authorizing the release of the medical records to WCF. 
This form gave WCF the right to review the records and, upon discovering evidence of a 
criminal fraud, to forward the materials to the proper authorities, particularly in light of 
strong public policy encouraging person to report criminal activity. 
A. Society Is Not Prepared To Recognize As Reasonable An Expectation Of 
Privacy In Medical Records Underlying A Workers Compensation Claim. 
The workers compensation process involves close scrutiny of claims of injury. 
Ellingsworth's efforts to use that process to gain compensation benefits while 
simultaneously maintaining an expectation of privacy in medical records underlying her 
claim is not one that society would endorse as reasonable. 
In general, employees injured on the job have a legal right to workers' 
compensation benefits. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 (1997).34 To collect these 
benefits employees must report their injuries to their employers, who in turn file notice of 
the claim with their workers' compensation insurance company and also with the Labor 
Commission. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-407. Once a notice of claim is filed, the 
Effective July 1, 1997, the statutes governing the labor commission were moved from Title 
35 to new Title 34A. While in this brief we will cite the currently-effective statutes, 
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employee, employer and the employer's insurance carrier are all subject to the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner and their subsequent actions regarding that claim 
are governed by workers' compensation statutes and regulations. See generally Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 & § 34A-2-420. An employee bears the burden of establishing 
that any injuries are work-related. See Wall v. Industrial Comm'n., 857 P.2d 964 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
Part of the process for evaluating a workers' compensation claim for a work-
related injury involves, scrutinizing the injury to see whether it is actually work-related. 
Because of the legitimate need for scrutiny, a diminished expectation of privacy exists for 
workers filing such claims. For example, as part of the evaluation process, the Labor 
Commission can actually "require[] any employee "to submit himself for medical 
examination at any time, and from time to time " Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-602 
(1997). Moreover, health care providers must make available to the Commission their 
records on workers who have filed compensation claims upon a request from the 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(8) ("all physicians, surgeons, and other 
health providers attending injured employees shall make reports to the Commission 
at any and all times as required as to the condition and treatment of an injured employee 
or as to any other matter concerning industrial cases they are treating"). 
It is of particular interest that the Labor Commissioner has promulgated rules 
authorizing the release of underlying medical records once a claim as been filed. As 
substantively indistinguishable provisions were in place at the time appellant submitted her 
fraudulent claim. 
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provided in Workers' Compensation Rule R612-2-22(B) (emphasis added), those 
interested in the claim are entitled to the records as follows: 
Those person or entities who are entitled to copies of medical 
records involving an industrial case are: 
1. The injured employee or his/her dependents, 
2. The employer of the injured worker, 
3. The employers' workers' compensation insurance carrier, 
4. The Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
5. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
6. The Commission,35 and 
7. Any attorney representing any of the above in any injury 
or occupation disease claim. 6 
From these rules and statutes, it is readily apparent that society is not prepared to 
recognize as reasonable any expectation of privacy in medical records relating to an 
injury for which a workers' compensation claims has been submitted. Indeed, the 
The Commission refers to the Labor Commission, which prior to 1997 was known as 
the Industrial Commission. 
36
 See Appendix C for a copy of this regulation. The relevant provision has not changed 
since 1994 however a copy of the regulation effective in at that time is also provided in 
Appendix C. The rule also provides in the following paragraph that "[n]o other person or 
entity would be entitled to medical records unless ordered by a Court or provided with a 
notarized release executed by the injured worker." Rule R612-2-22(C). This rule would 
not be read as preventing WCF from disclosing records to the Attorney General's Office. 
The natural construction of the provision would be to regard the Attorney General as an 
"attorney representing any of the above [Le^ the Labor Commission]." Rule R612-2-
22(B). By statute, the Attorney General represents the Labor Commission in various 
legal actions, including proceedings, "for the enforcement of any order of the commission 
or of any of the provisions of [Title 34A]." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-401. Reading the 
provision as allowing disclosure to the Attorney General is also the only construction 
consistent with the strong public policy favoring the reporting of criminal activity. See, 
e.g., Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) (discussed in 
more detail below). However, regardless of how this rule is ultimately construed, the 
only issue before this Court today is the Fourth Amendment issue. As the above-quoted 
list makes clear, at least seven authorized persons and entities are "entitled" to review 
medical records in workers' compensation proceedings, which is more than enough to 
establish that there is no Fourth Amendment "expectation of privacy" in these records. 
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evidence could not be clearer on this point. Through its elected and appointed 
representatives, society has specifically said that health care providers "shall make 
reports" when requested and further that those who have a legitimate interest in 
evaluating a claim are affirmatively "entitled" to examine underlying records. 
Accordingly, any expectation of privacy Ellingsworth may have had in the records 
disappeared with the filing of her claim. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 
(1972) (permitting inspection of license gun dealer's storeroom in part because "a dealer 
[who] chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal 
license,... does so with the knowledge that this business records, firearms and 
ammunition willfte subject to effective inspection"); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 335 (1973) ("there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to 
an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is 
required in an income tax return"). 
In addition, Ellingsworth implies that the medical records in this case were "her" 
records, when in fact the records belonged to various health care providers. "[H]ospital 
records are typically the property of the hospital rather than a patient," Young v. Murphy, 
90 F.3d 1225, 1236 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to seizure of 
a patient's records on this grounds). "Generally, before a defendant has standing to 
challenge the admission of evidence seized in a search, he or she must demonstrate some 
right of ownership or possession of the premises searched or the items seized." 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487,492 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 463-64 (Utah 1990); State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 
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(Utah 1987)). It is hard to understand what sort of possessory interest appellant had in 
records maintained by others. 
Various state courts have reached similar conclusions. In People v. Perlos, 462 
N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990), for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected an effort to 
suppress records of a hospital blood test, explaining that no expectation of privacy 
existed. "At the very least, various hospital employees become aware of the test results 
in the normal course of their work." Id. at 320. Similarly, in State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 
370, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (internal quotation omitted), the court concluded that 
"[t]he defendant enjoyed no Fourth Amendment protections of his medical records in 
possession of and owned by the health center. The Fourth Amendment does not 
guarantee to a person security against search, reasonable or unreasonable, in papers 
which are not that person's property and are not in his possession." Other cases suggest a 
similar approach. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977) (rejecting a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to N. Y. statute requiring doctors to report those to whom 
dangerous prescription drugs prescribed because "[w]e have never carried the Fourth 
Amendment's interest in privacy as far"); Pollard v. State, 439 N.E.2d 117, 183 (Ind. 
App. 1982) (admitting evidence of blood test because "it must be borne in mind that there 
was no search of Pollard, and nothing was taken from him by the police. The 
unprivileged blood sample was taken from the hospital"). 
In view of the foregoing, it is clear society is not prepared to recognize any 
expectation of privacy in the medical records at issue here — that is, there is no objective 
expectation of privacy. But these foregoing facts also raise the serious question of what 
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Appellant's subjective expectation was about the records. Workers generally understand 
that, by submitting a workers' compensation claim, their relevant medical history will be 
examined and that medical records may be disclosed by health care providers. In 
addition, workers are made aware that workers' compensation fraud is crime. Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1997). In fact, EUingsworth received such a warning. Prior to signing 
the medical release form she received several temporary total disability checks and 
endorsed these checks directly under the fraud warning on the back. R. 215/572-577'. 
The burden is on the party challenging an alleged "search" to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Utah App. 
1992) ("the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy must be established by the 
party challenging the police conduct"). The simple fact is that Appellant has failed to 
meet her burden on this point. She never testified as to what she expected to have happen 
to her records after she filed her claim or to whether the hospital records were shielded 
from scrutiny while at the hospital.38 R. 534-591,EUingsworth's entire testimony. 
The warning stated "Workers' compensation insurance fraud is a crime punishable by 
Utah law. Do not endorse or attempt to cash this check unless you are entitled to 
payment for the goods, services, disability benefits or health care services represented 
herein." 
Perhaps Appellant might now belatedly claim to have such an expectation of privacy 
based on the notion of doctor-patient privilege. But that privilege gives way in 
circumstances like those at issue here. See Utah R. Evid. 506 (no doctor/patient privilege 
as to "communications relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional 
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any 
claim or defense"). The intent behind this exception appears to be, in no small part, to 
prevent the privilege from being used to block disclosures that could "defeat dishonest 
claims or defenses." See generally Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 275, 300 (1962). Moreover, as noted above, medical records for those with 
workers' compensation claims must be made available to the Labor Commission. See 
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Perhaps she hoped that her fraud would not be discovered, but this hardly establishes an 
expectation of privacy. See State v. Lee, 633 P.3d 48, 51 (Utah 1981) ("A desire to avoid 
detection of criminal activity does not ipso facto give rise to a protectable privacy 
interest"). For all these reasons, appellant has failed to establish a Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy — either objective or subjective — in the medical records 
underlying her workers' compensation claim. 
B. WCF Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Medical Release Form By 
Providing Appellant's Medical Records To The Insurance Department For 
Criminal Investigation And Prosecution. 
Appellant also lacked an expectation of privacy in the records because she 
specifically signed a form authorizing their release, thereby knowingly exposing them to 
view. Curiously, Appellant seeks to use this form to her advantage. While the form was 
plainly designed to facilitate the release of records,39 Appellant claims that it should 
actually to construed to hinder their release by creating some sort of agreement by WCF 
not to provide the records to law enforcement. Whatever sort of claim this is, it is not a 
Fourth Amendment claim that would be relevant to this criminal proceeding. In any 
event, WCF fully complied with the terms of the release. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407(8). It seems unlikely that, even were she to try, that 
Appellant could establish that she truly expected to be able to keep her medical records 
from release having placed her physical condition at issue by making a workers' 
compensation claim. 
39
 The purpose of the release is not to give WCF permission to look at workers' 
compensation claimant's medical records. When employees file a workers' 
compensation claim, WCF as the employer's insurer is entitled to employee medical 
records. In spite of the specific statutory authorization for release of medical records 
discussed above, many medical providers will not provide medical records without a 
signed release because of liability concerns. 
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Ellingsworth signed a medical release form authorizing medical providers to 
release medical records to be used "for the sole purpose of evaluating [her] claim for 
workers' compensation benefits." WCF did what the release said it would to -WCF did 
not use Ellingsworth's records for any purpose other then to evaluate her workers' 
compensation claim. WCF's evaluation of her claim raised suspicion that Ellingsworth 
was perpetuating workers' compensation fraud. WCF then reported the suspected 
criminal activity to the Insurance Department and provided information lawfully obtained 
by WCF to support their suspicion. 
The nature of the Workers' Compensation Act supports the conclusion that the 
scope of the consent includes using medical records to prosecute those who commit 
workers' compensation fraud. The criminal workers' compensation fraud provisions are 
found in the Workers' Compensation Act.40 The legislature has given the Labor 
Commission comprehensive authority over employees, employers, and employer's 
insurance carriers, involved in the workers compensation system. See Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-1-301 (1997) (commission has duty and full power, authority and duty to determine 
facts and apply law in any title/chapter it administers); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-401 
(1997) (if requested by the commission, the attorney general shall prosecute the 
necessary actions for the enforcement of any provision of this title); Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-112 (1997) (the commission has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state and 
may administer the Workers Compensation Act and rules issued under the act to ensure 
that every employee has a safe workplace which employers have secured payment of 
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workers' compensation benefits for their employees). Thus, once an employee comes 
into the workers' compensation system, the employee is subject to all workers' 
compensation statutes and regulations including the fraud provisions. Employees can not 
chose which provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act apply to their claim. 
Therefore, the scope of the medical release form included by the language "evaluate 
claim for workers' compensation benefits" must include the Workers' Compensation Act 
in its entirety, mandating the consideration of workers' compensation insurance fraud. 
Any question regarding the scope of the medical release must be decided in favor 
of the strong public policy encouraging persons to report criminal activity to public 
authorities. In Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) the 
Utah Supreme Court articulated this public policy in a wrongful termination action: 
The public policies embedded in criminal laws have long been deemed of such 
importance that the law also encourages persons to report criminal activity to 
public authorities. [The court then footnotes "Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-705 which 
expressly requires persons having knowledge of computer crimes specified in 
section 76-6-703 to report such crimes to public authorities."] . . . [Courts] 
recognize the long-established proposition that public policy encourages citizens 
to report crimes. (Citations omitted.) Effective implementation of that policy 
requires the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge thereof. (Citations 
Omitted.) 
Courts have supported this public policy even when there was an expectation that 
information provided as evidence of criminal activity would remain confidential. For 
example, in Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Company, 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 
1972) the court upheld a district courts decision that a party reporting criminal activity 
which was discovered while surveying under contract for the defendant did not breach 
40
 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1997). 
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the non-disclosure clause of the contract. The court stated: "[i]t is the public policy in 
Oklahoma and everywhere to encourage the disclosure of criminal activity." Id. at 853. 
Further support for disclosure of criminal activity can be found in People v. 
Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990), where the court rejected an effort to suppress 
hospital records regarding defendants blood alcohol tests taken after an automobile 
accident. The court considered the problem of drunk driving and the public interest in 
curtailing drunk driving in determining that a statutory provision allowing hospital blood 
alcohol samples taken at hospitals for medical treatment to be used in criminal 
proceedings was constitutional. Id. at 320. The court also found the statutory provision 
supported the public interest of getting drivers injured in auto accidents prompt medical 
attention rather than be detained by police for criminal investigation. Id. 
Here Ellingsworth voluntarily submitted herself to Utah's workers' compensation 
system by filing a claim for benefits. As discussed above, the system requires disclosure 
of her medical records. If Ellingsworth, in fact, has any expectation of privacy in her 
medical record, it is a diminished expectation because of the workers' compensation 
statutory scheme and the fact that she was warned that workers' compensation fraud was 
a crime.41 These facts, along with the strong public policy encouraging disclosure of 
criminal activity, support the conclusion that WCF acted within the scope of the medical 
release when it reported Ellingsworth's suspected criminal activity to the Insurance 
Department and provided information lawfully obtained by WCF to support its suspicion. 
See R. 215/572-577 and n. 36 
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IV. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO WCF VIOLATES PUBLIC 
POLICY SUPPORTING STRONG INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION 
EFFORTS AND UNFAIRLY DISCRIMINATES AGAINST WCF AND ITS 
POLICYHOLDERS. 
A. Public Policy Supports Insurance Companies' Efforts In Insurance Fraud 
Prevention To Protect Their Policyholders And Hold Down The Cost of 
Insurance. 
Public policy mandates that insurance companies investigate fraudulent claims 
because of the impact fraud has on the cost of insurance. One source estimated workers' 
compensation insurers' losses from fraudulent claims over the period of 1985-1994 was 
$60 billion. Reprint of the Stephen Blakely, Fighting Fraud in Workers' Comp, Nation's 
Business, April 1988 at 14. (Appendix I ) . In fact, the fraud level for workers' 
compensation claims has been estimated at nearly 25%. Id. at 16. States and insurance 
companies have the duty to the public to take steps to combat fraud. For example, many 
states passed stronger state laws during this period which classified insurance fraud as a 
felony.42 Id. States also have established special anti-fraud units to investigate and 
prosecute insurance fraud.43 Id. Many private insurance companies have also formed 
special claims investigation units to investigate fraud. Id. Public policy supports strong 
The Utah Legislature also has recognized the seriousness of insurance fraud and passed 
legislation addressing fraud. In 1993, it enacted a workers' compensation fraud 
prevention act prescribing the elements of and for penalties for workers' compensation 
insurance fraud. Act of Mar. 3, 1993, ch. 190, 1993 Utah Laws 717 (codified as amended 
at Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-110 (1997)). The following year, the Utah Legislature enacted 
a general insurance fraud statute. Insurance Fraud Act, ch. 243, 1994 Utah Laws 1094 
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. 31A-31-101 et. al. (1997)). 
43
 In 1995, the Utah Insurance Department established a fraud division to investigate 
insurance and prosecute insurance fraud. Thirty-two percent of the fraud divisions 
investigations were workers' compensation fraud in 1995. 1995Utah State Insurance 
Department Annual Report, p.28. (Appendix J ) 
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and more importantly, Utah employers. WCF's fraud costs would increase, requiring 
WCF to raise its workers' compensation insurance rates. This would affect the insurance 
costs for many employers in Utah as WCF writes a majority of the workers' 
compensation insurance in Utah.45 
B. Subjecting WCF To The Strictures Of The Fourth Amendment Unfairly 
Discriminates Against WCF And WCF Policyholders. 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to WCF's claims investigations would unfairly 
discriminate against WCF. No other insurance carrier is required to satisfy Fourth 
Amendment requirements in handling claims submitted to them; nor are they limited in 
the kinds of admissible evidence that they can collect and provide to the Insurance 
Department for criminal investigations and prosecutions of those perpetrating frauds 
against them. Utah Supreme Court precedent does not permit discrimination against 
WCF in favor of other workers' compensation providers. For instance, in State Tax 
Comm'n. v. Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) the court flatly rejected 
the argument that "the Fund is different and therefore may be treated differently from 
other insurers." The court held that imposing a tax on WCF and not other insurers 
violated equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 
2 of the Utah Constitution. Id. The court explained that WCF was substantively 
indistinguishable from other workers' compensation providers: 
The assets of the Fund exist only to cover the identical obligations covered 
by private insurers. The Fund has the same administrative costs as private 
44
 See generally, Title 31 A, Chapter 19, Part IV, Workers' Compensation Rate-making. 
4
* In 1995, WCF's market share was 54%. 1995 Utah State Insurance Department 
Annual Report, p. 50. 
40 
insurers: est: i rates, procedures for 
analyzing claims ai insurance considerations, 
Fund investment de^ 1 <^*al fees and policy 
insurance . . . . The Fund has the id be sued and make 
contracts that a private insurer ha ,^. ^
 w/s no immunities not 
provided to private insurers. 
I reating WCF differently for purposes o* ..~, ns woul . .: raise serious 
liluli mi in i mi II iiirslidii. "'RtTinisr .ill ninpnnii's I 111111 .hint! workmnf s compensation 
nee are of a sing . a law ope lively upcMi. ie member of that 
class is constitutionally invalid as a special lav> ,
 L ^ at .»
 x
^ 
Smai t, 5- 51 I 2 165 »C 6 S C {I r i l . I S ; ; ] lili •"•• f 
^ CF's assets violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth. dment and Article 
1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.) 
V l III I Il in i l i i i i d i mi v\ i n in mi III i III i l l Il  t i n g l u l i l l III in in in |i Il mi I i III 
workers' compensation companies. WCF's polic> would 
higher insurance costs because of WCF's compromised fraud efforts Fraudulent claims 
b) employees payers ~_ . .... . piobL ,. _, . .couraging 
more fraudulent claims and increasing the employer's insurance costs. There is no 
justification for treating employers who insure with WCF differently from employers 
Il mi mi in'.in i L Willi uthci insurance carriers. 
Furthermore, it is important to recall WCF and Ellingsworth's employer in the 
instant case are the victim of a crime. Ellingsworth has been found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of submitting a false statement to i: :: iigl) obtain benefits .;. 
It is important for WCF t ;:: i in ;:::over such fraud fin protect its private as- -• 
41 
keep down the costs of insurance for its policyholders.. The theory of the Fourth 
Amendment that Appellant proposes would make it more difficult for WCF to protect its 
assets than for other private insurers to protect their assets. Cf. Hansen, 652 P.2d at 1341 
(moneys paid into the Fund "are in effect held as trust funds for an insurance problem 
which is deigned to protect private persons"). 
Finally, a ruling that WCF is a state actor subject to the Fourth Amendment would 
have significant ramifications to WCF's business activities. WCF operates its business 
and is treated by regulators as a private corporate entity, not a state entity. Such a ruling 
would, for example, raise issues such as government immunity and state liability for 
WCF, and would could seriously undermine WCF's contractual relationships as well as 
the operation of its subsidiary companies in Utah and other states. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should deny Ellingsworth's appeal of her conviction of workers' 
compensation fraud. WCF did not violate Ellingsworth's Fourth Amendment rights by 
investigating her claim and turning information WCF lawfully obtained over to the state 
for investigation and prosecution. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to WCF's 
actions, and furthermore, Appellant has not met her burden to show that she had any 
expectation of privacy in medical records voluntarily provided to WCF. 
DATED this l^^day of «i ^ ^ , 1998. 
DENNIS V. LLOYD Q 
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WORKERS1 COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
Section 
31A-33-101. Definitions. 
31A-33-102. Establishment of the Workers' c o m p e n s a tkm rui. .= . 
31A-33-103. Legal nature of Workers1 Compensation Fund. 
31A-33-103.5. Powers of Fund - Limitations. 
31A-33-104. Workers' Compensation Fund exempted. 
31 A-33-105. Price of insurance - Liability of state. 
31A-33-106. Board of directors. 
31A-33-107. Duties of board - Creation of subsidiaries. 
31 A-33-108. Powers and duties of chief executive officer. 
31A-33-109. Liability limited. 
31A-33-110. Audits and examinations required. 
31 A-33-111. Adoption of rates. 
31 A-33-112. Withdrawal of policyholders. 
31A-3 3-113. Cancellation of policies. 
31 A-33-114. Premium assessment. 
31 A-33-115. Interest and costs of collecting delinquent premium. 
31A-33-116. Dividends. 
31 A-33-117. Availability of employers' i i poi ts 
31 A-33-118. Scope of chapter. 
31A-33-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the board of directors of the Workers' Compensation Fund. 
(2) "Chief executive officer" means the chief executive officer appointed by the board. 
(3) "Director" means a member of the board. 
(4) "Fund" and "Workers' Compensation Fund" mean the nonprofit, quasi-public corporation 
established by this chapter. 
(5) "Injury Fund" means the premiums, reserves, investment income, cu. .. 
administered by the Workers' Compensation Fund as provided in this chapter. 
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 20. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279 rep e* iled a former § 35-3-1, as enacted by 
Laws 1985, ch. 242, § 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, effective Jt tly 1 1986, and enacted 
another § 35-3-1. See notes under § 31 A-33-102. 
Laws 1988, ch. 56, § 4 repeals former § 35-3-1, as enact* M il II } Il JWS 1986, • : II i. 204, § 279, listii ig 
definitions used in this chapter, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts til i = •$ i esei it se' :: tic i i. 
\mendment Notes. - T h e 1996 amendment, effective July Ill, Ill997, renumbered this sectioi i, i Il i : J i 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-1 
Cross-References - Contribution by state to fund, § 34A-2-203. 
31A-33-102. Establishment of the Workers' Compensation Fund and the Injury Fund. 
i' i) (a) There is created a nonprofit, quasi-public corporation to be known as the Workers' 
( >-:< *. I EX! 8 I aw Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
2 
Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(b) The purpose of the fund is to: 
(i) insure Utah employers against liability for compensation based on job-related accidental 
injuries and occupational diseases; and 
(ii) assure payment of this compensation to Utah employees who are entitled to it under Title 
34A, Chapters 29 Workers' Compensation Act, and 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) (a) There is created an Injury Fund, which shall be maintained by the Workers' 
Compensation Fund. 
(b) The Injury Fund shall consist of all assets acquired from premiums and penalties paid into 
the Injury Fund and interest and dividends earned on those assets. 
(c) The Injury Fund is the sole source of monies to: 
(i) pay losses sustained on account of the insurance provided; and 
(ii) pay salaries and other expenses of the Workers' Compensation Fund in accordance with 
this chapter. 
History: C. 1953,35-3-2, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1988, ch. 56, § 5; 1990, ch. 24, § 
2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 21; 1997, ch. 375, § 22. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 279 repealed former Title 35, Chapter 3 (§§ 
35-3-1 to 35-3-28), as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 242, § 58, relating to the State Insurance Fund, effective 
July 1, 1986, and enacted §§ 35-3-1 through 35-3-17. Sections 35-3-1, 35-3-3 and 35-3-5 to 35-3-13 were 
again repealed and reenacted by Laws 1988, ch. 56. The chapter was renumbered in 1996. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-2, and updated references to Title 35A. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapters 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act, and 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Title 35A, Chapters 3 and 3a" in 
Subsection (1)(b)(2). 
Cross-References. - Workers' Compensation Fund exempt from Money Management Act, § 51-7-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Nature of funds. 
Purpose of funds. 
Nature of funds. 
Indebtedness to the State Insurance Fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) is not indebtedness to the 
state. Chez v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549, 108 A.LR. 365 (1936). 
Moneys paid into the State Insurance Fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) belong not to the state, 
but to contributing employers as a common fund for their mutual benefit; therefore, appropriation of fund 
moneys over to Industrial Commission was an unconstitutional seizure of property without due process of 
law. Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977). 
Purpose of funds. 
The State Insurance Fund (Workers' Compensation Fund) was created for the purpose of insuring 
employers by the state against liability for compensation under the act, which fund is applicable to the 
payment of loss sustained on account of such insurance and to the payment of compensation. Utah 
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Delaware Mining Co. v Industrial Comm'n TiMJl.ih \lt ' Ml U4(!yJU). 
31A-33-103. Legal nature of Workers ' Compc nsii l i im IIMIIIIIIII1 
l, j The Workers' Compensation Fund is: 
(a) a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public corporation; and 
(b) a legal entity, that may sue and be sued in its own name. 
(2) All of the business and affairs of the corporation shall be conducted in the name of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah or if conducted through a subsidiary, such other corporate 
names that comply with state law. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-3, enacted by L. I I'll ill
 } Ill II Ill " I l l j Ill Ill III 
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 22; 1997, ch. 204, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effectivi Im! II II I i lenumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-3. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added "or if conducted through a subsidiary..." to the 
end of Subsection (2) and made a stylistic change. 
Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1997, ch. 204, § 7, as amended by Laws 1997 (2nd S.S.), ch. I, § I, 
establishes the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, effective May 5, 
1997 to November 30, 1997. The commission is to review and make recommendations on "(a) 
privatization of the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah; (b) how to serve the residual market; (c) the 
granting of new insurance authority to the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah for competitive reasons; 
and (d) any related issue." 
Cross-References d ml i i i uinpuiisdlinii I iiiiiiiiiil i ii(iiii|il III iiiii II lliiiiiiii II II iiiii IKIJI nit nil »i II II \ 
31 A-33-103.5. Powers of Fuml I i i I Il 
(1) The fund may II11mm11 mi m i|iin iiiii m III iiiiiiin * In accordance wi th Sect ion 31A-33-107 
m v p t as l imited by Subsect ions {2) IIIII 1 I " l. 
I }) (a) Subject to applicable in i i k rales in Il ! iiliiil ihe Workers ' Compensa t ion Fund 
MI I III in I in or its subsidiaries, m a y i III m mil. m l i i i iii[i in iiiii in IIIII in nice products and 
services in Utah and other states uiiiil die L i mi I iilniii III in il I m I nil in iin addressing the 
recommenda t ions of a legislatively author ized stum ill i I il I in I in in ill m m m 1 I i nil if any, to offer 
insurance products or services other than workers i IIIIIIIIIIL in ill in in IIIII muniee products or services 
either directly, through a subsidiary, or th rough a j( 
(b) A subsidiary of the Workers ' Compeii iiliiiin I in IN 1 of Utah may offer worln i 
compensa t ion insurance coverage only in a state ot 11»i 1111111 111, i i i 
(3) There is a moratorium until July 1, 2000, * icnsation Fund of Utah's 
authority, if any, to offer health insurance servic I, surgical, hospital, and 
other ancillary medical expenses, by any means uu linliii" iliifi ih\ through a subsidiary, or 
through a joint venture. 
History: C, 1953, 31A-33-103.5, enacted by L. 1W / , c!i. 204, * 2. 
Coordination clause. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 329(6), effective July 1, 1997, provides that the 
enactment of section in Laws 1997, ch. 204, § 2 supersedes the enactment in ch 375 
Effective Dates.-1.riws \Wi <.h ?04 .f 10 makes this section effective on Inly I I Hi 
31A-33-104. Workers1 Compensation Fund exempted. 
I The Workers' Compensation Fund is exempt from the provisions of: 
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
4 
(a) Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act; and 
(b) Title 63 A, Utah Administrative Services Code. 
(2) The board may specifically exempt the Workers' Compensation Fund from any 
provisions of: 
(a) Title 67, Chapter 19, Utah State Personnel Management Act; and 
(b) Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code. 
(3) The provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, do not govern 
the initial determination of any person's eligibility for benefits under Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Workers' Compensation Act, and Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
History: C. 1953,35-3-18, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 21; 1991, ch. 259, § 6; 1995, ch. 20, § 
81a; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 23; 1997, ch. 375, § 24. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Title 63A, Utah 
Administrative Services Code" for "Title 63, Chapter 1, Parts 1 through 9, Utah Administrative Services 
Act" in Subsection (1)(b) and substituted "Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Occupational Disease 
Disability Compensation" at the end of Subsection (3). 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35-3-18, and updated references to Title 35A. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapters 2, Workers' 
Compensation Act, and 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' 
Compensation, and Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act" in Subsection (3) and made stylistic 
changes. 
31A-33-105. Price of insurance - Liability of state. 
(1) The Workers1 Compensation Fund shall provide workers' compensation insurance at an 
actuarially sound price, which the board shall determine. 
(2) The state is not liable for the expenses, liabilities, or debts of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund, and may not use any assets of the Injury Fund for any purpose. 
History: C. 1953,35-3-4, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1988, ch. 56, § 7; 1990, ch. 24, § 
4; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 24. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-4. 
31A-33-106. Board of directors. 
(1) There is created a board of directors of the Workers' Compensation Fund. 
(2) The board shall consist of seven directors. 
(3) One of the directors shall be the executive director of the Department of Administrative 
Services or his designee. 
(4) One of the directors shall be the chief executive officer of the fund. 
(5) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint: 
(a) three directors who are owners, officers, or employees of policyholders other than the 
state that have been insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund for at least one year before their 
appointment; and 
(b) two directors from the public in general. 
(6) No two directors may represent the same policyholder. 
(7) At least four directors appointed by the governor shall have had previous experience in 
investments, risk management, occupational safety, casualty insurance, or law. 
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(8) Any director who represents a policyholder that fails to maintain workers"
 compensation 
insurance through the Workers' Compensation Fund shall immediately resign from the board. 
(9) A person may not be a director if he: 
(a) has any interest as a stockholder, employee, attorney, or contractor of a competing 
insurance carrier providing workers' compensation insurance in Utah; 
(b) fails to meet or comply with the conflict of interest policies established by the board; or 
(c) is not bondable. 
(10) After notice and a hearing, the govvrnm niii'i uMnu1 r iinv director for neglect of duty, 
inefficiency, or malfeasance. 
(11) (a) Except as required by Subsection (ll)(b), the ^ • : f th ^  directors 
appointed by the governor shall be four years, beginning July 1 o > f: : intn I : nt 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (1 l)(a), t i 11. at th = • time of 
appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that : t = • i r is • : f I: : z i I 
members are staggered so that approximately half of the board is appointed e\ ei j t s > o ) eai s. 
(12) Each director shall hold office until his successor is appointed and q u i I 
(13) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be 
appointed for the unexpired term. 
(14) The board shall annually elect a chair and other officers as needed from its membership. 
(15) The board shall meet at least quarterly at a time and place designated by the chair. 
(16) The chair may call board meetings more frequently than quarterly and sha11 
additional board meetings if requested to do so by a majority of the board. 
(17) Four directors are a quorum for the purpose of transacting all business of the board. 
'18) Each decision of the board requires the affirmative vote of at least four directors IQI 
• val. 
(19) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits for their services, but may 
receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the 
rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
(20) The fund shall pay the per diem allowance and expenses from the Injury Fund upon 
vouchers drawn in the same manner as the Workers' Compensation Fund pays its normal 
operating expenses. 
(21) The executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, oi his designee, 
and the chief executive officer of the Workers' Compensation Fund shall serve on the board 
without a per diem allowance. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-5, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 8; 1990, ch. 24, § 5; 1992, eh. 201, § 1; 
1993, ch. 212, § 19; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 25; 1996, ch. 243, § 80 
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "established by the 
director of the Division of Finance" and substituted "63A-3-106" for "63-1-14.5" in Subsection (20)(b). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 243, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote Subsections (11) and (13), revising 
provisions relating to terms of members and filling vacancies; deleted former Subsections (15) and (20), 
relating to members' compensation and expenses; added Subsection (19); and made appropriate 
redesignations of subsections and stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment ch. 240, effective J«.j ., ,J97, renumbered this section, whicf i foi n lei ly 
appeared as § 35-3-5. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Coordination clause. - Laws 1996, ch. 240, which renumbered this section effective July 1, 1997, 
"tes in § 379 that the amendments by that act be merged with amendments by any other acts if they 
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
6 
can be merged without conflict, except that references to the Industrial Commission shall be replaced with 
"department." 
Cross-References. - Appointment of executive director of Department of Administrative Services, § 
63A-1-105. 
31A-33-107. Duties of board - Creation of subsidiaries. 
(1) The board shall: 
(a) appoint a chief executive officer to administer the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(b) receive and act upon financial, management, and actuarial reports covering the operations 
of the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(c) ensure that the Workers1 Compensation Fund is administered according to law; 
(d) examine and approve an annual operating budget for the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(e) serve as investment trustees and fiduciaries of the Injury Fund; 
(f) receive and act upon recommendations of the chief executive officer; 
(g) develop broad policy for the long-term operation of the Workers' Compensation Fund, 
consistent with its mission and fiduciary responsibility; 
(h) subject to Sections 31A-19-401 through 31 A-19-420, approve any rating plans that would 
modify a policyholder's premium; 
(i) subject to Sections 31 A-19-401 through 31 A-19-420, approve the amount of deviation, if 
any, from standard insurance rates;
 t 
(j) approve the amount of the dividends, if any, to be returned to policyholders; 
(k) adopt a procurement policy consistent with the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah 
Procurement Code; 
(1) develop and publish an annual report to policyholders, the governor, the Legislature, and 
interested parties that describes the financial condition of the Injury Fund, including a statement 
of expenses and income and what measures were taken or will be necessary to keep the Injury 
Fund actuarially sound; 
(m) establish a fiscal year; 
(n) determine and establish an actuarially sound price for insurance offered by the fund; 
(0) establish conflict of interest requirements that govern the board, officers, and employees; 
and 
(p) perform all other acts necessary for the policymaking and oversight of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund. 
(2) Subject to board review and its responsibilities under Subsection (l)(e), the board may 
delegate authority to make daily investment decisions. 
(3) The fund may form or acquire a subsidiary under Section 31A-33-103.5 only if that 
action is approved by the board. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-6, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 9; 1990, ch. 24, § 6; 1992, ch. 205, § 
19; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 26; 1997, ch. 204, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-6. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1,1997, added Subsection (3). 
31A-33-108. Powers and duties of chief executive officer. 
(1) The chief executive officer shall: 
(a) administer all operations of the Workers' Compensation Fund under the direction of the 
board; 
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(b) recommend to the board any necessary or desirable changes in tli :::: 01 1! ::c ,1 '""! • * • i cnsatioii 
law; 
(c) recommend to the board an annual administrative budget covering the o, as of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund and, upon approval, submit the administrative budget, financial 
status, and actuarial condition of the fund to the governor and the Legislature for their 
examination; 
(d) direct and control all expenditures of the approved budget; 
(e) from time to time, upon the recommendation of a consulting actuary, recommend to the 
board rating plans, the amount of deviation, if any, from standard rates, and the amount of 
dividends, if any, to be returned to policyholders; 
(f) invest the Injury Fund's assets under the guidance of the board and in accordance ^ ; t h 
Chapter 18; 
(g) recommend general policies and procedures to the board to guide the operations ^ 
fund; 
(h) formulate and administer a s) silt an :>f personnel administration and ei:i!| • 1 oyee 
compensation that uses merit principles of personnel management, includes employee benefits 
and grievance procedures consistent with those applicable to state agencies, and includes 
inservice training programs; 
(i) prepare and administer fiscal, payroll, accounting, data processing, and procurement 
procedures for the operation of the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(J) conduct studies of the workers' compensation insurance business, :i ncluding the 
preparation of recommendations and reports; 
(k) develop uniform procedures for the management of the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(1) maintain contacts with governmental and other public or private groups having an interest 
in workers' compensation insurance; 
(m) within the limitations of the budget, employ necessary staff personnel and consultants, 
including actuaries, attorneys, medical examiners, adjusters, investment counselors, accountants, 
and clerical and other assistants to accomplish the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(n) maintain appropriate levels of property, casualty, and liability insurance as approved by 
the board to protect the fund, its directors, officers, employees, and assets; and 
(o) develop self-insurance programs as approved by the board to protect the fund, its 
directors, officers, employees, and assets to supersede or supplement insurance maintained under 
Subsection (l)(n). 
(2) The chief executive officer may: 
(a) enter into contracts of workers' compensation and occupational disease insurance, which 
may include employer's liability insurance to cover the exposure of a policyholder to his Utah 
employees and their dependents for liability claims, including the cost of defense in the event of 
suit, for claims based upon bodily injury to the policyholder's Utah employees; 
(b) reinsure any risk or part of any risk; 
(c) cause to be inspected and audited the payrolls of policyholders or employers applying to 
the Workers' Compensation Fund for insurance; 
(d) establish procedures for adjusting claims against the Workers1 Compensation Fund that 
comply with Title 34A, Chapters 2 and 3, and determine the persons to whom and through whom 
the payments of compensation are to be made; 
(e) contract with physicians, surgeons, hospitals, and other health care providers for medical 
and surgical treatment and the care and nursing of injured persons entitled to benefits from the 
Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(f) require policyholders to maintain an adequate deposit to provide security for periods of 
coverage for which premiums have not been paid; 
(g) contract with self-insured entities for the adminisii , , r *. •• . .,<. 
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and safety consultation services; and 
(h) with the approval of the board, adopt the calendar year or any other reporting period to 
report claims and payments made or reserves established on claims that are necessary to 
accommodate the reporting requirements of the Labor Commission, Insurance Commission, 
State Tax Commission, or National Council on Compensation Insurance. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-7, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 10; 1990, ch. 24, § 7; renumbered by 
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 27; 1997, ch. 375, § 25. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-7, in Subsection (1)(f) deleted "the provisions of Title 31 A", added " 1 " in 
Subsection (1)(o), updated references in Subsection (2)(d), and added "Department of Workforce 
Services" and deleted "Industnal Commission" in Subsection (2)(h). 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapters 2 and 3" for "Title 35A, 
Chapters 3 and 3a" in Subsection (2)(d) and "Labor Commission" for "Department of Workforce Services" 
in Subsection (2)(h) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Right to appoint attorneys. 
The attorney general does not have exclusive constitutional authonty to act as legal adviser to the 
fund, therefore, the provision of this section authorizing the appointment of attorneys does not violate Utah 
Const, Art VII, Sec 16, furthermore, this section provides an exception to the general authority of the 
attorney general to perform legal services for any agency of state government. Hansen v Utah State 
Retirement Bd , 652 P 2d 1332 (Utah 1982) 
31A-33-109. Liability limited. 
(1) No officer or employee of the Workers' Compensation Fund is liable in a private capacity 
for any act performed or obligation entered into when done in good faith, without intent to 
defraud, and in an official capacity in connection with the administration, management, or 
conduct of the Workers' Compensation Fund or affairs relating to it. 
(2) Subject to the director's fiduciary responsibility as established by Section 31A-33-106, 
no director of the Workers' Compensation Fund is liable in a private capacity for any act 
performed or obligation entered into when done in good faith, without intent to defraud, and in 
an official capacity in connection with the administration, management, or conduct of the 
Workers' Compensation Fund or affairs relating to it. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-8, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 11; 1990, ch. 24, § 8; renumbered by 
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 28. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-8, and in Subsection (2) substituted "31A-33-106" for "35-3-5 " 
31A-33-110. Audits and examinations required. 
(1) (a) The Workers' Compensation Fund shall annually obtain an audit: 
(i) conducted in accordance with: 
(A) generally accepted auditing standards; and 
(B) government auditing standards; and 
(ii) by a national firm of certified public accountants. 
(b) The fund shall provide the audit performed under Subsection (l)(a) to the state auditor 
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within 30 days of its completion. 
(2) (a) The insurance commissioner shall examine the Injury Fund according to the purposes 
and procedures provided in Sections 31A-2-203 through 31A-2-205 at least once every five 
years. 
(b) I he chief execi iti 3 officer shall p a;; th z necessary expense of this examina t ion from the 
Injury Fund . 
History: C. 1953,35-3-10, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § * ^ v , V«. ^4, § 9; renumbered by 
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 29; 1997, eh. 204, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendrnei _, . - y renumbered this section, whic! i 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-10 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, subdivided Subsection (1), making a stylistic change, 
and added Subsections (1)(a)(i) to (1)(b), deleting a requirement that the audit be performed by the state 
auditor 
31A-33-111. Adoption, of rates 
The Workers' Compensation Fund shall adopt the rates approved by the insurance 
commissioner under Chapter 19, Part IV. The chief executive officer, wi th the approval of the 
board, may file with the insurance commissioner a resolution to devia te from the rates approved 
by the insurance commissioner in order to provide workers' compensation insurance at the lowest 
possible cost to policyholders consistent with maintaining the actuarial soundness of the Injury 
Fund. 
§30, 
• Arnei icli i lei it Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July I, 1997 , i ei IUI nbered this section i, I iii ::::! m 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-11, and deleted "Title 31 A" from the citation in the first sentence. 
LATERAL REFERENCES 
C Il S III00 C.J.S. Workmen's Cor
 W _ JW. 
31! "I 33 1,12. !; I i thdraw all, of policyholders. 
Any policyholder may, upon complying with Section 31A-22-1002, withdraw from the 
Workers' Compensation Fund by providing an advance written notice of his intent to cancel. The 
policyholder shall remain liable for any unpaid premium for periods of coverage prior to 
cancellation. 
History: C. 1953 , 35 -3 -12 , enacted b> I-. 1 I'll 18, Ui. M>, § 15; reniunl n ill li I I.. 19%, ch. J! ill, 
§ 3 1 
Amendment Notes. - I he iw«', 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-12. 
31A-33-113. Cancellation of policies. 
r_ ~ only: 
(1) (a) by agreeing to the cancellation with the polk;; h : I. i 3i ; and 
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(b) sending notice of the cancellation to the Labor Commission; 
(2) for nonpayment of premium, after 30 days' notice to: 
(a) the Labor Commission; and 
(b) the policyholder; or 
(3) for failure on the part of the policyholder to comply with the contractual provisions of the 
policy, after 30 days' notice to: 
(a) the Labor Commission; and 
(b) the policyholder. 
History: C. 1953,35-3-13, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 56, § 16; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, 
§ 32; 1997, ch. 375, § 26. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-13, and, in Subsections (1), (2), and (3), substituted "Department of 
Workforce Services" for "Industrial Commission." 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Labor Commission" for "Department of 
Workforce Services" in three places and made stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cancellation of policy. 
The fund is not prohibited from canceling workers' compensation policies for nonpayment of 
premiums. State Ins. Fund v. E-Z Way Constr., Inc., 620 P.2d 69 (Utah 1980) (decided under prior law). 
31A-33-114. Premium assessment. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund is liable for the premium assessment provided by 
Subsection 59-9-101(2) to the same extent as private workers' compensation insurance 
companies. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-14, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1987, ch. 2, § 36; 1988, ch. 56, 
§ 17; 1994, ch. 266, § 6; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 33. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "assessment" for 
"tax." 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35-3-14. 
31A-33-115. Interest and costs of collecting delinquent premium. 
If the Workers' Compensation Fund commences a legal action for collection of delinquent 
premium, it is entitled, in addition to the unpaid premium, to interest on the unpaid premium at 
the same rate as is then being charged by the United States Internal Revenue Service for 
delinquent taxes from the due date of the unpaid premium, and for all costs of collection 
including reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. The remedies of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund under this section do not affect or diminish, and may be exercised in addition to, its right to 
cancel policies under Sections 31A-33-112 and 31A-33-113. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-15, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 204, § 279; 1988, ch. 56, § 18; 
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 34. 
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Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective Ji... /. renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-15, and substituted "3^-33-112" for "35-3-12" and "3^-33-113" for 
"35-3-13." 
31A-3J-1 lb. Dividends. 
The board may declare a dividend to policyholders if it determines that a surplus exists in the 
Injury Fund at the end of a fiscal period after the payment of all claims, administrative costs, and 
the establishment of appropriate reserves for future liabilities. In making this determination, the 
board shall require a certified audit and actuarial report of the financial condition of the Injury 
Fund. The board shall establish uniform eligibility requirements for such dividends. In 
determining the amount of dividend to be paid to policyholders, the board may establish a 
procedure which takes into consideration the claims loss experience of policyholders as an 
incentive to encourage safe working conditions for employees. The Workers' Compensation 
Fund may use dividends to offset amounts due or owing by policyholders or former 
policyholders. 
History: C, 1953, 35-3-16, enacted by I 1986, ch. 204,. § 279; 1988, cl i 56, § 19; 
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 35 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1 ^ " ibered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-16. 
31 A-33-117, Availability of emplo) ei sf i epoi ts. 
The Labor Commission shall make the employers' annual reports provided for in Section 
34A-2-206 available to the Workers' Compensation Fund, to the same extent the reports would 
be available to private insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 35-3-i -* - — -.. 204 § 2 1 9; 1988, ch. 56, § 20; 
renumbered by L. 1996, ch.. ; 1997, ch. 375, § 27. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 ent, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-3-17, and substituted "Workforce Services" for "Employment Security" 
"35A-3-206" for "35-1-41." 
I he 1997 amendment, effective July I, 199 7 , substituted "Labor Commission" for "Department of 
Workforce Services" and "34A-2-206" for "35A-3-206," and made a stylistic change. 
31A-33-118. Scope of chapter. 
The placement of this chapter in this title may not be construed to: 
(1) change the Workers' Compensation Fund's legal nature or pi irpose.as set forth in this 
chapter; or 
(2) change the Workers' Compensation Fund's obligation to write workers' compensation 
insurance pursuant to Section 31A-22-1001. 
History: C. 1953,31A-33-118, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 37. 
El fective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 240, § 378 makes the act effective on July , 
< 
APPENDIX B 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROVISIONS 
The following table outlines the impact of S.B. 166 on workers' compensation statutes found in Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2 of the 
Utah Code. The table is arranged sequentially according to the citations of current statutory sections that would be affected. The 
action taken for each citation is listed by a code according to the following legend: 
A=amends E=enacts N=renumbers and amends R=repeals 
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SELECTED PROVISIONS OF 1 
TITLE 34A 
UTAH LABOR CODE 
CHAPTER 1 
LABOR COMMISSION ACT 
34A-1-103. Labor Commission - Creation - Seal. 
(1) There is created the Labor Commission, that has all of the policymaking functions, 
regulatory and enforcement powers, rights, duties, and responsibilities outlined in: 
(a) this title; and 
(b) unless otherwise specified, Title 34, Labor in General. 
(2) The commission may sue and be sued. 
(b) A court in this state shall take judicial notice of the seal of the commission. 
History: C. 1953,34A-1-103, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 55. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 328 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
34A-1-301. Commission jurisdiction and power. 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers. 
History: C. 1953,35A-3-801, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 181; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 
375, § 64. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R602-2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section which 
formerly appeared as 35A-3-801, and substituted "commission" for "department." 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 240, § 378 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
34A-1-401. Attorney general and county attorneys - Duties. 
If requested by the commission, the attorney general or any county or district attorney shall: 
(1) institute and prosecute the necessary actions or proceedings for the enforcement of any 
order of the commission or of any of the provisions of this title; or 
(2) defend any suit, action, or proceeding brought against the commission. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 96; C.L. 1917, § 3157; R.S. 1933, 42-1-93; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
1941 (1st S.S.), ch. 15, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-93; L. 1971, ch. 75, § 1; 1979, ch. 138, § 8; C. 1953, 
35-1-101; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 114; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 74. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-1-101, substituted "department" for "commission," and deleted "or the 
members thereof in their official capacity" at the end. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
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35A-3-110; substituted "commission" for "department" throughout; inserted "or district" in the introductory 
phrase; substituted "title" for "chapter" in Subsection (1); and made stylistic changes. 
CHAPTER 2 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION ACT 
34A-2-110. Workers' compensation insurance fraud - Elements - Penalties - Notice. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-201(3). 
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(1). 
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(2). 
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-1-601(8). 
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(3). 
(2) (a) Any person is guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud if that person 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: 
(i) devises any scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage, 
disability compensation, medical benefits, goods, professional services, fees for professional 
services, or anything of value under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions; and 
(ii) communicates or causes a communication with another in furtherance of the scheme or 
artifice. 
(b) Workers' compensation insurance fraud under Subsection (2)(a) is punishable in the 
manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of workers' compensation insurance 
fraud under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (2) shall be measured 
by the total value of all property, money, or other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (2), except as provided in Subsection 
76-10-1801(l)(e). 
(5) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described in 
Subsection (2). 
(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (2) t a 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or anything of value is not a necessary 
element of this offense. 
(7) An insurer or self-insured employer giving written notice in accordance with Subsection 
(10) that workers' compensation insurance fraud is a crime is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (2). 
(8) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage includes any 
scheme or artifice to make or cause to be made any false written or oral statement or business 
reorganization, incorporation, or change in ownership intended to obtain insurance coverage as 
mandated by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at rates that do not reflect 
the risk, industry, employer, or class codes actually covered by the policy. 
(9) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability compensation includes a scheme or artifice to 
collect or make a claim for temporary disability compensation as provided in Section 34A-2-410 
while working for gain. 
(10) (a) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in connection with this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or furnishes a form to any person 
upon which that person applies for insurance coverage, reports payroll, makes a claim by reason 
of accident, injury, death, disease, or other claimed loss, or otherwise reports or gives notice to 
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the insurer or self-insured employer, shall cause to be printed or displayed in comparative 
prominence with other content the statement: "Any person who knowingly presents false or 
fraudulent underwriting information, files or causes to be filed a false or fraudulent claim for 
disability compensation or medical benefits, or submits a false or fraudulent report or billing for 
health care fees or other professional services is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fines and 
confinement in state prison." 
(b) Each insurer or self-insured employer who issues a check, warrant, or other financial 
instrument in payment of compensation issued under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to be printed or displayed in comparative prominence 
above the area for endorsement the statement: "Workers' compensation insurance fraud is a crime 
punishable by Utah law." 
(c) (i) The provisions of Subsections (10)(a) and (b) apply only to the legal obligations of an 
insurer or a self-insured employer. 
(ii) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud, 
and the failure of an insurer or a self-insured employer to fully comply with the provisions of 
Subsections (10)(a) and (b) may not be: 
(A) a defense to violating Subsection (2); or 
(B) grounds for suppressing evidence. 
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, insurer, or governmental entity that 
reports a suspected fraudulent act relating to a workers' compensation insurance policy or claim 
is not subject to any civil liability for libel, slander, or any other relevant cause of action. 
(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, this section supersedes Title 31 A, 
Chapter 31, Insurance Fraud Act. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-109, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 190, § 1; 1994, ch. 243, § 11; 1995, ch. 
20, § 80; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 118; 1997, ch. 185, § 19; renumbered by L. 
1997, ch. 375, § 92. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, added Subsection (12). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Subsection 76-2-103(1)" for "Subsection 
76-2-103(2)" in Subsection (1)(b). 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35-1-109; deleted "or Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act" after "this chapter" in Subsections (2), 
(7), (9), and (10); substituted "Subsection (2)" for "Subsection (1)" in Subsections (4) through (6); and 
substituted "35A-3-410" for "35-1-65" in Subsection (8). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 185, effective July 1, 1997, added Subsection (7), redesignating 
Subsections (7) to (11) as Subsections (8) to (12); added Subsection (10)(c); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 35A-3-114; inserted references to" Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" throughout; 
substituted "34A-2-410" for "35A-3-410" in Subsection (8); and made stylistic changes. 
This section has been set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 190 became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to Utah Const., 
Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
34A-2-112. Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3. 
(1) Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, is vested 
in the commission to be administered through the division, the Division of Adjudication, and for 
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administrative appeals through the commissioner and the Appeals Board. 
(2) The commission: 
(a) has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state and may administer this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and any rule or order issued under these chapters, to 
ensure that every employee in this state has a safe workplace in which employers have secured 
the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees in accordance with this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; 
(b) through the division under the supervision of the director, has the duty and full authority 
to take any administrative action authorized under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act; and 
(c) through the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, and Appeals Board, provide for the 
adjudication and review of an administrative action, decision, or order of the commission in 
accordance with this title. 
History: C. 1953,34A-2-112, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 94. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 328 makes the act effective on July 1,1997. 
34A-2-201. Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits for employees -
Methods - Self insured status. 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school districts, shall secure the 
payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees: 
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers1 
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final 
award by the commission; 
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock 
corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation 
insurance in this state, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final award by 
the commission; or 
(c) by furnishing annually to the division satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and when due as provided for in this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, which payments shall commence within 30 days after 
any final award by the commission. 
(2) (a) If an employer secures payment of workers' compensation benefits under Subsection 
(l)(c), the division may: 
(i) require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of 
compensation liabilities as they are incurred; and 
(ii) at any time change or modify the requirement to deposit acceptable security, indemnity, 
or bond, if in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict 
compliance with ail the provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the 
furnishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial expenses to injured 
employees and to the dependents of killed employees. 
(b) (i) The division may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a self-insurer. 
(ii) The revocation under Subsection (2)(b)(i) becomes a final order of the commission 
effective 30 days from the date the division revokes the privilege, unless within the 30 days the 
employer files an application for hearing in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 53; C.L. 1917, § 3114; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; 1923, ch. 64, § 1; 
1925, ch. 80, § 1; R.S. 1933,42-1-44; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,42-1-44; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 
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1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 1; 1977, ch. 156, § 3; 1986, ch. 204, § 271; 1986, ch. 211, § 
5; 1989, ch. 183, § 1; C. 1953, 35-1-46; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 122; renumbered 
by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 95. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R612-3. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-1-46; substituted "department" for "commission" throughout and "chapter" for 
"title" in Subsection (1)(c); designated the former second and third sentences of Subsection (1)(c) as 
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b); redesignating former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (3) and (4); 
and made stylistic changes. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35A-3-201; substituted "commission" for "department" in Subsections (1)(a), (1)(c), and (1)(b) and 
"division" for "department" in Subsections (1)(c), (2)(a), and (2)(b); redesignated former Subsection (2)(b) 
as Subsection (2)(b)(i); deleted former Subsections (3) and (4), relating to authority of the department to 
bring suit for noncompliance; added Subsection (2)(b)(ii); and made stylistic changes. 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the dependents of 
each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of 
funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, § 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 1; C. 1953, 35-1-45; renumbered by L. 
1996, ch. 240, § 144; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 109. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-1-45; added the subsection designations; and substituted "described" for 
"mentioned" and "35A-3-104" for "35-1-43" in Subsection (1). 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35A-3-401, and, in Subsection (1), substituted "34A-2-104" for "35A-3-104" and made a stylistic change. 
34A-2-407. Reporting of industrial injuries - Regulation of health care providers. 
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall 
provide notification to the employee's employer promptly of the injury. If the employee is unable 
to provide notification, the employee's next-of-kin or attorney may provide notification of the 
injury to the employee's employer. 
(2) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division within 180 
days of an injury is barred for any claim of benefits arising from the injury. 
(3) The following constitute notification of injury: 
(a) an employer's or physician's injury report filed with the division, employer, or insurance 
carrier; or 
(b) the payment of any medical or disability benefits by the employer or the employer's 
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insurance carrier. 
(4) (a) In the form prescribed by the division, each employer shall file a report with the 
division of any: 
(i) work-related fatality; or 
(ii) work-related injury resulting in: 
(A) medical treatment; 
(B) loss of consciousness; 
(C) loss of work; 
(D) restriction of work; or 
(E) transfer to another job. 
(b) The employer shall file the report required by Subsection (4)(a) within seven days 
after: 
(i) the occurrence of a fatality or injury; 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or injury; or 
(iii) the employee's notification of the fatality or injury. 
(c) Each employer shall file a subsequent report with the division of any previously reported 
injury that later resulted in death. The subsequent report shall be filed with the division within 
seven days following: 
(i) the death; or 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge or notification of the death. 
(d) A report is not required for minor injuries, such as cuts or scratches that require first-aid 
treatment only, unless a treating physician files, or is required to file, the Physician's Initial 
Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease with the division. 
(5) Each employer shall provide the employee with: 
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and 
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights and responsibilities 
related to the industrial injury. 
(6) Each employer shall maintain a record in a manner prescribed by the division of all: 
(a) work-related fatalities; or 
(b) work-related injuries resulting in: 
(i) medical treatment; 
(ii) loss of consciousness; 
(iii) loss of work; 
(iv) restriction of work; or 
(v) transfer to another job. 
(7) Any employer who refuses or neglects to make reports, to maintain records, or to file 
reports with the division as required by this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor and 
subject to citation under Section 34A-6-302 and a civil assessment as provided under Section 
34A-6-307, unless the division finds that the employer has shown good cause for submitting a 
report later than required by this section. 
(8) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (8)(c) all physicians, surgeons, and other health 
providers attending injured employees shall: 
(i) comply with all the rules, including the schedule of fees, for their services as adopted by 
the commission; and 
(ii) make reports to the division at any and all times as required as to the condition and 
treatment of an injured employee or as to any other matter concerning industrial cases they are 
treating. 
(b) A physician, as defined in Subsection 34A-2-lll(2), who is associated with, employed 
by, or bills through a hospital is subject to Subsection (8)(a). 
(c) A hospital is not subject to the requirements of Subsection (8)(a). 
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(d) The commission's schedule of fees may reasonably differentiate remuneration to be paid 
to providers of health services based on: 
(i) the severity of the employee's condition; 
(ii) the nature of the treatment necessary; and 
(iii) the facilities or equipment specially required to deliver that treatment. 
(e) Subsection (8) does not modify contracts with providers of health services relating to the 
pricing of goods and services existing on May 1,1995. 
(f) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, a physician, 
surgeon, or other health provider may file with the Division of Adjudication an application for 
hearing to appeal a decision or final order to the extent it concerns the fees charged by the 
physician, surgeon, or other health provider in accordance with this section. 
(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be furnished to: 
(a) the division; 
(b) the employee; and 
(c) the employer or its insurance carrier. 
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health provider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or 
neglects to make any report or comply with this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor for 
each offense, unless the division finds that there is good cause for submitting a late report. 
(11) (a) Subject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treatment or services rendered to employees by 
physicians, surgeons, or other health providers are: 
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational diseases; and 
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (ll)(a), Subsection 34A-2-211(7), or Section 
34A-2-212, a person may not maintain a cause of action in any forum within this state other than 
the commission for collection or payment of a physician's, surgeon's, or other health provider's 
billing for treatment or services that are compensable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-97, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 69, § 5; 1994, ch. 224, § 11; 1995, ch. 308, 
§ 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 150; 1997, ch. 205, § 1; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 
375, §115. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1990, ch. 69, § 5 repeals former § 35-1-97, as last amended by 
Laws 1967, ch. 66, § 1, relating to records and reports of accidents, and enacts the present section, 
effective April 23, 1990. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (4) and 
inserted "or by methods" in Subsection (4)(a). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (4)(a), making extensive stylistic 
changes and adding subsection designations; subdivided Subsection (8) into (8)(a), (8)(a)(i), and (ii) and 
made related changes, added the proviso at the beginning and deleted "excluding hospitals" after "health 
providers" in Subsection (8)(a), and added Subsections (8)(b) through (e); and made minor stylistic 
changes in Subsections (1), (3), and (5). 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35-1-97; substituted "department" for "commission" throughout; and substituted "35A-6-302" for "35-9-9" 
and "35A-6-307" for "35-9-307" in Subsection (7) and "35A-3-117" for "35-1-108" in Subsection (8)(b). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 205, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsections (5), (6), (8)(d), and 
(9); made stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and (5)(a); and added Subsection (11). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly 
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appeared as § 35A-3-407; substituted "division" for "department," throughout, "34A-6-302" for "35A-6-302" 
and "34A-6-307" for "35A-6-307" in Subsection (7), "commission" and "commission's" for "department" 
and "department's" in Subsections (8)(a)(i) and (8)(d), and "34A-2-111(2)H for "35A-3-117(2)M in 
Subsection (8)(b); added Subsection (8)(f); and made stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Coordination clause. - Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 329(8), effective July 1, 1997, directs that Subsection (11) be amended to substitute "commission" for "department," "34A-1-103" for "35A-1-302," 
"34A-2-211(7)M for "35A-3-204(7)," "Chapter 2" for "Chapter 3," "Chapter 3" for "Chapter 3a," and 
"34A-2-212" for "35A-3-211." 
34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission - No authority to change statutes of 
limitation - Authority to destroy records - Interest on award - Authority to approve final 
settlement claims. 
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. 
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board 
in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former 
finding or order of the commission. 
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the statutes of limitation referred to in 
Subsection (l)(c). 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than 
cases of .total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 
34A-2-417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% 
per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and 
payable. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, an administrative law judge 
shall review and may approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit 
entitlements under this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured 
settlement, or other appropriate payout. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917, § 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961, 
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1981, ch. 287, § 5; 1988, ch. 116, § 8; 1990, ch. 
69, § 4; 1994, ch. 224, § 8; 1995, ch. 306, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 163; 
renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 128. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected references in 
Subsection (3). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection (5), redesignated the third sentence 
in Subsection (1) as Subsection (2), redesignated Subsection (2) as (3) and deleted "Industrial" before 
"commission," redesignated Subsection (3) as (4), deleted "Title 35" before "Chapter 2" and the name of 
the act after "Chapter 2" in Subsection (4)(a), substituted "(4)" for "(3)" in Subsection (4)(b), and made 
stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35-1-78; substituted "department" for "commission" throughout; substituted "35A-3-417" for "35-1-98" in 
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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Subsection (2) and "35A-3-108" for "35-1-90" in Subsection (5); and substituted "this chapter or Chapter 
3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act" for "Chapters 1 or 2" in Subsection (4)(a); and made similar 
substitutions in Subsection (5). 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35A-3-420; substituted "commission" or "administrative law judge" for "department" where the terms 
appear; substituted 'Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with Part 8, 
Adjudication" for "department" in Subsection (1)(b); substituted "34A-2-417" for "35A-3-417" and 
"34A-2-108" for "35A-3-108" in Subsections (2) and (4), respectively; and made stylistic changes. 
34A-2-602. Physical examinations. 
(1) The division or an administrative law judge may require an employee claiming the right 
to receive compensation under this chapter to submit to a medical examination at any time, and 
from time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for the employee, and as may be provided by 
the rules of the commission. 
(2) If an employee refuses to submit to an examination under Subsection (1), or obstructs the 
examination, the employee's right to have the employee's claim for compensation considered, if 
the employee's claim is pending before an administrative law judge, commissioner, or Appeals 
Board, or to receive any payments for compensation theretofore granted by a final order of the 
commission, shall be suspended during the period of the refusal or obstruction. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 91; C.L. 1917, § 3152; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R,S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
42-1-85; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 174; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 139. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35-1-91, and substituted "department" for "commission." 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 
35A-3-602; substituted "division or administrative law judge" for "department, or its medical examiner" 
and "commission" for "department" in Subsection (1); substituted "an administrative law judge, 
commissioner, or Appeals Board" for "department" and inserted "by a final order of the commission" in 
Subsection (2); and made stylistic changes. 
(c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
APPENDIX C 
STATE OF UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION RULES 
REVISED AS OF OCTOBER 15,1997 
R612-2-22. Medical Records. 
A. When any medical practitioner provides copies of medical records to the parties of an 
industrial case, the following charges are presumed reasonable: 
1. A search fee of $15, 
2. Copies at $0.50 per page including copies of microfilm, and 
3. Actual costs of postage. 
B. Those persons or entities who are entitled to copies of medical records involving an industrial 
case are: 
1. The injured employee or his/her dependents, 
2. The employer of the injured worker, 
3. The employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, 
4. The Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
5. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
6. The Commission, and 
7. Any attorney representing any of the above in an industrial injury or occupational disease 
claim. 
C. No other person or entity is entitled to medical records unless ordered by a Court or 
provided with a notarized release executed by the injured worker. 
D. The Commission will operate in the release of its records to the parties/entities as specified 
above unless the information is classified as confidential under the Utah Privacy Act. 
E. No fee shall be charged when the Commission's Relative Value Schedule (RVS) requires 
specific documentation for a procedure or when physicians and surgeons are required to report by statute 
or rule. 
F. An injured worker may obtain one of each of the following records related to the industrial 
injury or occupational disease, at no cost, when the injured worker or his/her dependents ha ve a signed 
form by the division to substantiate his/her industrial injury/illness claim: 
1. History and physical, 
2. Operative reports of surgeries, 
3. Discharge summary, and 
4. Emergency room records, 
5. Radiological reports, 
6. Specialized testing results, 
7. Physician SOAP notes, progress notes or specialized reports. 
(a) Alternatively, a summary of the patient's record may be made available to the claimant at 
the discretion of the physician. 
8. And such other records as may be requested by the Commission in order to make a 
determination of liability. 
R612-2-23. Adjusting Relative Value Schedule (RVS) Codes-
A. When adjusting any medical provider's bill who has billed per the Commission's RVS the 
adjusting entity shall provide one or more of the following explanations as applies to the down coding 
when payment is made to the medical provider: 
1. Code 99202, 99203, 99204 or 99205 - the submitted documentation for a new patient did 
not meet the three key components lacking in the level of history for the code billed. 
2. Code 99202, 99203, 99204 or 99205 - the submitted documentation for a new patient did not 
meet the three key components lacking in the level of examination for the code billed. 
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EFFECTtVE JANUARY 1>1»5 
modes above the state's travel reimbursement rates as may be required due to the nature of 
the disability. 
B. ITiis rule applies to all travel to and from medical care with the following 
restrictions: 
1. The carrier is not required to reimburse the injured employee more often than 
every three months, unless: 
(a) More than $100 is involved, or 
(b) The case is about to be closed. 
2. All travel must be by the most direct route and to the nearest location where 
adequate treatment is reasonably available. 
3. Travel may not be required between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., 
unless approved by the Commission. 
4. Requests for travel reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment 
within one year of the authorized medical care. 
5. Travel allowance shall not include picking up prescriptions unless documentation 
is provided substantiating a claim that prescriptions cannot be obtained locally within the 
injured worker's community 
6. The Industrial Commission shall have jurisdiction to resolve all disputes. 
R568-2-20. Notice to Health Care Providers. 
Any notice from a carrier denying further liability must be mailed to the Commission 
and the patient on the same day as it is mailed to the health care provider. Where it can be 
shown, in fact, that a medical care provider and the injured employee have received a denial 
of further care by the insurance carrier or self-insured employer, farther treatment may be 
performed at the expense of the employee. Any future ratification of the denial by the 
Commission will not be considered a retroactive denial but will serve to uphold the force and 
effect of the previous denial notice. 
R568-2-21. Medical Records, (effective December 16, 1992) 
A. When any medical practitioner provides copies of medical records to the parties 
of an industrial case, the following charges are presumed reasonable: 
1. A search fee of $15, 
2. Copies at $0.50 per page including copies of microfilm, and 
3. Actual costs of postage. 
B. Those persons or entities who are entitled to copies of medical records involving 
an industrial case are: 
1. The injured employee or his/her dependents, 
2. The employer of the injured worker, 
3. The employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, 
4. The Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
5. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
6. The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 
7. Any attorney representing any of the above in an industrial injury or occupational 
disease claim. 
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C. No other person or entity would be entitled to medical records unless ordered by 
a Court or provided with a notarized release executed by the injured worker. 
D. The Industrial Commission will operate in the release of its records to the 
parties/entities as specified above unless the information is classified as confidential under the 
Utah Privacy Act. 
E. No fee shall be charged when the Industrial Commission's Relative Value 
Schedule (RVS) requires specific documentation for a procedure or when physicians and 
surgeons are required to report by statute or rule. 
F. An injured worker may obtain one of each of the following records related to the 
industrial injury or occupational disease, at no cost, when the injured worker or his/her 
dependents have a signed form by the Industrial Commission to substantiate his/her industrial 
injury/illness claim: 
1. History-and physical, 
2. Operative reports of surgeries, 
3. Discharge summary, and 
4. Emergency room records, 
5. Radiological reports, 
6. Specialized testing results, 
7. Physician SOAP notes, progress notes or specialized reports. 
(a) Alternatively, a summary of the patient's record may be made available to the 
claimant at the discretion of the physician. 
8. And such other records as may be requested by the Industrial Commission in 
order to make a determination of liability. 
KEY: workers' compensation, fees, employees' rights, physicians, medical records, 
1994 35-1-1 et seq 
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REC0MMEN0ATIONS 
RECOMMENDATION 1 
Based upon the advantages and disadvantages developed above, 1t is recommended 
that the Workers1 Compensation Fund be separated from the Department of 
Administrative Services and formed into a separate unit of state government 
with a board of directors established as the governing body for the Fund. Jhe 
Fund is not a support service and it does not mesh with the support services 
provided by the Department. The missions, activities, customers, and funding 
sources are all different. These differences may not allow either agency to 
fully achieve their respective missions. This recommendation would provide 
the opportunity for both agencies to pursue their divergent missions without 
artificial impediment, yet still be accountable in their respective 
environments. 
The recommendation to establish a part-time board of directors composed of 
policyholders would improve the accountability and oversight of Fund 
operations and programs. This improvement would treat the Fund like the 
business it is and allow it to become more responsive to its policyholders and 
the insurance market in general. 
The alternative for placing the Fund in another department of state government 
has been considered. However, it creates more problems for both the Fund and 
the receiving department than it solves and should not be adopted. 
One issue remaining concerns the amount of autonomy the Fund should be granted 
as a separate unit of state government. Alternative 3 would establish the 
Fund as an independent department but still subject to the normal controls of 
state government - fiscal, budget, personnel, purchasing, data processing, 
etc. There would be some additional expense to implement this alternative due 
to the need for staff to perform personnel, accounting and budget work now 
done by the Department. This should be minimal due to the semi-independent 
nature of the Fund currently. 
The Fund could still be limited 1n the pursuit of its mission by state 
controls. For example, since the Fund would still be subject to state 
personnel classifications and salaries, the hiring of professionals such as 
actuaries, investment managers, consulting physicians and attorneys would be 
limited. The state is not competitive with the private sector for many of 
these positions. Claims adjuster positions are filled by recruits with 
limited or no experience in claims adjusting and this is due to the low 
salaries given for this work compared with the private sector. This means 
there may be a long lead time before an adjuster is fully trained and 
proficient in the work. These examples illustrate the limitations which would 
restrict the Fund in fully accomplishing its mission of serving the business 
community of the state. 
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Alternative 4 would loosen state controls and give the Fund a more autonomous 
position relative to state government- The Fund would have more flexibility 
to respond to the market as decided by the board of directors. The board 
would be the governing body and, under this option, would become the fiduciary 
body for investments as well. There would be more expense involved in this 
alternative due to the need to establish an investment function at the Fund. 
This could be offset, however, with the greater control and flexibility gained 
over the investment function, and result in additional revenue. This function 
would be similar to that of the State Retirement Board which has in-house 
managers who monitor the private investment managers actually making the 
investments. 
RECOMMENDATION 2 
To provide the opportunity for the Fund to achieve its long term mission to 
the business community of the state, it is recommended that the Fund be 
granted autonomy from state controls and given the status of a quasi-public 
corporation, wi th a policyholder board of directors holding fiduciary 
responsibility for the Fund and its operations. At the same time autonomy is 
granted, it is imperative the Fund establish internal policies for purchasing, 
data processing, accounting and personnel which reflect state experience yet 
allow flexibility where it is needed. 
If it were not feasible to grant complete autonomy at the present time, 
independence from the Department should be granted and a board of directors 
established to act as the fiduciary body for the Fund. Under this option some 
or all state controls could still be maintained. 
IMPACT ON GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 
Although organizational autonomy for the Fund may improve accountability and 
productivity for both the Fund and the Department of Administrative Services, 
the impact on the rest of state government should also be considered. The 
alternatives should be examined specifically for their impact on the Governor 
and the Legislature. It is contended here that there will be no adverse 
impact. 
Elevating the Fund to autonomous status could affect the Governor in several 
ways. First, the Governor's span of control will not be enlarged with the 
addition of another autonomous agency, for the Governor will not be the 
governing body nor the fiduciary agent for the Fund. This will be the 
responsibility of the board of directors. 
The Governor would have some influence on the policies and operations of the 
Fund through the appointments he makes to the board of directors. This would 
be a regular annual event for there could be one director each year whose term 
expires. This would be an opportunity for a reappointment of a current 
director or a new appointment. 
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The Impact on the Legislature of autonomous status for the Fund could be less 
than that for the Governor. With the passage of Senate Bill 104 (1986 General 
Session), the Legislature already reviews separately the budget of the Fund 
and exercises limited authority to alter It. 
If the Fund were granted autonomous status, there would likely be more 
legislative scrutiny and oversight than at present due to the Increased 
visibility. The Senate would have to consent to appointments by the Governor 
for the Fund's board of directors. This would allow for a measure of 
oversight to occur by the Senate. 
Since the primary program of the Fund 1s workers' compensation, there is 
little involvement with any other part of state government, aside from the 
regulators noted earlier - the Industrial Commission and the Department of 
Insurance. No change would occur In these relationships. 
The impact on other departments will be negligible. The State Treasurer has 
indicated the removal of the Fund's assets from his management control would 
have little impact on his workload or on the remaining state assets. State 
agencies which hold policies through the Fund would not be affected except 
they would now have a voice on policy issues through the board of directors. 
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279, 167 P. 951; State v. Spillman, 110 
Wash. 662, 183 P. 915; State v. Wynn, 
125 Wash. 398, 216 P. S72." 
[2] Appellant makes some contention 
concerning the order of proof adopted in 
the trial of the case. That is immaterial, 
the corpus delicti being ultimately shown. 
State v. Marselle, 43 Wash. 273, 86 P. 
5S6. 
There was enough competent testimony 
to establish the corpus delicti and to sup-
port the verdict and judgment in all re-
spects. 
Affirmed 
MILLARD, C. J., and TOLMAX, HOL-
COMB, and BEALS, JJ., concur. 
fe^grw>aasY5TEw) 
C H E Z , At ty . Gen., v. I N D U S T R I A L COM-
MfSSfON O F UT/tH et af. 
No. 5731. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 1, 1936. 
1. States <§=»109 
Indebtedness to state Insurance fund, 
consisting of premiums and penalties paid by 
employers, maintained for purpose of insur-
ing employers against liability for compensa-
tion and of assuring the compensation, pro-
vided by compensation statute to persons en-
titled thereto, held not "indebtedness to state 
or any municipality thereof within Consti-
tution prohibiting Legislature from releasing 
or extinguishing indebtedness of any corpora-
tion or person to state, or to any municipality 
thereof (Rev.SU933, 42-2-1; Const, art. 6, 5 
27).i 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Indebted; Indebtedness," see Words & 
Phrases.] 
2. Master and servant <S=>383 
Industrial Commission Is without au-
thority to sell bonds held by the state insur-
ance fund without approval of board of ex-
aminers (Rev.SU933, 42-2-14). 
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'.(id) 
MOFFAT and EriIRAIM HANSON, JJ„ 
dissenting. 
Appeal from Original Proceeding in this 
Court. 
Original prohibition proceeding by Joseph 
Chez, Attorney General of Utah, against the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and others. 
Writ made permanent. 
S. D. Huffaker, of Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
Grover A. Giles and F. A. Trottier, both 
of Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
This is an application to prohibit the In-
dustrial Commission from accepting from 
the town of Scipio the sum of $7,200 in 
consideration of the surrender and cancel-
lation of seven of said town's $1,000 bonds 
together _wilh matured interest of $517.40. 
One bond,., due June 1, 1934, and another 
due June 1, 1935, are in default. The oth-
er five bonds had not matured when this 
writ was sued out. The petition alleges 
that the present value of all the bonds is 
S7.200. The action is really to procure an 
interpretation of section 27, art. 6, of our 
State Constitution, which reads as follows: 
'The Legislature shall have no power to 
release or extinguish, in whole or in part, 
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of 
any corporation or person to the State, or 
to any municipal corporation therein.'' 
It was rather presumed that the decision 
in this case would be of guidance to all of-
ficers, boards, departments, and commis-
sions as to their right to compromise or 
take less than the amount owing on or 
amount paid for bonds held by such orn-
cer, board, department, and commission. 
As will be seen by what is set out here-
under, this decision rests on its special 
facts and can form no such general rule 
of guidance. 
[1] We do not believe section 27, art. 6. 
applies to the facts of this case, because an 
indebtedness to the "State Insurance Fund" 
is not an indebtedness to the. state or any 
municipality thereof as meant by said sec-
tion 27. It must be kept in mind through-
out the ensuing discussion that the question 
is not whether the State Insurance Fund 
is a "public fund" in the sense that it is 
publicly administered, but whether a debt or 
i American Fuel Co. of Utah r. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah, 4S3, 1ST P. 633, S A.L. 
R. 1342. 
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ohlisation owing to it is an obligation or 
liability to the state as mean: by section 
27. art. 6. We shall examine the nature 
«>f the State Insurance Fund and see what 
: : really is. Section 42-2-1. R.5.1933, re-
dac t ing the original section contained in 
the 1917 laws, sets up the State Insurance 
Fund. It states: "There shall be maintain-
ed a fund * * * for the purpose of 
insuring employers against liability for the 
compensation, and of assuring to the per-
sons entitled thereto the compensation, pro-
rided by this title. Such fund shall consist 
[1] of all premiums and penalties received 
and paid into the fund, [2] of property and 
securities acquired by and through the use 
of moneys belonging to the fund, and [3] 
of interest earned upon money belonging 
to the fund and deposited or invested as 
herein provided.'* (Italics supplied.) It 
will be noted that the basic source of the 
fund is the premiums and penalties—noth-
ing else. Originally the state contributed 
:r40.000 to-start the fund,-but this-was to 
initiate it, and as a contribution towards 
its establishment—a benevolence. True, if 
the state has not been paid back on liquida-
tion it would probably have a claim for its 
advancement. But such <$dvancerr.cnt in no 
wise changed the nature of the fund. i. e., 
one derived from premiums and penalties 
payable by employers. And what is it ex-
pended for? It is paid on account of the 
employer for compensation for zihich he is 
primarily liable. See American Fuel Co. of 
Utah v. Industrial C~mrn., 55 Utah. 4S3. 187 
P. 633, S A.L.R. 13-2. The employer real-
ly pools his premiums in the S:ate Fund 
to create a fund for the payment of an 
obligation for which it is liable. It is a 
common fund belonging to the participat-
ing employers. It is therefore not derived 
from anything owing to the stare nor paid 
out on behalf of any state obligation. The 
coming into the fund is voluntary. If em-
ployers band together and form their own 
fund with a management selected by them, 
which fund would pay their compensation 
liability, there would be no question as to 
the nature of the fund. It would not then 
even be public moneys in the sense that it 
was in custody of and managed by a pub-
lic body or held by a public omcial. Change 
the situation somewhat. The Legislature 
provides for workmen's compensation, a 
social and a public purpose. The end it 
desired to accomplish was to see that work-
men incapacitated by industrial accidents 
or their dependents in case of an industrial 
death were paid something to live on. Not 
so much to accomplish this end as to as-
sure its accomplishment, ^the Legislature 
required the compensation risk to be in-
sured. It provided in cases of financially 
able employers for self-insurance. Those 
not obtaining the privilege of self-insur-
ance could either insure in a private carrier 
or in a fund which the Legislature pro-
vided for, consisting of employers' contri-
butions or premiums. Forty thousand dol-
lars was given to start it off, and premiums 
are paid into it by the state for its own 
employees like any private employer. But 
basically it is no different than if the state' 
and a^number of private empJoy,ers:agr«d_ 
to establish their own fund. It was made-
easier by" setting tip a .skeleton fund to be-
gin with, giving the Industrial Commission 
the administration of it and providing by 
law for rules and regulations to govern it. 
That reached more quickly and more easily 
* the same result as a mutual company would-
have reached. If served .to give employers; 
who were forced to insure, a means to g^t 
the insurance practically for the "cost of .the 
compensation without charges for profits 
or acquisition and in addition gave it a pub-
lic aspect and made its administration and 
management subject to public audit, inspec-
tion, and responsibility. But it did not 
change the essential nature of the venture. 
It was a venture by the state as an em-
ployer and certain private employers who 
choose to come in, in which they pooled 
their„premiums to create a fund for the pur-
pose oi paying, not a state obligation or 
making expenditures on behalf of the state, 
but of paying their own contingent compen-
sation liabilities. Any indebtedness or obli-
gation to such a fund, whether for premium 
payments, or principal or interest on s*e-
__curities invested in. is not an indebtedness 
or obligation or liability to the state as 
meant by section 27, art. 6, of our Consti-
tution. Should the state at some time es-
tablish a means whereby counties, cities, 
school districts, etc., could pay bond pre-
miums into a fund and obtain faithful per-
formance bonds from the body required by 
law to administer the fund, the state itself 
bonding its officers therein, and should make 
any profits payable to those contributing 
to the fund and should start it on by an 
advancement of $40,000. it would not be 
contended that such fund operated by the 
state purely for the benefit of the partici-
pants made, an indebtedness to the fund an 
indebtedness to the state. 
This theory is amply borne out by other 
sections of the Code. The cost of the audit 
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{s paid out of the fund, not by the state 
{)r out of an appropriation. Section 42-2-2. 
•'There shall be no liability on the part of 
the s*ate beyond the amount of such fund." 
Section 42-2-1. Thus, the state in efFcct 
5ays: "We will create, establish, manage, 
-ollect and administer through the Indus-
trial Commission but as an agent and trus-
tee only for the contributing employers." 
The commission may reinsure risks. Sec-
tion 42-2-9. By section 42-2-10, subsecs. (3) 
and (4), balances earned and not needed as 
reserves are turned where? Not to the 
state, but back to the contributing employ-
ers. If the Legislature decided to discon-
tinue the State Fund, upon liquidation any_-
rhin°" not needed to pay contingencies would 
he returned to the contributing employers. 
The fund is publicly administered, but its 
debtors are not debtors to the state. It 
. belongs, not to the state, but to the con-
tributing employers for their mutual bene-
nt. It constitutes a pooling of risks under 
the auspices of the-state. See 71 CJ. 9G0, 
§ 62S; State ex rel. Stearns v. Olson, 43 N. 
b 619, 175 N.W. 714; State v. Padgett, 54 
N\D. 211, 209 N.W. 338; Industrial Com-
mission of Colorado v. Stong, 77 Colo. 590, 
239 P. 12. Section 3096, aComp.Laws Utah 
1917, provided that the commission was 
vested with full authority over said fund, 
and may do all things necessary or con-
venient in the administration thereof, or 
in connection with the insurance business to 
MJ carried on by it under the provisions of 
.hat title. This section recognized it as an 
•insurance business.'' It is an insurance 
' business for the benefit and accommodation 
ui the contributing employers. It provides 
,i means for meeting an obligation placed 
..p. them by the Legislature which at the 
sime time is useful in holding down the 
charges of the private stock companies. 
The Legislature gave the commission "full 
authority'' over the fund. 
Owing to the fact that we have conclud-
ed that the State Insurance Fund, while a 
public fund in the sense of being adminis-
tered by a public body, is not public money 
in the sense that it is money of the state 
to be used for and on behalf of the state 
for a state expenditure, and therefore mon-
ey owing to it is not an obligation to the 
state as meant by section 27, art. 6, of the 
Constitution, it is unnecessary for us in this 
opinion to discuss or decide the question 
of whether section 27, art. 6, is a prohibi-
tion only against the Legislature as such or 
whether it extends to administrative or 
executive bodies or commissions created by 
the Legislature. Nor is it necessary for 
us to decide whether debts owing to the 
State Land Board, or other departments, 
commissions, or boards, may be compro-
mised by such bodies. Cases involving the 
right to compromise by such bodies will 
have to be decided on their facts when and 
as they arise. 
[2] We have decided the question pre-
sented in this case without determining 
whether there was not by injunction a 
speedy and adequate remedy at law. Hav-
ing now decided the legal question present-
ed, we are compelled nevertheless.to make 
the writ permanent because the Industrial 
Commission is without authority to sell the 
bonds without the approval of the Board 
of Examiners. The Chief Justice has call-
ed our attention to section 42-2-14, R.S. 
1933, reading as "follows: '-The commission 
may invest any of the surplus or reserve 
belonging to the state insurance fund^in 
bonds of the United States or federal land 
banks,- of this state, or of any county, city, 
town or school district of this state, at cur-
rent market prices for such bonds; or in 
first mortgages on real estate at not to ex-
ceed forty per cent of the cash value there-
of; provided, that such purchase or invest-
ment is authorized by a resolution adopted 
by the commission and approved by the 
state board of examiners. * * * The 
state treasurer shall honor and pay all 
vouchers drawn on the state insurance fund 
for the purchase of such bonds when signed 
by any two members of the commission up-
on delivery of said bonds to him when there 
is attached to such voucher a certified copy 
of such approved resolution of the commis-
sion authorizing the purchase of such bonds: 
and the commission may sell any of such 
bonds upon like resolution, and the proceeds 
thereof shall be paid by the purchaser to 
the state treasurer." 
The words "like resolution," in the last 
three lines of this section, we think, refer 
to "approved resolution." 
Since it does not appear that the Indus-
trial Commission has obtained the approval 
of the Board of Examiners to the proposed 
sale, the writ must be made permanent. 
Such is the order. 
ELIAS HANSEN, C J., and FOL-
LAND, J., concur. 
MOFFAT, Justice (dissenting). 
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I dissent. The petition alleges that peti-
tioner is the Attorney General of the State 
of Utah, a property owner and taxpayer of 
the state. That the Industrial Commission 
is a body corporate oi the state and the 
individual defendants are the duly appoint-
ed, qualified, and acting' members of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. That the 
town of Scipio is a municipal corporation 
of the state of Utah, organized and exist-
ing by virtue of the laws thereof. That 
about June, 1925, the town of Scipio is-
sued and sold, and the State Insurance 
Fund by and through the Industrial Com-
mission purchased, seven $1,000 bonds, 
which bonds were general obligations of 
the town and the full faith and credit and 
all taxable property within the town lim-
its were pledged for the punctual payment 
of the principal and interest thereof. 
That one of said bonds so purchased be-
came due and payable June 1,-1934, another 
June 1, 1935, and one each year thereaft-
er until June 1, 1940. A copy of one of 
the bonds is made a part of the petition. 
The defendants purchased the said seven 
bonds for and on behalf of the State In-
surance Fund. The purchase price there-
of was paid out o*£ and belonged to said 
fund. The bonds were deposited with the 
State Treasurer, and ever since their pur-
chase have been and now are in his cus-
tody and under the administration and in 
the control of the defendants as provided 
by law. The bonds maturing June 1, 1934, 
and June 1, 1935, have not been-paid. There 
is accrued interest due and unpaid in the 
sum of $517.40. 
It is *hen alleged that the town of Scipio 
is ottering to the defendants, the Industrial 
Commission and the members thereof in 
their official capacity, the sum of $7,200 for 
the cancellation of an obligation of $7,-
717.40, and in consideration of the offered 
payment requests the surrender, cancella-
tion, and release of all claim and obliga-
tion on the said bonds held as aforesaid 
against the town of Scipio. It is also al-
leged that the present market value of the 
said bonds, including the interest, is the 
sum of $7,200, the amount alleged to be of-
fered for the surrender and relinquishment 
thereof. It is further alleged that the de-
fendants have threatened to and will accept 
the offer of payment of $7,200 and will 
surrender and return to the town of Scipio 
the said bonds, and will release it from all 
obligations arising by virtue of the bonds, 
unless prohibited by order of this court, 
and that the defendants will ask and re-
ceive the consent of any other state offi-
cers or departments whose consent may be 
thought necessary to brini^ about a surren-
der, release, and cancellation ot said bonds. 
PlaintilY makes the usual allegation that he 
has no plain, speedy, r.nd ?Ac ;u:ite remedy 
in the ordinary course of law. and prays 
for the writ aforesaid restraining and pro-
hibiting defendants and each ox them from 
relinquishing, canceling, or returning the 
said bon Is to the town of Scipio for any 
sum less than the principal thereof with the 
full amount of the accrued interest thereon, 
and for general relief. 
There are not many cases bearing direct-
ly upon the question as submitted in the 
briefs and arguments presented to the court. 
The briefs and arguments stress the-twenty-
seventh section of article 6 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah. Before quoting the section or 
•discussing the matter, wc desire to say there 
is involved,, in the view we take of the 
case, more than the construction* and appli-
cability of the section of the Constitution 
referred to. Section 27 of article 6 reads: 
"The Legislature shall have no power to 
release or extinguish, in whole or in part, 
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of 
any corporation or person to the State, or 
to any municipal corporation therein." 
Does a bond purchased with the surplus 
or reserve funds of the "State Insurance 
Fund'' bring into existence an indebtedness, 
liability,..or obligation to the state? We 
think it does. It is to be observed that 
the questions under consideration relate to 
an indebtedness, liability, or obligation up-
on an investment in and disposition of 
bonds only. Under the provisions of the 
statute, 'The commission may invest any 
of the surplus or reserve belonging to the 
state insurance fund in bonds of the Unit-
ed States or federal land banks [bonds], of 
this state, or of any county, city, town 
or school district of this state, at current 
market prices for such bonds." R.S.Utah 
1933, 42-2-14. Under the provisions of sec-
tion 42-2-3, R.S.1933, "The commission shall 
administer the state insurance fund 
* * * agreeably to the provisions of this 
title." 
It has been held that the State Insurance 
Fund has no corporate existence. It has 
no power to claim or assert an indebtedness 
or an obligation to it as such. The ques-
tion of the status of the State Insurance 
Fund was set forth in the case of Baa & 
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t r i r iva Co. v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah/67 Utah, 301, 247 P. 490, 492. It is 
there said: "We have endeavored to point 
o u t that the Legislature has in no way at-
•Jnirred to make, nor has it made, the state 
insurance fund an independent entity disas-
sociated from the Industrial Commission. 
The fund *s n o t £P v e n an>' °* ^ i e powers 
usualH' provided or deemed necessary for 
tho functioning of a body corporate. In 
o : ; K r words, the state insurance fr.r.d as a 
Ic^al entity has no existence." There is a 
vJrv ?wd reason for the Supreme Court to 
Sn \:c\df as will appear from a later ref-
erence to the State Constitution relating to 
th.- matter. 
The State Insurance Fund, as such, may 
neither contract nor be contracted with. It 
i r : .v not incur an indebtedness nor obliga-
t ; n nor-claim the right to collect if such 
Wwre claimed. The Scipio bonds proposed 
t 0 be surrendered or canceled are* riot an 
• .Miration,, indebtedness, or liability to the 
S^ce Insurance Fund, though required to 
be deposited therein when purchased and re-
ceived. The Scipio bonds, or any other 
[.;nd or obligation, indebtedness, or liabil-
i;v arising out oi the investment by the 
Industrial Commission, do not create an in-
debtedness, liability, or obligation to the In-
dustrial Commission, as such, or to the 
members thereof, individually or collective-
ly. To argue so would be equivalent to ar-
cuir.g that school funds invested by the 
<;ate Land Board in bonds or other obliga-
tions become obligations due to the Land 
P.oard. or the members thereof. Because 
the State Treasurer is the custodian of the 
Srate Insurance Fund and is required to col-
lect the principal and interest on the bonds 
and deposit such collections in the fund 
does not make the obligation or the fund 
run to the State Treasurer. Section 42-2-14, 
R.S.1933, provides: "All such securities so 
purchased shall be placed forthwith in the 
hands of the state treasurer, who is hereby 
designated as custodian thereof, and it shall 
be his duty to collect the interest thereon 
as the same becomes due and payable, and 
also the principal thereof, and to place the 
iuine when collected to the credit of the 
state insurance fund/' 
That the "State Insurance Fund" is a 
public fund, a fund the state by its agen-
cies is administering for the state and be-
longs to the state, without indulging in re-
finements as to the nature of ownership, 
seems beyond question. Public funds are 
62 P.(2d)—35# 
"moneys belonging to a government, or any 
department of it, in the hands of a public 
official." Webster's New Int. Diet., 1005. 
"After the premiums are paid into the fund 
by the employer under the act, the fund be-
comes the property of the state, and is held 
in trust for the payment of compensation to 
such injured employees as the state may des-
ignate." (Italics added.) State ex rel. Wil-
liams v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 116 
Ohio St. 45, 156 N.E. 101, 103. The State 
Insurance Fund being a public fund, as dis-
tinguished from private funds, the bonds in 
question being a part of that fund, the ob-
ligation to pay such bonds as long as they 
remain a part of that fund is an obligation, 
indebtedness, or liability to the state, to be 
held, collected, or recovered by the properly 
designated state agencies. 
No-statute or authority is cited giving the 
Industrial Commission or any other state 
agency or officer authority or power to re-
lease or extinguish,' in whole or in part, 
the indebtedness, liability, or obligation to 
the state, and such power being denied the 
Legislature, it follows that the Industrial 
Commission may not do what it is not au-
thorized to do, nor what the Legislature 
may neither do nor authorize to be done. 
Section 1, art. 12, of the State Constitu-
tion provides: "Corporations may be form-
ed under general laws, but shall not be cre-
ated by special acts. All laws relating to 
corporations may be altered, amended or 
repealed by the Legislature, and all corpo-
rations doing business in this State, may, as 
to such business, be regulated, limited or 
restrained by law." 
The State Insurance Fund, under the lim-
itations imposed by the above provision. . 
could not, by the Legislature, be created or 
made a private corporation. Nor could the 
Legislature make the Industrial Commission 
a private corporation. Both the State In-
surance Fund and the State Industrial Com-
mission were created by special acts of the 
Legislature, and whatever status either of 
them may occupy in the administrative 
economy of the state, it must be that of an 
arm of the state and function as such. Nei-
ther the Industrial Commission or the State 
Insurance Fund can be a municipal corpo-
ration. Section 5, art. 11, of our Constitu-
tion provides, among other things, that, 
"Corporations for municipal purposes shall 
not be created by special laws." The In-
dustrial Commission, therefore, could not, 
under the special law creating it, obtain the 
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stains of a municipal corporation. The 
same is likewise true of the State Insurance 
Fund. May the State Legislature by special 
act create a state agency to do private busi-
ness, or develop two state agencies into a 
private business for the purpose of carry-
ing on an industrial insurance business, or 
set up a municipal agency to accomplish the 
same purpose? The provisions of the Con-
stitution forbid. State agencies are for the 
purpose of doing state business. If the 
Legislature may create some floating entity 
without ancestry, set it going as an orphan 
institution under the administration of a 
state-created board, agency, commission, or 
what not, acting for and on bqhalf of the 
state, and that agency may do things un-
der a* legislative enactment which the Leg-
islature is prohibited from enacting under 
the limitations of the Constitution, the con-
stitutional limitations or prohibitions or 
mandates become easy of evasion and their: 
existence a mere matter of words to be ig-
nored or disregarded whenever the desire to 
accomplish a given purpose may suggest a 
convenient procedure. 
The State Insurance Fund is a special 
trust fund, appropriated by the Legislature 
and built up by a direct appropriation of 
State Funds, with a provision for repay-
ment, with further provisions relative to the 
amount required to be accumulated by the 
payment of premiums into that'fund, the ' 
consideration for which is" insurance for em-
ployees of employers so paying. The ad-
ministration thereof as provided by law does 
not remove the fund from the effect of the 
constitutional limitation safeguarding that 
fund from depletion in the manner specified. 
Words and phrases are difficult of exact 
definition. When we use the phrase "public 
fund," we convert the word "public/* orig-
inally and commonly used as a noun, into an 
adjective. It is a convertible term, difficult 
if not impossible of definition and used va-
riously, depending upon the subjects to 
which it is applied. See 50 CJ . 44. The 
word "fund" is likewise a word with a va-
riety of meanings. Constructions differ, 
and the classification of a fund must depend 
upon and be gathered from the context. 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in 
the case of Tandsetter v. Oscarson, 56 N.D. 
392, 217 N.W. 660, referred to the Work-
men's Compensation Fund as a public fund. 
Chie'f Justice Budge, speaking for the Idaho 
Supreme Court in the case of Parsons v. 
Diefendorf. 53 Idaho. 219, 23 P. (2d) 236. 
239. in discussing the proposed sale of cer-
tain securities purchased with school funds 
(while neither the constitutional provision 
nor the statute is identical with ours, the 
situation is sufficiently analogous to be of 
interest), says: "The trust created by the 
Constitution and laws of this state is a fixed 
trust, in no sense a speculative trust or a 
trust that can be used for speculative pur-
poses, however advantageous a change in 
investments may appear," 
Under the Utah statute, the Industrial 
Commission is authorized to sell the bonds 
and mortgages referred to in the section, 
yet the fund is in no sense a speculative 
fund. The type of securities in which the 
surplus and reserve may be invested clear-
ly indicates its character. The law requires 
the investment of the surplus and reserve 
of the State Insurance* Fund in such securi-
ties as will preclude all reasonable possibil-
ity of loss or depletion by release, cancel-
lation, or sale so long as the ordinary proc-
esses of government are operating and 
maintained. This surplus fund investment 
is designed as a security, not to be released 
except upon payment in full of the obliga-
tion in which the fund is invested. 
The last clause of section 42-2-14, R.S. 
1933, provides: "The commission may sell 
any of such bonds upon like resolution, and 
the proceeds thereof shall be paid by the 
purchaser to the state treasurer." 
Defendants cite and rely upon Burr v. 
City of Carbondale, 76 111. 455. In that 
case the question was only indirectly in-
volved. Certain bonds had been issued for 
the construction of certain school and oth-
er buildings. The state later took over the 
project and became possessed of bonds for-
merly issued. The Legislature had author-
ized the issuance of a smaller amount of 
bonds and the cancellation of the larger 
and former issue of bonds upon sale of the 
subsequent bonds and payment of an amount 
considerably less than the amount of bonds 
held by the Governor. Numerous questions 
were presented including the validity of 
both the original and refunding issue of the 
bonds. The section of the Illinois Constitu-
tion (art. 4, § 23) is practically the same 
as section 27, art. 6, of our Constitution. 
Without argument or discussion and by a 
divided court the Illinois court on this point 
said: 
"But they contend, if the original issue 
was legal, then they insist that the resolu-
tion of the General Assembly of 1S71, au-
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The statute makes it the duty oi the State* thorizi'nc the Go\ernor to sell them to the 
c;tv i^u*ng them, is an infraction of sec- Treasurer to collect. If a contest or ques-
tion 23. of article 4. oi the present consti- ticn of value, hacaid, or doubtful recovery 
tution. That section is as follows: T h e 
Gcneial Assembly shall have no power to 
release or extinguish, in whole or in part, 
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of 
any corporation or md:\ idual to this State/ 
"We can not suppose this pro\ision was 
designed to embrace a case like this. If it 
vices, then the original issue being held valid, 
those bonds are still binding upon the city, 
and they must pay them. But we do not 
think this section of article 4 was intended 
to embrace a release of claims doubtful or 
hacaidous, which the State might hold 
against a municipal or other corporation or 
individual. On the face-of those bonds the 
State was not named as the obligee. They 
do not purport to be an undertaking in 
which fhe State is a party. They had be-
come the property of the State, which the 
Governor, under the resolution, was author-
ized to sell to the obligors for less than- one-
third of their nominal value." (Italics 
ours.) 
The case of Burr v. Carbondale, supra, 
was briefly referred to an£ commented up-
on in the case of State ex rel. Wilson v. 
Young, 44 Wyo. 6, 7 ?.(2d) 216, 221, to the 
effect that: "That decision goes too far, 
perhaps, and we are not at this time pre-
pared to follow it to its full extent, but it 
indicates, nevertheless, the rule that should 
»^ applied in this case." 
In addition to what was sa.d by the Wyo-
ming court as to the Illinois case going too 
far, it appears to us that the basis upon 
which the case is put as to whether or not 
the constitutional provision is applicable is 
untenable. 
When a claim is "doubtful or hazardous" 
and realization thereof becomes a matter 
for judicial determination, a different situa-
tion is presented than canceling an obliga-
tion by an administrative body, no matter 
how honest the intention or capable the per-
sonnel of such agency. If the power were 
to be left to the Legislature or any adminis-
trative agency set up by it to determine 
whether a claim, indebtedness, or obligation 
were "doubtful or hazaidous" and releases 
made upon such determination as a purely 
administrative matter, aside from any ques-
tion of good or bad faith, no standard or 
measure of determining such question could 
be made controlling The Constitution was 
intended to prevent preferential negotia-
tions from being made. 
is presented when the matter gets before the 
courts, the question then ceases to be one 
of release from indebtedness or liability. 
It becomes one of what may reasonably 
be recovered, as disclosed by the evidence. 
Bankruptcy, corporate dissolution, ability 
to realize upon taxes properly levied, catas-
trophes, droughts, or other factors may. 
when the question is submitted to the courts, 
be properly there for consideration. The 
constitutional inhibition runs against the 
Legislature, not the courts. 
Under the authority to sell bonds upon 
proper resolution of the Industrial Commis-
sion, as is authorized by section 42-2-14, R. 
S. 1933. such sale must be one in good faith 
to a good-faith purchaser, and must not be 
for tess than market value. No facts arc-
alleged from which a market value may be 
inferred or determined. It is not alleged 
that the bonds had been offered for sale 
either publicly or privately. There are no 
allegations indicating any necessity for a 
sale. Nor is there any showing that the 
obligor on the bonds is not able to pay ac-
cording to the contract contained in the 
bonds themselves. By the contract obliga-
tion of the bonds, the "full faith and credr 
and all taxable property within the town ol 
Scipio * * * are and shall continue to 
be pledged to the punctual pa\ment of the 
principal and interest" of the bonds here 
proposed to be canceled for less than there 
is due there.on. From the offer made. Sci-
pio must be soh ent. Under such a show ing. 
notwithstanding the allegation and, by de-
murrer, the admission, it would amount to 
a legal fraud upon the state and the State 
Insurance Fund to permit a cancellation of 
the bonds for less than the amount due and 
the State Insurance Fund would be depleted 
to the extent of the difference without air 
consideration therefor, and if it should *K 
shown that full payment could be made can-
cellation for less would be a fraud upon thv 
state, and a dereliction of duty for which 
officers should be personally responsible. 
Aiide from any constitutional inhibition, it 
would be legal fraud to sell the bonds for 
less than the amount due thereon, until a 
showing should be made indicating a rea-
sonable necessity therefor, and a legal order 
obtained therefor. No showing is made that 
the Insurance Fund must have the cash to 
carry on, nor is it intimated that the town 
of Scipio is unable to pay in full. An ex-
cellent credit standing is indicated from the 
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allegation that Scipio is offering to pay the 
major part of the bonds before maturity. 
No doubt the upstanding citizenry of Scipio 
would resent an imputation that its credit 
was not good, that the faith pledged when 
the bonds were issued had been blighted and 
-should now be held for naught, that the 
town was bankrupt, or that by the ordinary 
processes of taxation the necessary funds 
could not be raised to meet the bonds in 
question. 
The statute makes it the duty of the State 
Treasurer to collect the interest on the 
bonds in which the surplus and reserve of 
the Insurance Fund may be invested as the 
same becomes due and also the principal. 
R.S.Utah 1933, § 42-2-14. It is alleged that 
two of the bonds are past due and that there 
is unpaid interest. No suggestion is made 
as to why the Industrial Commission, in 
'pursuance of its'duty, has not called upon 
the State Treasurer to do his duty in this 
regard as required by the statute nor why 
he should not be requested to do so before 
the commission proposes to accept less than 
is due, upon an apparently sound obliga-
tion, and thus bring discredit to a good-faith 
obligation involving the integrity of a mu-
nicipality of the state without exhausting 
the remedy provided by law. 
It does not appear that a demand has 
been made by the treasurer or any one else 
•for payment of a just and apparently sound 
obligation, worth all that is due thereon. 
Should demand be made for payment and 
refused for any reason, then it would be 
the duty cf the State Treasurer to discharge 
the duty imposed upon him and proceed by 
law to enforce payment. It would be time 
enough to consider compromise, if compro-
mise were proposed, when a showing had 
been made in court that a state of bank-
ruptcy existed or that the obligation was 
hazardous or doubtful or recovery in full 
could not be had. The question would then 
be one for the court upon the issues and 
the evidence to determine, not that the lia-
bility, indebtedness, or obligation should be 
released in whole or in part, but on the con-
tested or conceded issues, how much or 
what could be recovered as shown by the 
evidence or as to what could be realized 
upon a judgment. If the authority vested 
and power conferred to levy ta^ces upon the 
property may not result in raising funds 
to pay the obligation in full, a state of 
bankruptcy may be found to exist and* the 
treasurer would no doubt be compelled to 
be content with such recovery as was pos-
sible. 
Such procedure is the intent of the stat-
ute. The surplus and reserve of the State 
Insurance Fund may be invested only in 
bonds of the United States or federal land 
banks, or bonds of this state, or bonds of 
any county, city, town, or school district, or 
first mortgages on real estate at not to ex-
ceed 40 per cent of the cash value thereof. 
It may be observed that the bond invest-
ments are limited to those issued by the 
United States, the state, or municipal arms 
of the state endowed with a general tax-
ing power equal to that provided for the 
.support of government itself." 
No want of good faith on the pan of the 
Industrial Commission, the State Treasurer, 
or other state agency is alleged or imputed, 
and nothing indicating such want of good 
faith is suggested nor remotely imputed 
'from what is said in this opinion. 
The question of the market value is not 
an issue. The amount for which the pro-
posed cancellation is to be made is said to 
be the market value. This is a conclusion. 
The law has provided for the investment of 
the funds in securities of such character 
as to eliminate questions of market value 
and such as to remove any necessity for a 
cancellation, release, or extinguishment of 
the debt, in whole or in part. The indebt-
edness, liability, or obligation evidenced by 
the bonds proposed to be released and can-
celled for less than the contract obligation 
would seem to require no sacrifice. 
In the case of Industrial Commission v. 
Stong, 77 Colo. 590, 239 P. 12, 14, the State 
Treasurer was directed by the Industrial 
Commission to invest certain of the state 
compensation insurance funds, of which he 
was custodian, in government bonds. The 
treasurer disregarded the direction given 
him and otherwise invested the fund until 
a loss was suffered when he complied. Suit 
in mandamus and for damages was insti-
tuted. The court said: "Plaintiff and Stong 
were in effect, if not technically, trustees 
of a public trust. They were obliged to 
invest this insurance fund as provided by 
law and in that way obtain an income from 
it for the benefit of dependents under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. That duty 
they could not neglect without responsibil-
ity, nor could they distribute gratis the fund 
thus intrusted to their care. * * * Cer-
tainly the commission could no more con-
sent that he fail in that duty than it could 
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consent that he appropriate the fund to his 2. Municipal corporations 0=57, 59 
own use." 
In principle, the commission can no more 
consent to cancellation or release of the 
obligation or indebtedness due from the in-
vestment of the insurance fund in the Sci-
pio bonds than it could consent to appropri-
ate the difference in amount due and the 
amount proposed to be paid to the construc-
tion of a monument to an honored citizen, 
who in his heart might say, "The humble 
shall see this and be glad.'' 
It is more important to maintain the hon-
esty and commercial integrity of people, 
cities, towns, and the state than to consider 
small losses or gains. 'To do justice and 
judgment is more acceptable to the Lord 
than Sacrifice." Prow 21:2, 3. "He that 
oppresseth the poor :o increase his riches, 
and he that giveth to the rich, shall surely 
come to want." Prow 22:16. If the State 
"Treasurer should find, in the orderly proc-
ess of collection, that the obligor has noth-
ing or not enough with which to pay and 
such showing be made, let justice be done. 
The peremptory writ of prohibition here-
tofore issued should be made permanent. 
Municipalities have only those powers 
which are given in express words necessarily 
or fairly impliable in or incident to power 
specifically granted or essential to accom-
plishment of declared objects and purposes of 
municipality.! 
3. Municipal corporations 0=870 
City held not authorized to use city funds 
to buy unsoline for sale, under statutory au-
thority to deal in commodities if for conve-
nience, comfort, and prosperity of inhabi-
tants, since such authority is limited by pro-
visions which specify particular purposes for 
which ordinances may be passed (Rev.St.1933, 
15-8-2).* 
4. Municipal corporations @=>57 
City has no power to deal in fuel, food, 
and other necessities to prevent exploitation 
of inhabitants'by monopolies and combina-
tions designed to keep up prices inordinately, 
in absence of express legislative grant, as-
suming that Legislature has constitutional 
authority to confer such power. 
EPHRAIM HANSON, Justice. 
I concur in the views expressed in the 
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice MOF-
FAT. 
<rv*St;jrsTW> 
Original proceeding on the application 
of the American Petroleum Company and 
others for a permanent writ of prohibition 
against Ogden City and others, a tem-
porary writ having been granted. 
Writ made absolute, 
J. Quill Nebeker, of Ogden, for plain-
tiffs. 
George S. Barker, of Ogden, for de-
fendants. 
AMERICAN PETROLEUM CO. et al. V, 
OGDEN CITY et ai. 
No. 5776. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nor. 28, 1936. 
f. Prohibition <3=>28 
Supreme Court would consider, on oil 
companies' application for permanent writ of 
prohibition, whether city acted in excess of 
its jurisdiction in using city funds to buy gas-
oline for sale, where city did not raise ques-
tion that injunction furnished speedy and 
adequate remedy. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Application for a permanent writ of 
prohibition. Temporary writ granted. 
The allegations material to this opinion 
contained in the petition are as follows: 
That the commissioners of Ogden City 
were using city funds "and city credit with 
which to purchase gasoline for sale, and 
were selling gasoline and other products 
to the customers of these plaintiffs for 
their private use, and in direct competition 
with the plaintiffs, and for the purpose of 
compelling the plaintiffs to reduce the 
price of their commodities, and that the 
plaintiffs would thereby be caused to be-
i Salt Lake City v. Sutter, SI Utah, 533, 
'216 P. 234; American Fork City v. Rob-
inson, 7? Utah, 16$, 292 P. 249; Utah 
Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City (Utah) 
58 P.(2d) 1. 
2 Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah, 533, 
216 P. 234. 
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STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 14658. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 14, 1978. 
State Tax Commission brought action against State 
Department of Finance, as administrator of State 
Insurance Fund, seeking payment of tax imposed upon 
State Insurance Fund. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered summary 
judgment declaring tax to be unconstitutional, and Tax 
Commission appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
held that tax of one percent of total premiums 
received, imposed, from among all employers' 
workmen's compensation insurers, only upon State 
Insurance Fund, which held assets only to cover 
identical obligations covered by private insurers, 
which had same administrative costs as private 
insurers, which had same rights to sue and be sued 
and to make contracts as private insurers, and which 
enjoyed no immunities not provided to private 
insurers, was arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited 
as violation of equal protection. 
Affirmed. 
[1] WORKERS' COMPENSATION kll 
413kll 
Purposes of Workmen's Compensation Act are to 
assure injured employee and his family an income 
during period of his total disability as well as 
compensation for any resulting permanent disability, 
to eliminate expense, delay and uncertainty of 
employee having to prove employer's negligence, and 
to place burden of industrial injuries on industry. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 etseq. 
[2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k211(l) 
92k211(l) 
Equal protection protects against discrimination within 
a class; Legislature has considerable discretion in 
designation of classifications but court must determine 
whether such classifications operate equally on all 
persons similarly situated. Const, art. 1, § 2; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
[2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k211(2) 
92*211© 
Equal protection protects against discrimination within 
a class; Legislature has considerable discretion in 
designation of classifications but court must determine 
whether such classifications operate equally on all 
persons similarly situated. Const, art. 1, § 2; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. 
[3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k228.5 
92k228.5 
Tax of one percent of total premiums received, 
imposed, from among all employers' workmen's 
compensation insurers, only upon State Insurance 
Fund, which held assets only to cover identical 
obligations covered by private insurers, which had 
same administrative costs as private insurers, which 
had same rights to sue and be sued and to make 
contracts as private insurers, and which enjoyed no 
immunities not provided to private insurers, was 
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited as violation of 
equal protection. Const, art. 1, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14; U.C.A.1953, 31-14-4(l)(b). 
[3] WORKERS' COMPENSATION k35 
413k35 
Tax of one percent of total premiums received, 
imposed, from among all employers' workmen's 
compensation insurers, only upon State Insurance 
Fund, which held assets only to cover identical 
obligations covered by private insurers, which had 
same administrative costs as private insurers, which 
had same rights to sue and be sued and to make 
contracts as private insurers, and which enjoyed no 
immunities not provided to private insurers, was 
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited as violation of 
equal protection. Const, art. 1, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14; U.C.A.1953, 3l-14-4(l)(b). 
[4] STATUTES k81 
361k81 
Because all companies furnishing workmen's 
compensation insurance are of a single class, law 
operating exclusively upon one member of that class 
is constitutionally invalid as a special law. Const, art. 
6, § 26. 
•1298 Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., G. Blaine 
Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Joseph P. McCarthy, 
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Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Appeal from a summary judgment declaring a tax 
levied against the State Insurance Fund under U.C.A., 
1953, 31-14-4(l)(b) to be unconstitutional. We 
affirm. 
[1] Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act [FN1] was 
first enacted in 1917 largely as a consequence of the 
hazards associated with die growth of industry. The 
purposes of the Act are to assure the injured employee 
and his family an income during the period of his total 
disability as well as compensation for any resulting 
permanent disability, to eliminate the expense, delay 
and uncertainty of the employee having to prove the 
employer's negligence, and to place the burden of 
industrial injuries on industry.[FN2] To assure the 
availability of funds when such injury occurs, 
employers are required by law [FN3] to secure 
compensation through one of three ways: (1) the State 
Insurance Fund; (2) private insurance carriers; or (3) 
self-insurance. Participation in the State Insurance 
Fund is therefore voluntary, and although publicly 
administered, it is a private trust fund to be used to 
meet liabilities of various employers when an 
employee is entitled to compensation. [FN4] 
FN1. U.C.A., 1953, Title 35, Chapter 1. 
FN2. Wilstead v. Industrial Comm., 17 Utah 2d 
214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965). 
FN3. U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-46. 
FN4. Gronning v. Smart, Utah, 561 P.2d 690 
(1977); Chez v. Industrial Comm., 90 Utah 447, 
62 P.2d 549 (1936). 
Every company providing workmen's compensation 
insurance in Utah, (including the State Insurance 
Fund), is required to pay a tax of 31/4 percent of the 
total premiums received. [FN5] This tax is not in 
issue on this appeal. In addition to this, the State 
Insurance Fund is required to pay a tax of 1 percent of 
the total premiums it receives.[FN6] This tax law was 
passed in 1971 and applies only to the State Insurance 
Fund. As administrator of the Fund, the Department 
of Finance, respondent herein, refused to pay this 
additional tax, and the State Tax Commission, 
appellant herein, sued to compel payment. The 
district court found the statute unconstitutional and 
excused the respondent from payment of die additional 
tax. The Tax Commission now appeals, challenging 
the constitutional aspects of the decision as well as the 
propriety of granting a summary judgment. 
FN5. U.C.A., 1953, 31-14-4(3). 
FN6. U.C.A., 1953, 31-14-4(l)(b). 
[2][3] The thrust of the Tax Commission's claim is 
that die Fund is different and dierefore may be treated 
differendy from other insurers. Equal protection 
[FN7] protects against discrimination within a 
class. [FN8] The legislature has considerable 
discretion in the designation of classifications but the 
court must determine whether such classifications 
operate equally on all persons similarly situated. [FN9] 
The State Insurance Fund has been singled out from 
among a larger class of insurers to pay a tax imposed 
upon no one else which must be considered to be 
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited. Examples of 
the similarities between the Fund and others within its 
class include the following. The assets of die Fund 
exist only to cover the identical obligations covered by 
private insurers. The Fund has the same 
administrative costs as private insurers: establishment 
of premium and hazard rates, procedures for 
analyzing claims and *1299 making disbursements, 
reinsurance considerations, Fund investment 
decisions, collection procedures, legal fees and policy 
issuance. These administrative costs, and other 
expenses are deducted from die Fund by legislative 
appropriations of Fund money.[FN 10] The Fund has 
the same rights to sue and be sued and make contracts 
that a private insurer has. The Fund enjoys no 
immunities not provided to private insurers. The only 
distinguishable feature is diat the Fund is administered 
by a State agency, the cost therefor being paid from 
the premiums. This feature is not a rational basis to 
treat the Fund as a distinct classification. The Tax 
Commission implies that the tax is to pay for die cost 
of administration. It is represented by appellant on this 
appeal that the Commissioner of Finance and his 
Department provide many services to the Fund as 
does die State Treasurer, Attorney General, and State 
Auditor. If such be the case it would appear that the 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 35-3-1 would apply and 
that a legislative appropriation from the Fund should 
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be made available ro pay for these services. To 
permit otherwise would be to grant preferential 
treatment in favor of the Fund, a situation as offensive 
to the equal protection provisions as the one alleged in 
this appeal. 
FN7. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 2; 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
FN8. Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 
96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939). 
FN9. Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 
P.2d 153 (1949). 
FN10. U.C.A., 1953,35-3-1. 
[4] An argument closely related to that of equal 
protection involves the constitutional provision 
Page 3 
precluding enactment of a special law where a general 
law can apply.[FN 11] Because all companies 
furnishing workmen's compensation insurance are of a 
single class, as explained supra, a law operating 
exclusively upon one member of that class is 
constitutionally invalid as a special law. 
FN11. Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 26. 
Appellant's final claim of error is that summary 
judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P., was improper 
because genuine issues of fact remained to be 
resolved. We are convinced that what is involved is 
strictly a law question and we therefore affirm the 
lower court's judgment. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and 
WILKINS,JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Carlyie F. GRONNING, in his official capacity as 
Chairman, Commissioner of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Herbert F. SMART, in his official capacity as 
Director of Finance, Department 
of Finance, State of Utah, and Administrator of the 
State Insurance Fund, et 
al., Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 14846. 
Supreme-Court of Utah. 
March 8, 1977. 
On appeal from a declaratory judgment of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, 
Sr., J., which held as constitutional certain legislative 
enactments appropriating funds from the State 
Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission, the 
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that the aforesaid 
enactments are unconstitutional as violative of due 
process, since money in the Fund is not public money 
subject to appropriation to meet expenses of 
government, but is a trust fund to be used to meet 
liabilities of employers when an employee is entitled 
to compensation. 
Reversed. 
[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k301(4) 
92k301(4) 
Formerly 92k301 
Legislative enactments appropriating funds from the 
State Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission are 
unconstitutional as violative of due process, as money 
in the Fund is not public money subject to 
appropriation to meet expenses of government, but is 
a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of employers 
when an employee is entitled to compensation. 
U.C.A.1953, 34-19-1 et seq., 35- 1-1 et seq., 35-3-1 
et seq.; Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
14. 
[1] WORKERS' COMPENSATION k35 
413k35 
Legislative enactments appropriating funds from the 
State Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission are 
unconstitutional as violative of due process, as money 
in the Fund is not public money subject to 
appropriation to meet expenses of government, but is 
a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of employers 
when an employee is entitled to compensation. 
U.C.A.1953, 34-19-1 et seq., 35- 1-1 et seq., 35-3-1 
et seq.; Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
14. 
[2] WORKERS' COMPENSATION kl075 
413kl075 
The State Insurance Fund is not an arm of the state to 
enforce requirements calling for safe places of 
employment, safety devices, safeguards, work 
methods and processes; these are clearly functions of 
the Industrial Commission and such exist entirely 
independent of the provisions of law assuring 
recovery of monies due to injured workmen. 
U.C.A.1953, 34-19-1 et seq., 35-1-1 et seq., 35-3-1 et 
seq.; Const, art. 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 
14. 
*691 Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Joseph P. 
McCarthy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
A. Wally Sandack, Roger D. Sandack, Special Asst. 
Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
[1] Appeal from a declaratory judgment which held 
as constitutional certain legislative enactments 
appropriating funds from the State Insurance Fund to 
the Industrial Commission. Such an appropriation of 
trust funds by the Legislature is a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the 
decision below is reversed. 
The Industrial Commission is a state agency which 
exercises the police power of the State as it applies to 
employment entiretly without reference to the State 
Insurance Fund and its duties and responsibilities are 
specifically enumerated in Titles 34 and 35, 
U.C.A.1953. 
[2] The Insurance Fund is a state administered mutual 
insurance program established by the Legislature for 
the purpose of insuring employers against liability for 
compensation and assuring to the persons entitled 
thereto the compensation provided by law and its 
purposes and functions are set forth in Title 35, 
Chapter 3, U.C.A.1953. The Insurance Fund is not 
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an arm of the State to enforce requirements calling fc 
safe places of employment, safety devices, safeguards, 
work methods and processes. These are clearly 
functions of the Industrial Commission and such exist 
entirely independent of the provisions of law assuring 
recovery of monies due to injured workmen. [FN 1] 
FN1. American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 55 
Utah 483, 187 P. 633. 
Respondent's position is that since in the 
administration of the Insurance Fund it is authorized 
to employ 'inspectors' that it necessarily follows that 
safety inspectors hired by the Industrial Commission 
should be panially supported by appropriation of 
monies from the Insurance Fund. This is an untenable 
position since the conduct of a safety program 
requiring such inspectors is a general duty of the 
Industrial Commission and is not carried on at the 
request of or for the particular benefit of the Insurance 
Fund. Also, a distinction is clearly necessary between 
the 'inspectors' the statute allows the Insurance Fund 
to appoint and the 'safety inspectors' that are 
absolutely required to conduct the safety program 
statutorily imposed upon the Industrial Commission 
which only incidentally affects the Insurance Fund. 
The previous announcement of this court in Chez v. 
Industrial Commission,[FN2] is dispositive of this 
appeal and the cases cited by respondent in no way 
alter the holding therein. In that case we were 
directly faced with a determination of the specific 
nature of the Fund. The Fund had purchased bonds 
issued by the Town of Scipio which sought to 
compromise the obligation owing thereon by a 
payment over to the Induatrial Commission. The 
question then becomes whether a debt or obligation 
owing to the Fund was an obligation or liability to the 
State. We held that a debt owing the Fund was not an 
obligation due the State, and in doing so determined 
the status or nature of the funds received from 
employers, stating: 
FN2. 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549. 
*692 . . . The employer really pools his premiums 
in the State Fund to create a fund for the payment of 
an obligation for which it is liable. It is a common 
fund belonging to the participating employers. It is 
therefore not derived from anything owing to the 
state nor paid out on behalf of any state obligation. 
. . . The fund is publicly administered, but its 
debtors are not debtors to the state. It belongs, not 
to the state, but to the contributing employers for 
their mutual benefit. . . . 
. . . while a public fund in the sense of being 
administered by a public body is not public money 
in the sense that it is money of the state to be used 
for and on behalf of the state for a state expenditure. 
. . . (Emphasis added.) 
The Chez case, supra, was recently followed by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in interpreting the status 
of a very similar State Insurance Fund created 
there.[FN3] 
FN3. Moran v. State ex rel. Deny berry, Okl., 
534 P.2d 1282 (1975). 
The money in the Fund is not public money subject to 
appropriation to meet expenses of government. It is a 
trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of employers 
when an employee is entitled to compensation. If the 
appropriation were to be made it would amount to a 
seizure of trust funds for State purposes without due 
process of law.[FN4] 
FN4. Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d 
310, 437 P.2d 442 (1968). 
ELLETT, C.J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and 
WILKINS,JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Robert B. HANSEN, Attorney General, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD and Utah 
State Retirement Fund, et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Robert B. HANSEN, Attorney General, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREiMENT BOARD and Utah 
State Retirement Fund; Utah State 
Industrial Commission and Utah State Insurance 
Fund; University of Utah, for 
and in behalf of the University of Utah Hospital for 
the University Medical 
Center; University Medical Center Trust Fund, 
First Security Bank of Utah, 
Trustee, Defendants and ResDondents. 
Nos. 16714,16560 and 16851. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 27, 1982. 
Utah Attorney General filed suit seeking a judgment 
declaring that the Utah Constitution has conferred 
exclusive authority on him to act as legal adviser to 
state defendants, and an injunction prohibiting 
defendants from employing counsel pursuant to 
various statutory provisions. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J., 
entered summary judgment for defendants, and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) constitutional authority of Attorney 
General is to act as legal adviser to constitutional 
executive officers referred to in Article VII and to 
other state executive offices referred to in Article VII, 
insofar as the officers act within the scope of duties of 
such office, and (2) Industrial Commission, State 
Retirement Board, funds it administers, State 
Insurance Fund, and University of Utah are not 
executive department agencies and, therefore, 
Attorney General does not have exclusive authority to 
act as their legal adviser; however, it is within his 
constitutional power to act as legal adviser to director 
of Department of Administrative Services and to State 
Treasurer when those officers perform executive 
department functions; nevertheless, the functions 
performed by the director and Treasurer with respect 
to Insurance Fund and by the Treasurer with respect 
to Retirement Board and Unemployment 
Compensation Fund did not require the Court to hold 
unconstitutional those statutes authorizing the 
employment of independent counsel for the benefit of 
those entities. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, Retired Justice, filed a concurring opinion. 
[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW kl2 
92kl2 
Utah constitutional provision which, on its face, was 
intended only to provide for launching the new state 
government by specifying those "state officers" who 
were initially to stand for election was not intended to 
define the term "state officers" wherever it appears in 
the Constitution; to construe the provision to define 
the term "state officers" as used in other constitutional 
provisions and in entirely different contexts would 
violate basic rules of constitutional interpretation and 
would produce anomalous consequences violative of 
such basic principles as the doctrine of separation of 
powers. Const. An. 24, § 12. 
[2] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6 
46k6 
Although the constitutional power of the Utah 
Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state 
officers," the text of the constitutional provision does 
not permit the term "state officers" to be read in its 
most expansive meaning to include all employees of 
state government. Const. Art. 7, § 16. 
[3] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6 
46k6 
Since the office of Attorney General is, by virtue of 
specific constitutional language, an executive 
department office, it naturally follows that its 
constitutional duties should be limited to rendering 
advice to executive department officials. Const. Art. 
7, § 16. 
[4] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6 
46k6 
Although the constitutional power of the Utah 
Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state 
officers," to interpret the phrase "state officers" to 
vest plenary authority in the Attorney General to act 
as legal adviser to all state officers and agencies 
would effectively nullify the power conferred by the 
Constitution on the Legislature to add to and shape the 
powers of the Attorney General. Const. Art. 7, § 16. 
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[5] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6 
46k6 
Constitutional authority of the Utah Attorney General 
is to act as legal adviser to the constitutional executive 
officers referred to in Article VII, i.e., the Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, and the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, the departments 
over which they have direct supervisory control, and 
to the other state executive offices referred to in 
Article VII, insofar as the officers act within the scope 
of the duties of such office. Const. Art. 7, § 16. 
[6] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6 
46k6 
In addition to constitutional and statutory authority, 
the Utah Attorney General has common-law powers; 
however, those powers are not constitutionally rooted 
and therefore do not expand the power conferred by 
Article VILConst. An. 7, § 16. 
[7] STATUTES k222 
361k222 
Where a conflict arises between the common law and 
a statute or constitutional law, the common law must 
yield. U.C.A. 1953, 68-3-2. 
[8] ATTORNEY GENERAL k6 
46k6 
Industrial Commission, State Retirement Board, funds 
it administers, State Insurance Fund, and University 
of Utah are not executive department agencies and, 
therefore, Attorney General does not have exclusive 
authority toact as their legal adviser; however, it is 
within his power to act as legal adviser to Director of 
Department of Administrative Services and State 
Treasurer when those officers perform executive 
department functions; nevertheless, functions 
performed by Director and Treasurer with respect to 
Insurance Fund and by Treasurer with respect to 
Retirement Board and Unemployment Compensation 
Fund did not require the Court to hold 
unconstitutional those statutes authorizing employment 
of independent counsel for those entities' benefit. 
U.C.A.1953, 35- 1-32, 35-3-1, 35-4-11, 49-9-4, 
62-5-3, 63-30-28, 67-5-5; Const. Art. 7, § 16. 
*1334 Bernard M. Tanner, William G. Gibbs, 
Richard L. Dewsnup, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
William T. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for Univ. of Utah. 
Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for Industrial Com'n. 
Mark A. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for Retirement Bd. 
James R. Black & Robert Moore, Salt Lake City, for 
State Ins. Fund. 
Merlin Lybbert, Salt Lake City, for Medical Center. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The Utah Attorney General filed this suit seeking 1) a 
declaratory judgment that the Utah Constitution has 
conferred excli»ve authority on him to act as legal 
adviser to the defendants, and 2) an injunction 
prohibiting defendants from employing counsel 
pursuant to various statutory provisions. The 
complaint alleges that the defendants are state 
agencies, state funds, quasi-state agencies, and trust 
and insurance funds. The Attorney General appeals 
adverse summary judgments. 
The complaint characterizes the defendants as 
follows: Utah State Retirement Board, an independent 
state agency; Utah State Retirement Fund, a quasi-
state agency fund; the Utah State Industrial 
Commission, a state agency; Utah State Insurance 
Fund, a quasi-state agency fund; the University of 
Utah Hospital, a state agency that established the 
Medical Center Trust Fund, which is administered by 
First Security Bank as Trustee, to provide medical 
malpractice insurance. 
The Attorney General contends that he has exclusive 
constitutional authority to act as legal adviser to the 
defendants. The defendants contend to the contrary 
and assert that the Legislature has constitutionally 
authorized each agency to hire its own counsel. In 
addition, the Retirement Fund, Insurance Fund, and 
Medical Center Trust Fund affirmatively contend that 
they are in effect private trusts administering private 
trust funds, not public monies. 
The basic issue to be resolved on this appeal is the 
meaning of the term "state officers" as used in 
Article VII, § 16. 
I. THE POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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At statehood the office of Attorney General was 
established as an office within the executive branch of 
government by Article VII, § 1 of the Constitution. 
Meyers v. Second Judicial District Court, 108 Utah 
32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945). As originally written, 
Article VII, § 1 stated: "The Executive Department 
shall consist of Governor, Secretary of State, State 
Auditor, State Treasurer, and Attorney General ...." 
[FN1] 
FN1. Article VII, § 1 as amended in 1980, now 
states: 
The elective constitutional officers of the Executive 
Department shall consist of Governor, Lieutenant 
Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, and 
Attorney General.... They shall perform such 
duties as are prescribed by this Constitution and as 
provided by law. 
The executive article. Article VII, was drafted to give 
effect to the fundamental principle that the organic law 
establishing the basic framework of government for 
this State should provide sufficient flexibility and 
latitude, within the limitations of certain fundamental 
restrictions, so that government could be organized to 
cope with the inevitable and unforeseeable exigencies 
that would arise. In part, the powers conferred on the 
constitutional executive officials were constitutionally 
based. However, the framers also conferred on the 
Legislature broad authority to shape the powers and 
authority of those officials as the needs of the times 
dictated. The 1980 amendments *1335 to the 
executive article reaffirmed, and to some extent 
extended, the same general principle setting forth the 
powers and duties of the constitutionally established 
executive officers. [FN2] 
FN2. A constitutional amendment substantially 
revising the executive article of the Constitution 
was ratified in 1980. In addition to other changes 
the office of Secretary of State was changed to the 
office of Lieutenant Governor. Prior to the 
amendment, Article VII, § IS established the 
powers of the Attorney General. The pertinent 
provision is now Article VII, § 16. See Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 7, 1979 Utah Laws 1318. 
Thus, except for the powers of the Governor, [FN3] 
the executive article tersely states in one section 
certain basic or core duties of each constitutional 
officer, and in addition, provides that the Legislature 
may add thereto certain powers and responsibilities. 
See, e.g., § 14, specifying the duties of the Lieutenant 
Governor; [FN4] § 15, specifying the duties of the 
Auditor and Treasurer; [FN5] and § 17, specifying 
the duties of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
[FN6] Section 16 establishes the powers of the 
Attorney General in the following language: 
FN3. Throughout Article VII various powers and 
responsibilities are conferred on the Governor. 
See, e.g., §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
Because the "executive power" of the State is 
vested in the Governor, § 5, his powers and. 
responsibilities are dealt with somewhat differently 
than the other constitutional executive officers. 
FN4. Article VII, § 14 provides: The Lieutenant 
Governor shall serve on all boards and 
commissions in lieu of the Governor whenever so 
designated by the Governor, shall perform such 
duties as may be delegated by the Governor, and 
shall perform such other duties as may be provided 
by law. 
FN5. Article VII, § 15 provides: 
The State Auditor shall perform financial post 
audits of Public Accounts, except as otherwise 
provided by this Constitution, and the State 
Treasurer shall be the custodian of public moneys; 
and each shall perform such other duties as 
provided by law. 
FN6. Article VII. § 17 provides: 
The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 
perform such duties as provided by law. 
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of 
the State officers, except as otherwise provided by 
this Constitution, and shall perform such other 
duties as provided by law. 
The Attorney General contends that the term "state 
officers" as used in § 16 encompasses all state 
employees. The defendants rely on Hansen v. Legal 
Services Committee of the Utah State Legislature, 19 
Utah 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967), in support of the 
argument that the term "state officers" should be 
narrowly construed. 
In Hansen the Court held that the Legislature, by 
appointing its own legal adviser to assist in the 
performance of the Legislature's constitutional duties, 
had invaded the constitutional authority of the 
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Attorney General. The Court defined the term "state 
officers" as used in Article VII, § 16 (then Article 
VII, § 18) to mean the same as it means in Article 
XXIV, § 12 of the Constitution. [FN7] The Court 
therefore held that since Senate and House members 
are referred to in Article XXIV, § 12 as Mstate 
officers," the Attorney General had exclusive 
constitutional power under Article VII, § 16 to act as 
legal adviser to the Legislature. 
FN7. See supra, note 2. 
[1] After a careful reanalysis, we are of the view that 
Hansen does not provide a sound basis for defining 
the term "state officers." Article XXIV, § 12, the 
lynchpin of the Hansen opinion, provides: 
The State Officers to be voted for at the time of the 
adoption of this Constitution, shall be a Governor, 
Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, 
Attorney General, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Members of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, three Supreme Judges, nine District 
Judges, and a Representative to Congress. 
Clearly, Article XXTV, § 12 was not intended to 
define the term "state officers" wherever it appeared 
in the Constitution. On its face, Article XXIV, § 12 
was intended only to provide for launching the new 
state government by specifying those "state officers" 
who were initially to stand for election. To construe 
Article XXIV, § 12 to *1336 define the term "state 
officers" as used in other constitutional provisions and 
in entirely different contexts would violate basic rules 
of constitutional interpretation and would produce 
anomalous consequences violative of such basic 
principles as the doctrine of separation of powers. 
See Article V, § 1. Clearly, it is as impermissible for 
the Attorney General to act as legal adviser to the 
judiciary in the performance of the judicial function, 
[FN8] as it is for him to act as legal adviser to the 
Legislature. Furthermore, the term "state officers" as 
used in Article XXIV, § 12, includes the 
"Representative to Congress." That officer, however, 
is not an officer of state government at all, but of the 
federal government. 
FN8. There are occasions, of course, when the 
Attorney General may properly represent members 
of the legislative or judicial branches in litigation 
without violating the doctrine of separation of 
powers. 
Finally, the specific holding in Hansen was 
overturned by a constitutional amendment ratified in 
1972 that amended Article VI, § 32 expressly to 
authorize the Legislature to employ its own legal 
counsel to assist in performing its legislative duties. 
[2][3][4] Although the constitutional power of the 
Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state 
officers," the text of Section 16 does not permit the 
term "state officers" to be read in its most expansive 
meaning to include all employees of state government. 
In the first place, the office of Attorney General is by 
virtue of specific constitutional language an executive 
department office. Article VII, § 1. As such, it 
naturally follows that its constitutional duties should 
be limited to rendering advice to executive department 
officials. Furthermore, to interpret the phrase "state 
officers" to vest plenary authority in the Attorney 
General to act as legal adviser to all state officers and 
agencies would effectively nullify the power conferred 
by Section 16 on the Legislature to add to and shape 
the powers of the Attorney General. The result would 
be to undermine the intended flexibility accorded the 
Legislature to provide legal counsel to various state 
agencies whose functions may require special legal 
counsel or whose duties could result in conflicts of 
interest. The construction contended for by the 
Attorney General would also require the inadmissible 
conclusion that the Attorney General is to act as legal 
adviser to officials of both the legislative and the 
judicial branches of government. 
Other provisions in the Constitution also use the term 
"state officer," but they do not require a more 
expansive definition of that term than is used in 
Article VII, § 16. The term "state officers" is used in 
a variety of contexts, each for a different purpose and 
each requiring a construction in accord with that 
purpose. Cf. State v. Yelle, 52 Wash.2d 856, 329 
P.2d 841 (1958). Thus, for example, Article VII, § 18 
uses the term broadly to provide that compensation 
should be paid those executive branch officers 
enumerated in Article VII, § 1, as well as "such other 
State and District officers as provided for by law ...." 
[FN9] The terms "state officers" or "state office" are 
used in still another context with a much narrower 
meaning in Article VII, § 9, which provides for 
interim appointments by the Governor under certain 
conditions. The term is also used with a restricted 
meaning in Article VII, § 10, which provides for 
senatorial confirmation of certain state officers 
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appointed by the Governor. In sum, the term "state 
officers" has been used in the Constitution to specify 
different groups of state officers, and there is no 
textual basis for choosing one meaning over another to 
resolve the issue in this case. 
FN9. Prior to the 1980 revision of Article V, the 
pertinent section of Article VI was § 20. 
[5] Therefore, in light of the constitutional language, 
as well as the nature and history of the office of 
Attorney General, see 7A C.J.S. Attorney General § 7 
(1980), we conclude that the framers intended to 
confer constitutional power on the Attorney General 
only with respect to executive department offices. 
Thus, the constitutional authority of the Attorney 
General is to act as legal adviser to the constitutional 
executive officers referred to in Article VII, i.e., 
*1337 the Governor, Lt. Governor, Auditor, 
Treasurer, and the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, the departments over which they have 
direct supervisory control, and to the other state 
executive offices referred to in Article VII, insofar as 
the officers of those offices act within the scope of the 
duties of such office. 
Our conclusion as to the constitutional power of the 
Attorney General with respect to state officers is 
consistent with precedents from other jurisdictions. 
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Yelle, 52 
Wash.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958), in construing a 
virtually identical constitutional provision describing 
the powers of the Attorney General, has reached a 
conclusion similar to the one we reach. See also 
Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 1, 27 So.2d 524 (1946); 
Holland v. Watson, 153 Fla. 178, 14 So.2d 200 
(1943); Saint v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 So. 246 
(1931). 
In addition to the power conferred by the 
Constitution, the Attorney General also enjoys other 
broad powers conferred pursuant to Article VII, § 16 
by the Legislature. U.C.A., 1953, § 67-5-3 confers 
sweeping authority on the Attorney General to 
perform "legal services for any agency of state 
government." In pertinent part that provision states: 
The attorney general may assign his legal assistants 
to perform legal services for any agency of state 
government.... As used in this act "agency" means 
any department, division, agency, commission, 
board, council, committee, authority, institution, or 
other entity within the state government of Utah. 
The Attorney General also has broad litigating 
authority. Section 67-5-1 provides: 
It is the duty of the attorney general: (1) To ... 
prosecute or defend all causes to which the state or 
any officer, board or commission thereof in an 
official capacity is a party; and he shall have charge 
as attorney of all civil legal matters in which the 
state is in anywise interested. 
However, the broad powers conferred by Section 
67-5-3 must be read in juxtaposition with statutes 
authorizing certain agencies to employ independent 
counsel and the implied limitation provided in Section 
67-5-5 which states: 
Except where specifically authorized by the Utah 
Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall hire legal 
counsel, and the attorney general alone shall have 
the sole right to hire legal counsel for each such 
agency. (Emphasis added.) 
[6] In addition to constitutional and statutory 
authority, the Utah Attorney General, like attorneys 
general of numerous other states, has common law 
powers. [FN 10] State v. Jiminez, Utah, 588 P.2d 707 
(1978); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 
177 (1969). However, those powers are not 
constitutionally rooted and therefore do not expand the 
power conferred by Article VII, § 16. Meyers v. 
Second Judicial District Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 
711 (1945). The source of the common law power 
lies in the State's statutory adoption of the common 
law which has been in effect, except as modified by 
statute, since statehood. 1898 Revised Statutes § 
2488; 1907 Compiled Laws of Utah § 2488. The 
present provision is found in § 68-3-1. [FN 11] See 
also Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 P. 20 
(1907); Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 
1, 10 S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 478 (1890). 
FN10. See generally 7A C.J.S. Attorney General § 
7 (1980), 
FN11. Section 68-3-1 provides: 
The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or 
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
with and adapted to the natural and physical 
conditions of this state and the necessities of the 
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the 
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rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
[7] Of course, where a conflict arises between the 
common law and a statute or constitutional law, the 
common law must yield. Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 
68- 3-2; [FN12] Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. 
Salt Lake Investment Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. *1338 
586 (1909); In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 
757 (1906). The principle has been applied 
specifically with respect to the common law powers of 
the Attorney General. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. 
Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1976). 
FN12. Id. 
The exact extent of the Attorney General's common 
law powers need not now, however, be decided 
because the issues in this case turn on constitutional 
and statutory provisions. [FN 13] Whether the 
Attorney General has the power to represent the 
defendants in this case depends on whether the 
defendants are executive department officials, and if 
not, whether the Legislature has authorized defendants 
to employ independent counsel. 
FN13. For a discussion of some of the common 
law powers exercised by the Attorney General, see 
Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church Controversies, 
1981 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 805. 
n. THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF 
DEFENDANTS 
A. Utah State Retirement Board and Trust Fund 
The Utah State Retirement Office is "administered 
under the general direction of the retirement board." 
§ 49-9-2. The board consists of six persons to be 
appointed on a non-partisan basis and the State 
Treasurer as an ex officio member. However, the 
Retirement Office is specifically established as an 
"independent state agency and not a division within 
any other department." § 49-9-2. The Board 
members "serve as investment trustees of the Utah 
state retirement fund" and have general direction over 
the Retirement Office. § 49- 9-3. 
The Retirement Board administers the 1) Utah State 
Retirement Act, § 49-10-1 et seq.; 2) Utah Judges' 
Retirement Act, § 49-7a-l et seq.; 3) Utah Firemen's 
Retirement Act, § 49-6a-l et seq.; and 4) Utah Public 
Safety Retirement Act, § 49-11-1 et seq. Each system 
has different retirement standards, contribution rates, 
withdrawal rates, and pension benefits. The various 
funds are administered as a common trust fund, 
known as the Utah State Retirement Fund, solely for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries and not for the public 
at large. Some 80 percent of the beneficiaries are not 
state employees, but employees of municipalities or 
counties. Each fund is required by statute to pay its 
proportional share of the administrative costs. § 
49-9-5. No state funds are appropriated to meet any 
administrative costs. 
Investments are not subject to control of the Board of 
Examiners. § 49-9- 12(2). Section 49-9-4 authorizes 
the executive director of the Retirement Board to 
employ attorneys to assist in the administration of the 
retirement systems. Legal fees and other general 
administrative costs are to be paid from the various 
funds on a prorated, cost-of-service basis. § 49-9-5. 
In a formal opinion, No. 78-007, the Attorney 
General has ruled that the Retirement Fund was not a 
state fund but a public trust fund and that as such the 
fiduciary responsibilities of the Board "would be in 
conflict with control exercised by the state auditor or 
other public official." 
B. Industrial Commission and State Insurance Fund 
The Industrial Commission administers the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Occupational 
Disease Disability Law, and the Employment Security 
Act, among other responsibilities.- The Commission is 
an administrative agency, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 73 Utah 366, 274 P. 
139 (1929), with administrative, quasi-judicial, and 
quasi-legislative powers. It can sue and be sued in its 
own name. § 35-1-2; Industrial Commission v. 
Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918). It is not a 
body within the executive branch of government, but 
rather an independent agency. 
Section 35-1-32 authorizes the Commission to appoint 
independent legal counsel to prosecute or defend any 
legal action within or concerning its jurisdiction. 
Section 35-1-32 states: 
The commission may with the approval of the 
governor appoint a representative to act as special 
prosecutor or to defend *1339 in any suit, action, 
proceeding, investigation, hearing or trial relating to 
matters within or concerning its jurisdiction. Upon 
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the request of the commission, the attorney general 
or the county attorney of the county in which any 
investigation, hearing or trial had under the 
provisions of this title is pending, shall aid therein 
and prosecute, under the supervision of the 
commission, all necessary actions or proceedings for 
the enforcement of this title. 
See also § 35-2-49 and § 35-4-20. 
Closely associated with the State's workmen's 
compensation scheme is the State Insurance Fund. 
Section 35-3-1 authorizes the creation of the State 
Insurance Fund to provide workmen's compensation 
insurance to employers for the protection of their 
employees. The Director of the Department of 
Administrative Services [FN 14] now administers the 
Fund, and the State Treasurer, also an executive 
department official, is the custodian of all monies in 
the State Insurance Fund, § 35-3-13. The Director is 
authorized by statute to hire attorneys and other 
professional expens to assist in the administration of 
the Fund. § 35-3-1. [FN 15] All administrative costs 
of the Fund are borne by the Fund itself, including 
attorney's fees. Id. The Department of 
Administrative Service is an office within the 
executive branch of government. 
FN 14. Section 35-3-3 states that the Commission 
of Finance has the responsibility for administering 
the State Insurance Fund. In 1981, however, that 
provision was impliedly repealed by an act 
reorganizing a part of the executive branch of 
government. See 1981 Laws of Utah ch. 257. 
The responsibility for administration of the Fund 
was transferred to the Director of the Department 
of Administrative Services, § 63-1-5 (Supp.1981). 
See also § 63-1-10 (Supp.1981). 
FN 15. That authority was transferred to the 
Director by § 63-1-10. 
The Insurance Fund resembles a private insurance 
company that collects insurance premiums from 
employees and pays out to employees insurance 
benefits pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and the Occupational Disease Act. See State Tax 
Commission v. Department of Finance, Utah, 576 
P.2d 1297 (1978); Gronning v. Smart, Utah, 561 
P.2d 690 (1977); Chez v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936). In State Tax 
Commission v. Department of Finance, supra, this 
Court recognized that the Fund may enter into 
contracts and has the legal capacity to sue and be 
sued. 
The Industrial Commission also administers the 
Unemployment Compensation Act for which there is 
"a special fund, separate and apart from all public 
moneys or funds of this state ...." § 35-4-9(a). The 
State Treasurer is the treasurer and custodian of the 
Fund and administers the Fund "in accordance with 
the directions of the commission ...." § 35-4-9(b). 
The Security Administration Fund is essentially a trust 
fund. To assist in the administration of the 
Unemployment Compensation Act, the Legislature has 
authorized the Commissioner to appoint attorneys. 
Section 35-4-11(d) provides: 
The commission shall appoint on a nonpartisan merit 
basis, fix the compensation, and prescribe the duties 
and powers of such officers, accountants, attorneys, 
experts, and other personnel as may be necessary in 
the performance of its duties. 
C. University of Utah and University of Utah 
Medical Center 
The University of Utah has constitutional status and 
is a legal entity with the status of a body corporate. 
State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P. 285 (1909). 
Article X, § 4 of the Constitution provides: 
The location and establishment by existing laws of 
the University of Utah ... are hereby confirmed, and 
all the rights, immunities, franchises and 
endowments heretofore granted or conferred, are 
hereby perpetuated unto said University .... 
The University operates the University of Utah 
Hospital at die University of Utah Medical Center. 
The Medical Center provides educational services to 
the University of Utah and receives some State 
funding, but it is primarily funded through receipts 
from patient care and federal funds. 
*1340 A trust fund was established by the University 
of Utah, on behalf of the Medical Center, with First 
Security Bank of Utah as trustee, to provide self-
insurance for the Medical Center against malpractice 
and other casualty claims. The purpose of 
establishing the Fund was to avoid the cost of 
commercial malpractice insurance. The Fund is 
financed solely from a portion of patient care 
revenues. The Medical Center, because it participates 
in several federal assistance programs for which it 
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receives federal funds, is subject to various federal 
rules and regulations, and the trust was established 
pursuant to certain of those regulations. Those 
regulations require that the trustee have legal title to 
the Fund and that it cannot be related to the health 
care provider either through ownership or control. 
No State funds are appropriated to the trust. 
The trust agreement between the University and the 
bank authorizes the bank, as trustee, to employ and 
pay from the trust fund, attorneys and others as may 
be necessary for the effective administration of the 
self-insurance program, consistent with applicable 
regulations of pertinent federal agencies and to pay 
from the trust fund all costs, expenses, or other 
liabilities that may be incurred by the trustee in 
connection with the trust. 
ffl. AUTHORITY OF DEFENDANTS TO EMPLOY 
COUNSEL 
[8] None of the defendant agencies as such is an 
executive department agency. For various reasons the 
Legislature has established the Industrial Commission, 
the State Retirement Board and the retirement funds it 
administers, and the State Insurance Fund as 
independent agencies. Likewise, the University of 
Utah, which enjoys a degree of constitutionally rooted 
independence, is not an executive department agency. 
[FN16] 
FN16. In People v. Barrett, 382 111. 321. 46 
N.E,2d 951 (1943), the Court addressed an issue 
somewhat similar to that with which we are here 
confronted: 
[Trustees of the university] are not state officers in 
the sense that the Attorney General is their legal 
advisor or representative, as contended by 
respondents in this case .... 
In the sense that it is a department or branch of the 
state government the University of Illinois is not an 
agency or instrumentality of the state. It is a 
separate corporate entity, which functions as a 
public corporation. 
Id. at 346-347, N.E.2d at 964. 
As to each defendant, the Legislature has conferred 
specific statutory authority authorizing the 
employment of independent counsel. Section 35-1-32 
authorizes the Industrial Commission to appoint 
counsel, with the approval of the Governor, and § 
35-4-11 authorizes the Commission to appoint 
attorneys to assist in the administration of the 
Unemployment Compensation Act. The Utah State 
Insurance Fund is authorized to employ independent 
counsel pursuant to § 35-3-1. The Retirement Board 
is empowered to hire legal counsel pursuant to § 
49-9-4. Under the authority of § 63-30-28 
(Supp.1981), the University of Utah is authorized to 
purchase insurance "by establishing a trust account 
under the management of an independent private 
trustee having authority ... to expend both principal 
and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the 
costs of investigation, discovery, and other pretrial 
and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees." 
Thus, the authority for each defendant to hire 
independent counsel has a clear statutory foundation. 
The statutes providing such authorizations fall within 
the exception, see § 67-5-5, to the general authority of 
the Attorney General to perform legal services for 
"any agency of state government." § 62-5-3. 
It is, however, readily apparent that the Director of 
the Department of Administrative Services is an 
executive department official acting under the general 
supervision and control of the Governor, and that the 
State Treasurer is a constitutional executive officer. 
Thus, they are state officers within the meaning of 
Article VII, § 16. Therefore, as a general 
proposition, it is within the constitutional power of the 
Attorney General to act as legal adviser to *1341 
those officers when they perform executive 
department functions. Nevertheless, we do not think 
the functions performed by the Director and the 
Treasurer with respect to the Insurance Fund and by 
the Treasurer with respect to the Retirement Board 
and the Unemployment Compensation Fund require us 
to hold unconstitutional those statutes authorizing the 
employment of independent counsel for the benefit of 
those entities. 
The State Insurance Fund operates essentially as a 
private insurance company; it receives no public 
moneys and pays its own administrative expenses 
from the premiums received. The moneys paid into 
the Fund do not belong to the State but in effect to 
contributing employers. Gronning v. Smart, Utah, 
561 P,2d 690 (1977). The funds are in effect held as 
trust funds for an insurance program which is 
designed to protect private persons. The same is true 
of the Unemployment Compensation Fund. As for the 
Treasurer's participation on the Retirement Board, it 
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is clear that the Legislature intended that the agency 
be independent from the executive branch. The 
Treasurer's participation does not transform that 
agency into an executive branch agency. Thus, the 
Director and the Treasurer, in performing the 
assigned duties, do not perform responsibilities that 
properly belong to the executive department. Rather, 
they perform duties for essentially independent state 
entities. Hence, the Constitution does not require that 
the Attorney General act as legal adviser to the 
entities in question. 
Affirmed. No costs. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, J., concur. 
CROCKETT, Retired Justice (concurring with 
comments): 
I concur with the main opinion. However, in my 
view there is a somewhat different rationale, grounded 
on fundamental principles, which supports its 
conclusion, and which I think is of sufficient 
significance and applicability to justify stating 
separately. 
The first of those principles is that due to the respect 
that should be accorded the concept of the separation 
of powers in our system of government, the judiciary 
should exercise great restraint in intruding into the 
legislative prerogative. Consistent with that policy, 
there is indulged a strong presumption in favor of 
constitutionality, which is overcome only when it is 
abundantly clear that the legislative enactment is in 
contravention of some constitutional provision. [FN1] 
FN1. Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder, 87 
Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); Newcomb v. 
Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement 
Commission, et al., 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941 
(1952). 
In regard to the authority of the legislature relating to 
the enactments in question, it is further important to 
bear in mind that the legislature is constitutionally 
vested with the power to make the laws for this 
sovereign state; and thus has inherently the power to 
enact all laws essential to the carrying on of the 
purposes of government, except only as expressly 
prohibited or limited by constitutional provisions. 
[FN2] 
FN2. See statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 
359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962) and see Kimball v. 
Grantsville City, 19 U. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 
628 (1899); said in awareness of possible 
limitations in Enabling Act, not applicable here, 
see Jensen v. Dinehart, Utah, 645 P.2d 32 (1982). 
With die above-stated general propositions in mind, 
attention is focused upon the challenge to the validity 
of the several legislative enactments which authorize 
the defendant state agencies to employ adequate staffs, 
including attorneys, to carry out their legally imposed 
responsibilities. 
In support of his challenge, plaintiff cites and relies 
on § 16, An. VII of our Constitution, which provides 
that: 
The Attorney General shall be the legal advisor of 
state officers, and shall perform such other duties as 
may be provided by law. 
He places emphasis on the word " shallM; argues that 
it is mandatory; and that therefore the just-quoted 
provision gives him the sole and exclusive right and 
duty to act as attorney for defendant entities and 
*1342 prohibits the legislature from authorizing them 
to employ their own attorneys. 
In analyzing that contention, it is pertinent to observe 
that the term "shall" is a flexible one. This is clearly 
revealed by reference to that comprehensive lexicon 
of the law. Words and Phrases. It contains several 
pages of case references to the word "shall/ a perusal 
of which indicates that it is sometimes used in the 
mandatory sense and sometimes merely as directory 
or permissive, leading to the conclusion that its 
meaning is to be determined from the context in which 
it is used and the purpose sought to be accomplished. 
[FN3] 
FN3. To the same effect, see 80 C.J.S. p. 138 and 
cases there cited. 
Typical of numerous cases therein listed as 
supporting that view are In re NorrelTs Estate, 139 
NJ.Eq. 550, 52 A.2d 407, 410 (1946), wherein the 
court states that the word "shall" in a statute is to be 
construed as merely permissive when no public 
benefit or private right requires it to be given an 
imperative meaning. Our own Court has recognized 
the same proposition. In the case of Bird and Jex Co. 
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v. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831 (1939), it was 
held that "shall" as used in a statute relating to the 
authority of our Liquor Control Commission to 
regulate advertising is merely permissive and not 
mandatory. 
Applicable to the question as to which meaning is to 
be given the word "shall" in the provision under 
scrutiny is the rule of statutory construction: that 
where there is a choice as to the interpretation and 
application of a statute, it should be so construed and 
applied as to make it constitutional, in preference to 
one which would make it invalid. [FN4] This same 
principle of harmomous reconciliation in favor of 
validity has reciprocal effect in considering 
constitutional provisions in relation to legislative 
enactments. It is submitted that if the rules 
hereinabove stated are applied to the problem 
presented by plaintiffs contention it will be seen that 
an entirely reasonable understanding of the provision 
of § 16, of Art. VII is that the Attorney General is 
simply authorized and given the responsibility of 
being legal advisor to state officers; and more 
specifically, of controlling importance on the problem 
here: there is nothing in its language which expressly 
states or necessarily implies any prohibition upon the 
inherent powers of the legislature to provide for the 
adequate staffing of state institutions, including 
attorneys, where that is essential to the carrying out of 
responsibilities imposed upon them. 
FN4. Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42, 
504 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1972); Norville v. State 
Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937 
(1940); Treffry v. Taylor, et al., 67 Wash.2d 487, 
408 P.2d 269 (1965). 
On the grounds stated in the main opinion, and the 
additional grounds stated herein, I join in affirming 
the rulings of the district courts: that the legislature 
did not transgress its constitutional prerogative in the 
enactments under attack herein. 
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., do not participate herein. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Fighting Fraud 
In Workers' Comp 
By Stephen Blakely 
A suspicious rash of injury claims by one of Timothy 
Jans' commuter-van drivers led to a landmark convic-
tion of the employee for workers' compensation fraud. 
The Cost Of Fraud 
Property/Casualty Insurers* Losses From Fraudulent Claims, 
1985-1994, In Billions Of Dollars 
Timothy Jans, co-owner of Cook-DuPage Transporta-tion Co. in Chicago, still bristles at the memory of 
the scam that almost worked. 
In just six months in 1995, one 
of his commuter-van drivers 
had four nearly identical rear-
end traffic accidents that re-
sulted in very minor damage to 
the van but very major insur-
ance claims, including claims 
for workers' compensation. Each time, the 
driver complained of a back injury and col-
lected insurance payments while off the job. 
Jans recalls that "something smelled 
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claims. Teople talk, and we picked up that 
[the suspect driver] wasn't really hurt. So 
we complained to our insurer because our 
premiums had been going up," Jans says. 
Cook-DuPage's insurer, Fremont Com-
pensation Insurance Group of 
Glendale, Calif., has a reputa-
tion for aggressiveness in fight-
ing workers' comp fraud. The 
company quickly put the "in-
jured" driver under video sur-
veillance, and suspicions were 
confirmed: The driver was 
working secretly as a tow-truck 
operator while getting workers' 
comp payments to stay home 
with a bad back—a scheme 
that not only bilked the insurer but also cost 
Cook-DuPage sharp increases in its insur-
ance premiums. 
"They caught him on videotape trying to 
get a tow on a small car that was parallel 
i 
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Armed unth stronger laws, new 
resources, and a tougher attitude, 
employers and their insurers are 
striking ba^k against this costly 
brand of cheating. 
parked," recalls Jans. "He goes behind the 
car, bends down, and physically shoves it 
out of the parking space—by himself. It's 
great video.* 
That ironclad evidence made workers' 
comp history in Illinois. The driver was 
convicted and served about a month in jail 
for felony insurance fraud. It was the first 
time in Chicago that a worker had been 
prosecuted and imprisoned under the 
state's workers' comp law, according to 
Fremont Compensation. 
Fremont Compensation, on behalf of 
Cook-DuPage, then petitioned the Illinois 
workers' comp board to throw out the 
claim, allowing the insurer to lower the 
company's premium. This marked the 
first time an employer got the state board 
to purge a fraudulent claim from its work-
ers' comp accident record immediately. 
For Cook-DuPage, a local commuter 
service that Jans and his two brothers 
founded in 1975, the case "really sent a 
message" and paid off in a big way, Jans 
says. With 140 vans and 200 drivers, the 
company has had no suspicious workers' 
comp claims since 1995. It also is paying 
$250,000 less in annual workers' comp 
premiums than it was three years ago, 
largely because the fraudulent claims by 
the one driver were erased from its record. 
As Jans can testify, a single incident of 
workers' comp fraud can have serious fi-
nancial consequences for a small busi-
ness. But his story also demonstrates that 
employers, insurance companies, and 
prosecutors—armed with stronger laws, 
new resources, and a tougher attitude— 
are fighting back successfully. 
The crackdown on fraud is a major rea-
son why workers' comp costs have been 
falling in recent years. (For details, see "A 
Crisis Past," Page 16.) The decline is es-
pecially remarkable because fraud in the 
workers' comp system is a huge and tan-
gled problem that involves not only work-
ers and employers but also doctors, 
lawyers, and others. 
"There's no question that we've become 
more aggressive" at combating all types 
of workers' comp fraud, says Robert 
Injuries Covered 
In Paid Claims 
Under Workers' 
Compensation, 1996 
M i Location Of Pain 
CShaughnessy, a senior fraud investiga-
tor for The Hartford Insurance Group in 
Hartford, Conn., referring to both his com-
pany and the industry as a whole. "If s cer-
tainly more difficult to get away with 
fraud than it used to be." 
Hie Ihie Costs Of Fraud 
Although insurance fraud is sometimes 
called a "victimless" crime, it hurts a lot of 
people in many different ways. Honest 
workers with legitimate injuries often feel 
they are under suspicion by co-workers or 
managers just for using the workers' comp 
system as it was intended. 
Fraud is also expensive. It raises busi-
nesses' insurance premiums, can reduce 
productivity, and can even threaten a 
company's survival. Other employees may 
be forced to pick up the slack of a malin-
gering co-worker, jobs may have to go un-
filled; pay raises or profit-sharing gains 
may suffer as revenue is lost. Insurers and 
law-enforcement agencies spend large 
sums to detect and fight fraud. 
Ultimately, the costs of workers' comp 
fraud are passed on through increases in 
insurance premiums paid by the compa-
nies that must buy the coverage. The re-
sult is a huge—if not readily apparent— 
economic burden on employers. 
For the insurance industry, the cost of 
Nature Of Injuries 
51% Sprain Or — Strain. 
Fracture Or « « n / 





Bruise Or 4 1 1 0 / 
Concussion-. I U / 0 
.Cut Or Puncture Q % 
Occupational 
Disease Or Q 0 Z 
Cumulative Injuries ' 
Burns...2% 
; Carpal-Tunnel A Q / 
' -— Syndrome £• / 0 
-Other.. 6% 
SOURCE: NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
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fraud in workers' comp claims is about $5 
billion a year, according to estimates by the 
National Insurance Crime Bureau (MCB) 
in Palos Hills, EL, an industry-financed 
anti-fraud organization, and by the Insur-
ance Information Institute in New York 
City, a communications organization 
sponsored by the property and ca-
sualty insurance industry. 
In fact, workers' comp in re-
cent years has been the largest 
source of fraud within the prop-
erty/casualty insurance sector, 
accounting for more than one-
third of property/casualty fraud 
losses, according to a 1996 analysis by 
Conning Insurance Research and Publica-
tions in Hartford. (Workers' comp is classi-
fied as property/casualty insurance—not 
health insurance—because it provides com-
mercial liability coverage.) 
"Fraudulent claims in workers' compen-
sation easily outstrip those in other lines of 
[the property/casualty] business," says the 
Conning report. (See the chart on Page 14.) 
The FBI estimates there is fraud in 10 
percent of all insurance claims; the Conning 
study concludes that the fraud level in 
workers' comp claims is nearly 25 percent. 
Why is workers' comp fraud so pervasive? 
The short answer is because it's easy to 
commit and hard to detect 
Workers' comp is a unique and complex 
system that can vary significantly from 
state to state. There's no centralized report-
ing or collection of data, so it's impossible to 
monitor the U.S. system as a whole, let 
alone the individuals who may swindle it 
Also, only 32 of the 50 states have 
laws that define insurance fraud as 
a felony. That leaves more than 
one-third of the states without 
workers' comp fraud laws or 
with statutes that are either in-
adequate or ineffective for pros-
ecuting workers' comp fraud, 
according to the Insurance Infor-
mation Institute. 
"I thought welfare was easy to rip 
off, but nothing is as easy as workers' comp," 
says Ranney Pageler, Fremont Compensa-
tion's vice president of fraud investigations, 
who helped put Cook-DuPage Transporta-
tion's problem driver behind bars. *lt's a 
complicated system." 
How Workers'Comp Woite 
Workers' compensation is a state-man-
dated, no-fault insurance system financed 
almost exclusively by employers. It pays 
medical expenses and a portion of lost 
wages to workers who suffer job-related in-
juries or illnesses. 
Workers incur no out-of-pocket expenses, 
and benefits are not taxed. By providing 
workers' comp coverage to their employees, 
employers are shielded by law from having 
to defend themselves against liability law-
suits filed by workers injured on the job. 
Workers' comp, established in 1908, was 
the first form of social insurance in the 
United States. Today, every state has its 
own program; the federal government cov-
ers most of its workers under the Federal 
Employees' Compensation Program. The 
states receive no federal funding. 
Generally, the states require employers to 
buy workers' comp insurance or prove they 
can afford to pay workers' claims out of 
company funds-—known as self-insuring. 
Businesses typically buy workers' comp 
coverage from private insurers. In six "mo-
nopoly" states, however, employers are re-
quired to buy policies from die state's own 
insurance plan. Thirteen states have both 
state-run and private insurance plans. 
The premium a company pays for its 
workers' comp policy is determined by three 
major factors: job classifications, which rate 
the risk of a specific job; the number of em-
ployees; and the firm's accident record. 
Companies with high-risk jobs or fre-
quent accidents pay more for workers' comp 
coverage than firms with low-risk jobs or 
good safety records. (See "Costly Numbers 
In Workers' Comp," September 1997.) 
Part of what makes workers' comp 
unique also makes it easy to scam. In al-
most all states, the workers' comp system 
A Crisis Past 
In the 1980s, the workers' compensation system in the 
United States was drowning in red ink and on the 
edge of financial collapse. 
But costs started coming down in the early 1990s, 
and in 1994—after 14 consecutive years of losses— 
workers' comp insurers returned to profitability 
In the past few years, analysts say, 
workers' comp has become the most-im-
proved sector in the insurance industry. 
In a report issued late last year, the 
National Council on Compensation In-
surance, the industry's clearinghouse 
in Boca Raton, Fla., stated, "For the 
first time since the early 1980s, the 
U.S. workers' compensation system is 
now financially stable and continues 
to improve." 
The most dramatic evidence of the 
turnaround is that states and insurers 
in the past three or four years have been 
lowering their workers' comp premiums. 
As a result, employers' costs for workers' 
comp insurance as a percentage of pay-
roll have declined nearly 16 percent 
since 1993. 
Observers—while warning that seri- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
ous problems remain in the system—cite SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOTSTATISTICT 
several factors that contributed to the turnaround. 
Among them: 
Stronger state laws. Under pressure from the 
insurance industry and the business community 
over the past decade, 32 states have enacted 
laws that classify insurance fraud as a felony, 
according to the Insurance Information Insti-
tute, an industry group in New York City. 
Yet 16 states do not define insurance 
fraud as a crime, and at least two oth-
ers have statutes that are too vague to 
be effective, according to the institute. 
Stronger enforcement. At the start 
of this year, 33 states had special anti-
fraud bureaus or units, and three more 
states had new legislation to establish 
such units. 
At least 20 states require insurers to 
forward all suspicious claims to their 
state's fraud bureau. 
In addition, many states require in-
surance companies to have their own 
anti-fraud departments in order to be li-
censed to operate. 
Prosecutions for insurance fraud have 
increased, and the number of insurance 
companies' special investigation units 
has grown. 
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stands apart from the civil- and criminal-
justice systems, with its own rules, judicial 
proceedings, and regulatory process. And in 
most states, workers' comp is administered 
by multiple agencies, which may not com-
municate effectively with one another. 
Moreover, as many employers have 
painfully discovered, workers' comp sys-
tems generally give the claimant the bene-
fit of the doubt. This presumption, reflect-
ing the no-fault nature of workers' comp, 
makes it easy for workers to commit fraud. 
Insurance-industry observers say this 
worker-friendly bias helps explain the pop-
ularity of "soft-tissue" claims, such as back 
pain, muscle strain, or sprains that are vir-
tually impossible for a doctor to detect or 
disprove. (See the chart on Page 15.) 
An employer who tries to fight a workers' 
comp claim must abide by the system's 
unique procedures. Ignorance of workers' 
comp can lead to costly mistakes for any 
business owner who tries to take on the sys-
tem. (See "Cooking Up A Workers' Comp 
Disaster," Page 18.) 
There are various types of fraud for which employers bear the ultimate cost. Two in particular hurt business owners directly: claimant fraud and in-
surer fraud. Two others—premium fraud 
and provider fraud—may be less apparent 
but are costly nonetheless. 
Claimant Fraud 
When a worker fabricates or exaggerates an 
injury claim to get paid time off, it's 
claimant fraud. Although back injuries and 
pulled muscles are popular excuses, some 
workers concoct more-imaginative, even 
bizarre plots. 
A notorious case of claimant fraud oc-
curred in 1994 in Rockford, 111., when a 
24-year-old college student staged a rob-
bery at a Kinko's store, where he worked 
the late-night shift alone. After violently 
ransacking the store, he had an accom-
plice shoot him through the shoulder to 
embellish the hoax. His story later un-
raveled when a perpetrator tipped off 
authorities. 
"His intent was to claim a big workers' 
comp settlement that would pay for col-
lege," says Samantha VanDenburg, the spe-
cial agent with the NICB who helped pros-
ecute the case. "He filed with the [workers' 
comp] industrial commission immediately, 
at first for $50,000. He was mostly daiming 
pain and suffering." 
The student eventually was convicted on 
theft charges, and his workers'comp claim 
was dropped. 
A less dramatic case of claimant fraud oc-
curred in 1995 at Barr-Miles Trucking Co., 
a Chicago firm with 50 employees. Co-
owner Larry Barr says an employee tried to 
cover up a missed day at work by using 
forged physician reports to make a false 
claim that he had been hurt on the job. 
Simply by following reporting procedures 
and demanding medical documentation, 
Barr helped insurance investigators expose 
the fraud. The worker was fired and 
pleaded guilty to forgery charges. 
A more difficult workers' comp issue for 
Barr and other business owners is malin-
gering, a practice in which a worker who 
may have sustained a legitimate injury 
stretches out the recovery time to extend or 
enlarge disability payments. 
Malingering is a widespread problem in 
workers' comp. If s often hard to prove, and 
sometimes employers simply try to negoti-
ate a financial settlement to close the case 
and get the absent worker off the payroll. 
"The treachery is that you get a lot of 
[workers' comp] cases that aren't outright 
fraud but are deceitful and get turned into 
something bigger. If s tough to say the guy 
isnt hurt," says Barr. 
Insurer Fraud 
A type of workers' comp fraud that targets 
small firms in particular involves the scam 
artist who peddles cut-rate but nonexistent 
workers' comp policies and later absconds 
with the premiums. 
The business owner gets a bogus certifi-
cate of insurance to file with the state but is 
left with no coverage once a claim is actually 
Insurers' 
Fraud Patrol 
Membership growth of the 
International Association of 
Special Investigation Units, a 
major organization of insurance-
fraud investigators. 
A safer workplace. 
The exploding costs of 
workers' comp insurance 
in the 1980s forced busi-
nesses to improve safety. 
As a result, workplace fa-
talities, injuries, and ill-
nesses have declined 
sharply. 
The average number of 
workdays lost to job-re-
lated injuries declined by 
almost 13 percent in the 
four years through 1996— 
the latest year for which 
figures are available—ac-
cording to the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
Managed care. Workers' 
comp has shared in the cost 
reductions attributed to the 
continuing shift to man-
aged health care in recent 
years. 
A similar development 
specific to workers' comp 
has been employers' and 
medical providers' aggressive use of case management, in 
which individual claims are monitored closely and efforts are 
98f9r9If93f94f95v9i97 
SOURCE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNITS 
made to accelerate an injured worker's return to work and pre-
vent disputes. 
Insurance analysts warn, 
however, that the big savings 
from managed care are over 
and that workers' comp costs 
are likely to track the current 





sive advertising and educa-
tion campaigns by the insur-
ance industry have raised 
public awareness about the 
impact of fraud: Eighty-
eight percent of Americans 
now recognize insurance 
fraud as a major problem 
that increases their premi-
ums, according to a 1996 
Gallup Poll. 
Nonetheless, fraud is still 
tolerated by many. More than 
one in three Americans believe 
it is acceptable to overstate 
their insurance claims, accord-
ing to a survey released in 
January by the Insurance Re-
search Council of Wheaton, HI. 
Employers'Cost 
For Workers' Comp 
Coverage, Per $100 Of Payroll 
$2.5 
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filed. Such outfits typically vanish when 
their obligations come due. 
One example of such insurer fraud came 
to light in 1995, when the California De-
partment of Insurance took action against a 
company accused of selling fraudulent 
workers' comp policies to more than 290 em-
ployers. Within two days, the agency's 
owner had reopened under a different 
name. He later fled to Texas. Eventually he 
was caught and convicted of a litany of fed-
eral crimes, according to the Coalition 
Against Insurance Fraud (CAIF), an insur-
ance-industry group in Washington, D.C. 
Premium Fraud 
Businesses not only are victims of workers' 
comp fraud. Sometimes they commit it. 
In premium fraud, dishonest business 
owners cheat their insurers to save on pre-
miums. They deliberately misclassify their 
companies'jobs to hide the true risk of the 
work, or they conceal the number of em-
ployees on their payroll, or they change the 
names of their companies to hide a poor ac-
cident record. 
While virtually any type of business can 
commit premium fraud, investigators say 
this problem is most pervasive in construc-
tion, trucking, and employee leasing, where 
firms act as independent suppliers of labor 
to a wide variety of businesses. Such com-
panies may be tempted to try to save money 
by lying to their insurers, investigators say, 
because of the high premiums involved, the 
transient or multistate nature of the jobs, 
and the lack of strong regulatory oversight. 
The largest case of premium fraud in 
Maryland involved the owner of an em-
ployee-leasing firm who was convicted of 
cheating the state's workers' comp fund out 
of $3.6 million by underreporting payroll 
and thus underpaying premiums, according 
to the CAIF; the firm supplied workers to 
roofing and trucking companies. 
In some instances, workers' comp under-
writers lose as much from premium fraud 
committed by employers as they do from 
claimant fraud committed by workers. 
Provider Fraud 
As the term implies, provider fraud is com-
mitted by health-care or legal profession-
als who provide services to injured work-
&&u&4 %* ^ 
Cooking Up A Workers' Comp Disaster 
When disputing workers' compensation claims, some employers 
seem to have a sure-fire recipe for disaster. Take it from labor 
lawyer Jane Eden, a partner with Eden, Tolins & RafFerty in 
Worcester, Mass. She represents injured employees in workers' 
comp disputes, and she says a lot of employers cook their own 
goose before legal proceedings ever begin. 
Eden estimates that in her 14 years of practice, she 
has forced more than 2,000 companies and their insur-
ers to pay contested workers' comp claims. Many em-
ployers defeat themselves, she says, through simple 
carelessness or ignorance about workers' comp. 
Under the state-run workers' comp system, workers 
are entitled by law to medical and disability payments 
for work-related injuries. Employers contesting a claim 
as not legitimate or as unrelated to work wind up—in 
most states—before an administrative-law judge who 
arbitrates workers' comp disputes. 
Each side must cover its own legal bills in these pro-
ceedings, although the labor lawyer's payment usually 
comes out of the workers' comp award. 
If you want to lose a workers' comp dispute, says 
Eden, just make these mistakes: 
Force an injured employee to continue working 
despite the injury. Eden says that as soon as the em-
ployee's complaint is disregarded, "it's over. You'll get a 
claim. And youll lose." 
She adds: "What you don't want to do is send the 
message, *We don't care about you, and we won't help 
you.'All too often, that message is sent on the first day 
of injury." 
Neglect the basics for warding off disputes. Eden says 
employers should report all accidents. Get employees involved in 
safety issues, she says. Have a safety plan in place, and be pre-
pared if there's an accident. 
If a worker perceives that the employer doesn't care about the 
PHOTO cRiCK FRIEDMAN—BLACK STAR 
Many employers defeat themselves in workers' compensation disputes 
through carelessness or ignorance, says lawyer Jane Eden 
Don't give employees any information about workers' 
comp. Even worse, Eden says, is lying about their benefits. 
With rare exceptions, employees have a legal right to workers' 
comp coverage, so don't try to hide it from them, she warns. 
Harass the person about returning to work. Eden says 
that while employers have the right to monitor an injured 
worker's medical care, the "fit-for-work" decision is up to a doctor, 
not a manager. Most states prohibit employers from pressuring an 
injured employee to return to work. 
injury or is trying to cheat the employee, she adds, the worker 
has "nowhere else to go but to a lawyer." Most of her clients call 
"because they're hurt, they're petrified that no one will help 
them, and they're terrified they will lose their jobs." 
Eden readily acknowledges that there is fraud in the work-
ers' comp system but insists that "the vast majority" of work-
ers' injury claims are legitimate. 
"Remember, these employees are human beings," she says. 
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ers. Like employer fraud, it is expensive 
and hard to detect. 
Because the health-care system is so big, 
the opportunities for deceptive billing are 
also vast, which makes this the largest 
source of workers' comp fraud in some 
states. 
Before California enacted comprehensive 
workers' comp reform legislation in 1994, 
hundreds of medical "comp mills" churned 
out millions of dollars' worth of fraudulent 
or padded workers' comp bills yearly. 
One of the largest such cases drained at 
least $30 million a year from the state 
workers' comp system, according to the 
CAIF. It involved a doctor and 
several lawyers in Los Ange-
les who were accused of sub-
mitting fraudulent bills for 
medical treatments. They al-
legedly persuaded clients of 
state unemployment agen-
cies to visit law offices and 
medical clinics run by the ac-
cused perpetrators, who then 
billed almost every workers' 
comp carrier in the state. 
In some cases, fraudulent 
"providers" don't even bother 
to recruit injured workers; 
they simply obtain or fabri-
cate workers' names or Social 
Security numbers and bom-
bard workers' comp insur-
ance companies with bills. 
Thus, it's crucial for insur-
ance firms to have claims au-
ditors who can detect and 
refuse payment of fraudulent 
workers' comp bills. 
Provider fraud can be spot-
ted easily by some small 
firms. Wayne Ruggiere, a 
partner in the Ohlert-Rug-
giere Insurance Agency in 
Queens, N.Y., teDs about "the 
case of the missing finger," in-
volving one of his clients. 
An employee cut himself, 
went to a doctor for treat-
ment, and returned to work the same day 
with a few stitches. But the doctor's bill 
later diagnosed the injury as a partial am-
putation, declared the worker to be dis-
abled, and charged almost $900 for "recon-
struction" of the fingertip. "It was [a 
health-care provider] who misrepresented 
the injury," Ruggiere says. "It's a perfect ex-
ample of misuse of the system." 
I n light of the huge losses and the com-plexity of workers' comp fraud, insurers have attacked it on several fronts. Among other things, they have been 
pushing hard to change state laws and pub-
lic attitudes to make it easier to fight fraud. 
This is the goal of the CAIF. 
And to improve coordination of 
the industry's legal efforts 
against fraud, most insurance 
companies support the NICB. 
It maintains a database of 
more than 350 million records 
of suspicious property/casualty 
claims, and it helps local prosecu-
tors with criminal-fraud cases. 
Insurance companies also have been cre-
ating special investigation units (SIUs) to 
pursue such fraud. A1996 survey by Con-
ning Insurance Research found that 75 
percent of the top 250 property/casualty in-
surers in the United States had estab-
fraud are clearly increasing, in-
surers are less interested in 
criminal prosecution than in 
saving money. In most in-
stances, insurers will declare 
victory if they simply get a claim 
dismissed or dropped. 
"Our main goal is to not pay 
fraud. If a prosecution happens, 
that's a bonus," says Jay S. Williams, vice 
president of corporate claims for CNA In-
surance in Chicago and a former police 
detective. "Our main goal is to get the 
claimant off the [workers' comp disabil-
ity] dole and back to work." 
R : 
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High-tech cameras are among the weapons used by insurance-fraud 
detectives stick as Brian McCauley, but the techniques they employ 
can be decidedly mundane. 
lished in-house SIUs to fight fraud. 
One measure of that investment is the 
850 percent membership growth since 1990 
of the International Association of Special 
Investigation Units. Based in Baltimore, it 
is the major professional group for insur-
ance-fraud cops. (See the chart on Page 17.) 
"Prior to the formation of SIUs, there was 
no mechanism for insurance companies to 
combat insurance fraud," says John 
McHale, the association's president. "A lot 
of companies just paid it and passed it on 
to their customers." 
By industry estimates, each dollar 
spent on SIUs returns $7 to $10 in sav-
ings through deterrence or restitution. 
Although arrests for workers' comp 
I egardless of the type of 
' fraud being investi-
I gated, the most impor-
[ tant factor is documen-
tation. Investigators say that 
without a paper trail, which 
starts with the employer, they 
quickly reach a dead end. 
For employers, that means 
paying extremely careful at-
tention to the "first report of 
injury," the form they are re-
quired by state law to file with 
their insurers when a work-
related accident occurs. These 
reports establish the facts of 
an accident and can become 
the basis for prosecution if the 
employee's story changes. 
How do insurance sleuths 
discover and prove fraud? It 
depends on the kind of fraud. 
Uncovering Claimant Fraud 
A fabricated claim is fre-
quently the easiest type of 
workers' comp fraud to prove 
because it involves a pur-
ported injury that restricts an 
employee's physical abilities. 
If fraud is suspected, as in 
the case of the Cook-DuPage 
driver, the proof often winds 
up on film or videotape show-
ing the "injured" worker openly engaging 
in activities that vividly disprove the 
claim. Says James Feckey, director of the 
Minnesota Labor Department's Investiga-
tive Services Unit: "If a picture is worth a 
thousand words, video is worth a million." 
Workers' comp fraud has been a gold 
mine for private detectives who are hired 
by insurance companies to secretly track 
and record suspects. Their primary tools 
are digital video minicameras and 35-mm 
still cameras fitted with high-powered 
lenses, used from inside nondescript vans 
or cars. Such cameras can capture detailed 
images from a block or more away. 
Brian McCauley, owner of Power Investi-
gations in Queens, N.Y., says some tech-
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niques for combating fraud are not elabo-
rate. He cites a case of a restaurant waiter 
who fell at work and filed a suspicious $1 
million claim for a permanent back injury, 
saying he couldn't bend over. 
"After [the suspect] left home one day, I 
put an empty bottle in his driveway and 
threw some change on the ground," Mc-
Cauley recalls. "He came back, got out of his 
car without his cane, and we videotaped 
him bending down four or five times to pick 
up the things. He could bend forward, and 
we proved it." The claim was rejected. 
Although video surveillance can raise 
privacy concerns and is not always suc-
cessful, it is a powerful anti-fraud weapon 
when combined with proper documenta-
tion, specialists say. 
"Virtually no fraud prosecution is suc-
cessful unless you have surveillance," says 
Eugene Mattioni, a lawyer in Philadelphia 
who specializes in workers' comp cases. "If 
you're going to [prosecute], you have to go 
for the jugular.'' 
Premium And Provider Fraud 
Fraud involving employers or health-care 
providers is usually harder to prove because 
such paper crimes cannot be videotaped: 
Jobs are misclassified, workers are not re-
ported, medical bills and treatment records 
are falsified. 
Insurers typically uncover such fraud 
by using specialized computer-software 
programs that detect suspicious charac-
teristics in an insurance application 
from an employer or a medical bill from 
a provider. Such techniques require 
highly trained auditors and claims ad-
justers and sophisticated computers. A 
red flag, insurers say, is the absence of 
documentation by a company. 
When investigators suspect a business 
owner is hiding the true nature of the firm's 
jobs or the size of its work force on an in-
surance application, they turn to other use-
ful sources of information: phone books, 
business directories, credit bureaus, news-
What You Can Do 
Business owners can protect themselves against workers' compen-
sation fraud by taking preventive measures, recognizing suspi-
cious cases, and helping insurers combat it, industry specialists 
say. Here are tips from various sources, including Ranney 
Pageler, head of fraud investigations for the Fremont Compensa-
tion Insurance Group in Glendale, Calif., and from the National 
Insurance Crime Bureau, an industry-financed 
anti-fraud organization based in Palos Hills, DL 
Preventing Fraud 
• Maintain a safe workplace. Eliminate "acci-
dents waiting to happen." Enlist workers and 
your insurance agent to establish and improve 
safety procedures. 
• Screen job applicants, verify their state-
ments on job applications, and check references. 
A person who lies on paper may lie on the job. 
• Give all new hires a written statement of 
your company's workers' comp policies and a 
separate statement about safety. Inform work-
ers directly and indirectly that the cost of in-
juries affects the company's ability to compete. 
Display posters on fraud awareness. 
• Be wary of unknown or cut-rate insurers if 
you're switching to a new carrier. A workers' 
comp polipy that sounds too good to be true 
probably is, especially if it is offered by an unfa-
miliar underwriter. Ask for references and 
check with the state insurance department. 
• Be honest with your insurance agent. 
Premium fraud by dishonest employers is as 
much an issue as claimant fraud by dishon-
est workers, some experts say. Don't be part of the problem. 
Recognizing Fraud 
While the following factors do not prove a case of claimant 
fraud, experts say, the presence of two or more indicates that 
fraud may be present: 
• The accident occurs late Friday afternoon and isn't reported 
until Monday morning, or it occurs early Monday morning. 
• No one saw the injury occur, the employee's own descrip-
tion does not logically support the cause of the injury, or the 
accident occurred in an area outside the employee's regular 
work area. 
PHOTO SSAHT BARTHOLOMEW 
Computer data can help uncover 
ivorkers'compfratid, says Ran-
ney Pageler of Fremont Com-
pensation Insurance Givup. 
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• The reported accident occurred just before or after a strike, 
job termination, or layoff, or at the end of seasonal work. 
• The claimant's description of the accident conflicts with the 
facts in the initial report—the form describing the occurrence 
that employers are required to file with their insurers. 
• The employee delays reporting the claim without a reason-
able explanation. 
• The employee has a history of numerous suspicious or liti-
gated workers' comp claims. 
• The diagnosis is inconsistent with treat-
ment, or the injured worker takes more time off 
than the injury seems to warrant. 
• The claimant refuses a diagnostic proce-
dure to confirm the nature of an injury. 
• The claimant is hard to reach at home while 
allegedly disabled or has a history of frequently 
changing addresses, jobs, or physicians. 
Fighting Fraud 
Because claimant fraud is an insurance 
crime, prosecuting it is the job of the insurance 
company or law-enforcement authorities. But 
there are ways you can help your underwriter 
build an airtight case: 
Document everything. Have your employ-
ees sign a workers' comp statement acknowl-
edging that false injury or disability claims are 
a crime. (This can help rebut any contention 
that there was no "intent" to defraud.) 
When an injury occurs, employers are re-
quired to give their insurers a detailed report, 
generally within 24 hours. Doing so is critical: 
Basic facts, detailed descriptions, witness state-
ments, and sketches or photos of accident areas 
are powerful tools against workers' comp fraud, especially if the 
claimant later changes his or her story. 
Keep your eyes and ears open. Carefully review the facts on 
claim applications. Review other accident records for similar in-
juries. Listen to your workers; they are more likely than employ-
ers to hear if a co-worker is malingering or lying about a disability. 
Communicate regularly with injured workers, physicians, 
and your insurer's claims representative. If fraud is involved, close 
cooperation between employer and insurer is the only way to 
build strong evidence. 
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paper or company advertisements, licens-
ing and regulatory agencies, corporate 
directories, and, increasingly, online data-
bases and the Internet. 
Tbm Corcoran, an investigator with the 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of Elgin, 111., 
says one business owner failed to disclose 
important information on the insurance ap-
plication but disclosed it on the company's 
World Wide Web site. 
Efforts For The Future 
For the growing army of insurance auditors 
and examiners, progress against workers' 
comp fraud will depend on several develop-
ments now under way. 
Foremost is the nation's continuing shift 
away from traditional fee-for-service health 
insurance to managed-care plans, which 
have reduced medical costs by controlling 
providers' rates and patient access to med-
ical resources. For those reasons, managed 
care is becoming increasingly popular as 
the medical-treatment option offered by 
workers' comp insurance policies. 
But health-care swindles account for the 
largest source of economic fraud in the 
United States, authorities say, and the shift 
to managed care is bringing with it new and 
complex types of billing fraud aimed at in-
surance companies. 
In recognition of that problem, Congress 
provided the FBI with more than $500 mil-
lion in the 1996 Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act to finance a new 
assault on health-care fraud. The statute 
created a "federal health-care offense" that 
gives prosecutors new legal powers to deal 
with the problem. 
The FBI is transferring or hiring nearly 
500 agents to work for a newly created 
Health Care Fraud Unit to focus exclusively 
on that sector, the bureau says. 
The new FBI presence is likely to help un-
mask and shut down health-insurance 
scams faster. It will also make insurance 
fraud in general a far bigger issue with the 
public and prosecutors, according to insur-
ance-industry investigators. 
Another important development sched-
uled to occur this year is the creation of a 
nationwide, centralized computer database 
of all workers' comp insurance claims. The 
aim is to allow companies to identify past 
perpetrators of fraud quickly and to check 
for warning signs such^as aliases or multi-
ple Social Security numbers. This planned 
"all-claims" database arose from the 1997 
merger of two insurance-claims groups and 
the participation of the NICB. 
A growing concern among fraud inves-
tigators, however, is President Clinton's 
proposed health-care "bill of rights," 
which includes a broad right to privacy 
regarding medical reports. Insurers are 
worried that any legislation in Congress 
to revise managed care may create pri-
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Characteristics Of injured Workers 
1 Age^ - 37 
1 Weekly Wage $382 
1 Gender 67% Male 
1 Married 70% 
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vacy laws so restrictive that insurers 
would be prevented not only from using 
an all-claims database but also from 
sharing information they currently ex-
change. 
And finally, as states have clamped 
down on workers' comp fraud with 
tougher laws and as benefit payments 
have dropped, organized labor has been 
fighting back out of concern that such 
! efforts will discourage or deny legiti-
1
 mate workers' comp claims. | Last year, a coalition composed of the 
1
 AFL-CIO and trial attorneys persuaded 
I Ohio voters in a statewide referendum 
I to overturn a new law approved by the 
J General Assembly to overhaul the 
j state's workers' comp system. Organiz-
i ers of the successful $3 million labor 
j campaign called themselves the Com-
i mittee to Stop Corporate Attacks on In-
! jured Workers. 
G iven human nature and the complex-ity of the system, investigators ac-knowledge that fraud in workers' comp probably will never be elimi-| nated. But they say it can be controlled. 
I "You'll never be able to fight fraud only 
through criminal prosecution," says Sally 
Narey general counsel of the National 
Council on Compensation Insurance in 
Boca Raton, Fla., the insurance industry's 
centralized rating bureau. "You have to 
make people realize it's wrong and won't be 
tolerated." 
Insurance investigators say employers 
can make a big difference by being alert 
k^SSi 
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for signs of fraud, informing employees 
about how fraud affects them, and thor-
oughly documenting every workplace in-
jury or accident. (See "What You Can Do," 
Page 21.) 
If you suspect a case of claims fraud, in-
dustry specialists say, call your insurance 
company and let its experts handle it. Tell 
your insurer "what your leads are," says 
Pageler of Fremont Compensation. 
Pageler also says employers should not 
wait for a problem to occur before establish-
ing an employee-education effort and that 
they should remind workers repeatedly 
how they can be hurt by workers' comp 
fraud. "If the employer can educate his 
work force, his work force will protect him, 
because fraud has such an impact on pay-
roll and it can cost jobs," Pageler says. 
Jans of Cook-DuPage Transportation, 
who worked with Fremont to resolve the 
company's claimant-fraud problem, agrees. 
Employers who believe they have a fraud 
situation, he says, should call their workers' 
comp carrier and be persistent until the car-
rier takes action. 
Jans tells other employers that fighting 
fraud will pay off, although it isn't easy. "It'll 
take a little time, but it will benefit you," he 
says. "If the business owner isn't looking to 
improve the situation, nobody will." NB 
7b express your views on workers' comp 
fraud, see Where I Stand, Page 71. 
7b order a reprint of 
this story, see Page 58. 
For a fax copy, see Page 7. 
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Fraud Division 
The Insurance Fraud Act of 1994 gave rise 
to the Insurance Fraud Division, This Division 
is charged with the responsibility of conduct-
ing criminal investigations and prosecutions of 
insurance fraud violators. These violators 
include individuals who defraud insurance 
companies as well as dishonest insurance 
representatives who steal from or otherwise 
defraud the consumer. 
The division provides a focal point for 
the anti-fraud efforts of insurance company 
investigators, other law enforcement agencies 
and the public in order to achieve a cooperative 
and coordinated investigative and prosecution 
approach to insurance fraud. The Fraud 
Division has established an excellent relation-
ship with the Attorney Generals' Office and 
has an Assistant Attorney General assigned to 
its staff on a full-time basis to prosecute 
insurance fraud. 
The Division is increasing public aware-
ness about insurance fraud and is actively 
soliciting the cooperation of the public. The 
Insurance Fraud Division receives approxi-
mately 15 calls per week from the public 
reporting suspected insurance fraud, and when 
possible, these complaints are investigated 
with the victim insurance company. 
The Fraud Division is recognized as an 
official law enforcement agency in the State of 
Utah and investigators for the Division are 
special function law enforcement officers each 
having Police Officers Standards and Training 
(POST) Certification. 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR 1995 
During its nine months of operation in 1995, the 
Fraud Division had opened 110 cases. Prosecu-
tion was initiated in 41 of these cases with the 
filing of 69 felony counts and 14 misdemeanor 
counts. As of December 31,1995, sentences had 
been handed down in 18 of those cases. Recog-
nizing that the Division was fully staffed only 
since March 1,1995, these statistics are impres-
sive and provide strong evidence of the Divi-
sions initial impact on insurance fraud. 
The Division works a wide variety of insurance 
fraud investigations. The following chart re-
flects the different types of cases investigated by 
the Division: 
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WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INS CO 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS CO OF PITTS 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY CO 
LIBERTY INS CORP 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INS CO 
ZURICH INS CO US BRANCH 
MID-CENTURY INS CO 
TIG PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY 
EMPLOYERS INS OF WAUSAU A MUTUAL CO 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY CO OF THE NW 
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY CO 
AMERICAN NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE CO 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO OF IL 
AMERICAN MOTORISTS WS CO 
CENTURY INDEMNITY CO 
EAGLE PACIFIC INS CO 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY 
CIGNA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS CO 
TOTAL FOR TOP 20 RANKED INSURERS 
TOTAL FOR ALL 201 INSURERS WRITING THIS LINE 
Percent 
of Market 
53.81% 
6.02% 
4.06% 
3.32% 
2.83% 
2.60% 
1.74% 
1.65% 
1.54% 
1.32% 
1.14% 
0.96% 
0.86% 
0.82% 
0.71% 
0.70% 
0.68% 
0.59% 
0.58% 
0.56% 
86.49% 
100.00% 
Direct 
Premiums 
Written 
$146,059,264 
$16,337,669 
$11,032,629 
$9,003,640 
$7,680,110 
$7,059,633 
$4,730,319 
$4,480,722 
$4,180,419 
$3,576,255 
$3,100,760 
$2,601,858 
$2,346,252 
$2,216,105 
$1,933,927 
$1,890,848 
$1,859,299 
$1,602,289 
$1,570,188 
$1,509,836 
$234,772,022 
$271,435342 
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